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Abstract 
 
In recent decades, the state restructuring of trade liberalisation and decentralisation has 
emerged globally as attempts to promote more equal economic growth. This state-
restructuring also occurs in Indonesia following the Asia financial crisis in 1997.  
As a case study, Indonesia provides two important insights on the study of state-
restructuring on regional convergence. First, Indonesia is a member of the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) that its institutional arrangements emphasis on member countries 
freedom to determine their own trade liberalisation sectors and schedules. Second, 
Indonesia decentralisation is a rapid and significant shift of politico-economy and 
social. Second, there is a rapid and significant shift of politico-economy and social 
institutional arrangements from centralised to decentralisation regime. These external 
and internal state-restructuring are expected influence the variety of regional economic 
development and convergence.  
This study aims to analyse the impact of state restructuring on disparities at the 
district level for the period from 1993 to 2005. The study divides the period under 
observation into three sub periods, the pre-decentralisation, the decentralisation and the 
whole period. This research aims to achieve this objective with three empirical studies 
as follows, first, using economic indices, the thesis examine inequality level of district 
economic growth and industry concentration. Second, econometrics analysis explores 
the impact of trade openness and decentralisation on regional economic growth. Finally, 
this thesis adopts comparative political analysis by using the historical institutionalism 
approach to understand the variation of state restructuring impact.  
The main findings show that despite evidence of regional convergence, disparities 
are persistent and severe in the post state restructuring period. The quantitative analysis 
shows that AFTA has insignificant impact and decentralisation significantly contract 
regional economic growth. While qualitative case studies in the Batam and Bandung 
cities found that institutional history and path development strongly influence 
development progress and discourses. Politico-economy shocks only act as critical 
juncture that provides opportunity for the state and regions to create new development 
path. However, path dependence of institutional changes and economic development is 
bounded by the regions’ past institutional arrangements and knowledge. For Indonesia, 
a country with long history of authoritarian regime, the role of nation-state remains 
important to promote balance local development. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
This research focuses on economic disparities across Indonesia’s regions. Indonesia 
consists of thousands of islands and it is the largest and most populated country in the 
Southeast Asian region. This thesis studies the impact of two state-restructuring events 
on Indonesian development: the entry into the ASEAN free trade agreement (AFTA) in 
1992 and decentralisation in 1999. Following the financial crisis in 1997, Indonesia’s 
political arrangement shifted from a centralised regime to a decentralised government 
system. The new system emphasised local democracy and autonomous regions at both 
provincial and district levels. The splitting increased the size of administration in 
Indonesia from 26 provinces with 292 districts in 1997 to 33 provinces with more than 
500 districts. 
This thesis studies the determinants of Indonesia’s growth divergence from the 
centralised regime to the state-restructuring period. The growth theory and historical 
institutionalism framework guide the empirical analysis on the impact of state 
restructuring on divergence. Currently, the emergence of ‘new regionalism’ follows a 
functional demand mainly for economic reasons (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004). 
While trade openness and liberalisation enhance opportunities to gain benefits from the 
globalise environment, decentralisation is regarded as a means to achieve development 
efficiency; a greater degree of autonomy strengthens local economic growth. The 
combination of these state-restructuring processes determines economic growth. 
However, the differences of local governments’ capacities to exploit opportunities from 
state restructuring affect growth divergence and development. 
1.2 Past studies on Regional Disparities  
The literature review chapter revisits two important debates related with this thesis, 
which are the debates on the convergence of growth and the impact of state 
restructuring. First, the convergence literature seeks to understand the different 
assumptions and ideas that laid the foundation of convergence and divergence economic 
growth theories. The debates in convergence are based on neoclassical perspectives that 
development is encouraged by open market and free trade, thus allowing the factors of 
production, such as labour and capital, to mobilize to the location where they are most 
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efficient (Williamson, 1965). More recently, the ! and B convergence analysis (Barro, 
1991, 2000) has emerged as the main econometrics modelling approach in the 
neoclassical economic convergence literature.  
The divergence views include location theories (von Thünen 1966; Weber, 1929; 
Hoover, 1948; Losch, 1954). Other divergence theories are the cumulative causation 
and growth centre theories (Myrdal, 1957; Hirschmann, 1958; Perroux, 1950). In the 
contemporary debate, divergence theories have expanded rapidly with the development 
of the New Trade Theory and New Economic Geography by Krugman (2003), dynamic 
models by Quah (1993, 1996), and Institutional Economic Geography (Scott and 
Storper, 1987; Cooke and Morgan, 1998). The literature review also revisits Marxist 
political economics that introduce the spatial fix theory (Harvey, 1982; Schoenberger, 
1991) and socio-spatial dialectic (Soja, 1980) to analyse uneven geographical 
development. Recently, the notion of innovation models emerged from the industrial 
clustering and agglomeration phenomenon. This model places emphasis on the 
institutional arrangements and actor networks including Collective Learning (Capello, 
1999), New Industrial Spaces (NIS) (Storper and Scott, 1988), Industrial Districts 
(Lagendijk, 2006), and Flexible Production System (Piore and Sabel, 1986).  
The literature review also explores the impact of state restructuring on divergence 
literature. The impact of decentralisation should improve development in the regions, 
including efficiency in allocation of resources, income distribution, and macroeconomic 
stability (Musgrave, 1959). Furthermore, considering the significant institutional change 
from centralisation to decentralisation in Indonesia, the literature review looked over the 
role of the government on the supply side (Prud’homme, 1995) and the economic 
dividend of decentralisation (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004). Trade liberalisation 
influenced trade structures from agricultural commodities to the manufacturing sector; 
they have also influenced convergence (Rodríguez-Pose, 2005). Furthermore, Sjöberg 
and Sjöholm (2004) pointed out that trade liberalisation affected growth through a 
concentration of activities. However, the rate of this effect depends on the market and 
supplier access, which differ across countries and regions. Furthermore, institutional 
arrangements of trade unions also determine trade effect on member countries through 
trade creation and trade diversion. Studies show that this economic effect is more 
significant in regions with abundant local endowment and infrastructure, especially 
regions in the borders, which attract more investments (Juan-Ramón and Rivera-Batiz 
1996; Paelinck and Polèse, 2000; Elliott and Ikemoto, 2004). 
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1.3 Hypothesis, Objectives, and Research Questions 
This study provides economic and institutional perspectives on regional disparities. The 
hypothesis is that decentralization and AFTA provides opportunity to accelerate 
economic growth through promoting property rights and lower transaction cost. 
Decentralization promotes property rights through administration, political, and fiscal 
devolution. While AFTA introduces industrial policies, market access and trade 
liberalization.  
The main objective is to understand the impact of state restructuring of 
decentralisation and AFTA on Indonesia’s regional disparities. First, the research 
examines the economic impact of trade openness and decentralisation to disparities in 
Indonesian regions in economic terms. Second, this research studies to what extent 
institutions affect regional disparities and growth divergence. These general objectives 
can be divided into three specific research questions:  
 
1) Does policy change in state restructuring affect the dynamic of regional economic 
divergence?  
2) To what extent does policy change in state restructuring determine regional 
economic growth?  
3) How do institutional changes in state restructuring explain regional economic 
divergence in Indonesia?  
 
1.4 Thesis Organisation 
This research is divided into three main parts (Fig. 1-1). The first part is the research 
design, which introduces research background and methodologies. The second part 
describes the context of the research, both the theoretical framework and the empirical 
research. The last part consists of three analytical chapters, which are interrelated and 
enfolds the research theme.  
The first chapter introduces the research and the second chapter explores the 
theoretical framework and previous studies in which this research is grounded. 
Furthermore, it discusses a wide range of classical and contemporary literature on 
regional convergence as the foundation of this thesis. For the research context, chapter 
three portrays the methodologies used in the research. Chapter four illustrates the 
empirical case study on Indonesia during the state-restructuring period, which was 
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stimulated by the supra-national agreement AFTA and shifts in domestic political 
orders with the emergence of decentralisation.  
The third part consists of three analytical chapters that are organised as follows; 
chapter five explores the dynamics of Indonesia’s regional convergence level. This 
study examines dynamic regional convergence through economic, geographical, and 
sectoral analysis. Chapter six elabourates on the effect of AFTA and decentralisation on 
regional convergence with a large set of statistical data and econometrics analysis. The 
study uses variables related to trade liberalisation and decentralisation, such as regional 
social endowments and physical infrastructure, human capital, local tax revenues, 
intergovernmental transfers, and the AFTA Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT) rate. Chapter seven studies the effect of past institutions and institutional 
changes on state-restructuring on the regional disparities. The differences in regional 
growth are explained through understanding the role of historical institutions and 
institutional change in state restructuring. The last chapter will summarise the research 
findings and explore suggestions of further related research in AFTA and 
decentralisation. 
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Chapter 2 State-restructuring and Regional Convergence: A 
Review of Theories and Debates 
 
 
2.1 The Dynamic Debates on Regional Development 
This chapter discusses the theoretical development in economics, free trade agreements, 
and devolution. In the old debate of economic development, there are two fundamental 
theories on development. The first theory is neoclassical economy that assume 
diminishing return operates as economy development has a limit of growth. 
Consequently, convergence is obtain when advance economy reach this limit and poor 
economies developed. Second, the economic divergence theory of increasing returns 
through circular accumulation of production and demand. The United States (US) and 
French geographers initiated studies on economic growth, such as Perroux (1950), 
Hirschman (1958), and Boudeville (1966). These authors introduced core economic 
terminologies, including growth pole and growth centre, forward and backward 
linkages, trickle-down effects, and backwash effects. Furthermore, they argued that 
mainstream economics neglected the spatial dimension of economic events. To address 
this literature gap, they established a hybrid branch of economics, science and spatial 
analysis, and revisited the locational and growth centre theories by German economic 
geographers from the 1920s. As a result, the new form of research conceptualised high 
mathematical calculation and quantitative economics, which became the new standard 
on economic analysis.  
Following the decline of the Fordism era and the financial crisis in the 1970s, 
economic analysis was enriched with the development of political economics. The 
political economy approach based its argument on Marxism. In the following decades, 
the notion of innovation and knowledge became the main driver of development. The 
concept, grounded on the territorial innovation model (TIM) and other social-interaction 
models, examines theories grouped in structuralised organisation. The new approach 
emphasis on socio-institutional analysis based on a firm’s organisation and structure and 
social networks, both cognitive and cultural, which affect local production value. 
(Barnes, 2001; Lagendjik, 2006).  
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2.2 Regional Convergence Debate 
2.2.1 The Regional Convergence Arguments 
The theories on development convergence lie on the neoclassical perspectives that 
development are accelerated by an open market and free trade. By allowing the factors 
of production of labour and capital to mobilise to the location where they are most 
efficient, leads to the new spatial and international divisions of labour (Perrons, 2004, 
pp.134).  
   
Neoclassical Regional Growth  
The neoclassical is a traditional approach that argues decreasing convergence of local 
and development (Williamson, 1965) (Fig. 2-1). Economic growth becomes the core 
subject of economics and focuses on the long-term decrease of disparities in income per 
capita (Pike et al., 2006). Neoclassical theory seeks to explain the determinants of 
disparities and convergence rate. 
The basic idea of neoclassical theory is of diminishing returns. Early 19th century 
economists, including Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo, introduced the concept of 
diminishing returns to the process of economic growth. This concept simply explains 
that economic growth must be quantified in real terms of per capita income, and not 
total income. Suppose output, Y, is a function of labour, L, with land, N, and the 
production function in the general form 
Y = F (L, N)  
 
By assuming that land, N, is a fixed supply and with the absence of technological 
process, the only way to improve output is to increase labour, L. But, with a fixed 
amount of land, labour is subject to a diminishing of returns; therefore, as more labour 
is added to the production process, output rises but in decreasing increments.  
The Solow-Swan growth model became the basic neoclassical model for regional 
growth (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000), as it derived its basic assumptions and concepts 
from the neoclassical economy and applied those concepts to regional convergence. The 
Solow model starts with a specification of a general production function with output Y, 
quantity of capital K, and labour L, as below, 
Y = F (K, L) 
 
 16 
This model assumed that individual inputs were subject to diminishing returns and 
production was subject to constant returns to scale, for any positive constant ". Solow 
assumed that savings always adapt to new capital, although with diminishing returns. 
These two models, however, differ in that the Solow model recognises that stock of 
capital is subject to depreciation. The Solow model assumed that the capital stock 
depreciates in a constant percentage of existing capital stock. From this basic version of 
the Solow model, it is understood that if the production function exhibits (i) constant 
returns to scale, (ii) diminishing returns to any inputs, and (iii) that the values of 
parameters ! and # are constant, in the long run, the capital-labour ratio is at the 
equilibrium k* and per capita income settles at equilibrium y*. This represents a steady 
state where the growth of k and, hence, f (k) = y are zero. Despite the rate of savings 
and investment, in the Solow model growth finally stops. In conclusion, the Solow 
model explains how medium- and long-term growth relates with investment and 
technological progress. The limitation of this model is that it assumes these variables as 
exogenous, outside the model. It fails to explain why the saving rate ! and technology 
progress z are what they are and how economic policy may affect them.   
The neoclassical researchers measure economic growth as the increase of production 
or income and describe the capacity of the region to generate and accumulate resources 
and capital (Pike et al., 2006). In line with output growth, output growth per worker 
productivity in a region is measured as a ratio to the amount of resources that are used. 
The neoclassical economy approach treats output growth a result of three factors of 
production: capital stock, labour force, and technology. The basic neoclassic approach 
assumes technological changes and other determinants (savings, population growth, and 
human capital) as exogenous or independent of capital and labour input. Neoclassical 
assumption has two main impact on growth analysis or known as the exogenous growth 
theory. First, as the stock of capital increase, growth declines and halt which leads to 
convergence among regions following diminishing returns to investment in rich regions 
and that poor regions exploits their resources. The neoclassical output growth can be 
described as follows.  
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Figure 2-1. Neoclassical Output Growth 
Source: Adapted from Pike et al., 2006: 63 
 
In addition, regional growth is determined by the rate of technological progress and 
the relation between labour and capital. Productivity per worker will only increase if the 
capital increases (Clark, et al., 1986). This is the central concept of the neoclassical 
approach: diminishing marginal returns. This occurs when beyond a specific level of 
input the marginal output of the product per unit will only decrease. When the marginal 
reaches zero, equilibrium is achieved, and, thus, there is no incentive to increase the 
capital per labour ratio.  
The impact of the neoclassical assumption of decreasing returns in growth is that 
spatial agglomeration economies are not considered in this theory (Richardson, 1979). 
Overall, by neglecting increasing returns in production function, assuming that labour 
flow to higher wage regions and capital heads to the opposite direction, Neo-classical 
(NC) theory argues a balance growth development. Hence, this theory postulates that 
the world will be convergent as poor regions grow at a higher rate than rich regions, 
which had reach its diminishing returns condition.  
 
The Endogenous Growth and Convergence Theory 
The revival of growth theories since the 1980s led to empirical studies during the last 
few decades. Growth theories are considered as an extended version of the neoclassical 
model with more depth analysis of variables than the earlier theory. The initial 
excitement centred on the endogenous growth theories, with government policies and 
other forces as the variables in the analysis (Barro, 1991, 2000). The variables are used 
to measure the convergence of the economic growth rate, between initial level of output, 
y, and its target, y*. Such variables act as additional variables in the conditional 
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Growth 
Import of 
Knowledge 
Education and 
Training 
Population 
Growth 
Migration Foreign 
Investment 
Domestic 
Stock 
Growth of 
Technology 
Growth of 
Labour 
 
Growth of capital 
stock 
 18 
convergence, while absolute convergence only examines the initial level of output and 
the level of the target, without the effects of other variables. 
The following discussion explores the endogenous growth theory and its contribution 
to understand regional economic performance. This theory seeks to incorporate external 
and independent elements into the conceptualization of economic growth (population 
growth, saving rates, human capital, and technological change). Hence, this theory 
attempted to introduce increasing returns to the Neo-classical theory by specify the 
relationship between technological change and innovation to growth process. 
Technology is cause and effect of economic growth, thus it is endogenous to growth 
process  (Pike, et al, 2006, p.104).  Technological change is explained through the 
number of workers in knowledge-producing industry, existing stock of knowledge, and 
technological transfer and diffusion. Furthermore, this theory is related with the 
Keynesian theory of cumulative causation as the former theory claims that economic 
growth is a function local endowments and institutions which accumulate over time, 
differences in initial local endowments leads to further economic growth among 
regions. Specifically, the endogenous theoretical discussion below provides insight on 
the actions of domestic economic agents that respond to the market and its impact on 
divergence on regional economies.  
Endogenous growth model seeks to incorporate factors that are considered external 
and independent in the neo-classical theory into the explanation of economic growth 
(Pike, et al, 2006, p.102). The authors argue that the dynamics of convergence and 
divergence are the focus of endogenous growth models on regional and local 
development. Technically, the endogenous growth theory follows the neo-classical 
economy economic growth model using the Cobb-Douglas and Solow-Swan theories. 
This theory critiques and rejects the neo-classical economy assumption that human 
capital and technology are exogenous factors of economic growth. As the theory regards 
human capital and technology is the results of actions of economic agents, endogenous 
theory rejects NC theory assumption that source of agglomeration and economic growth 
are determine by external factors.   
With this basic argument, endogenous theory allows the analysis of regional 
economic divergence in the long-run. This model that regards the sub-national entity of 
the “region” as the geographical focus and introducing increasing returns mechanism 
into the neoclassical production function to determine growth rate within the model. As 
a result, the model explains the geographically uneven rates of regional convergence 
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and clustering between different regional development rates. The idea of increasing 
returns implies two characteristics of regional development, agglomeration and 
geographical spillovers.  
First, agglomeration is a result of knowledge accumulation and distance proximity. 
The model explicitly specifies the relationship between technological change and 
innovation to economic growth. As economic agents see the incentives to produce new 
ideas and knowledge for profit, technological progress is internalised in the production 
function. The production function is determined by the number of workers in the 
knowledge-producing industries, the existing stock of knowledge and technological 
transfer (Romer, 1990). Exogenously produced technology embodied in capital goods 
determines regional technology by its capital stock. While disembodied technological 
progress contributes to regional growth disparities independently of capital stock and 
produced in innovative environment that varies between regions (Pike, et al, 2006, 
p.104).  
Second, the geographical spillovers occur as the endogenous model argues that 
knowledge is an increasing marginal productivity and marginal product of knowledge 
and of physical capital is decreasing returns (Romer, 1986). This implies that local 
education and transfers of knowledge is embedded and accumulate within each region. 
However, as knowledge is sticky and geographically limited, it is subject to diminishing 
returns. Borrowing from the Neo-Schumpeterian approach, the model argues that 
spillovers are non-rival and semi non-excludable. It is semi non-excludable because 
technological and knowledge mobility decreases as distance increase (Romer, 1990).  
As a result, spillovers occur in locally bounded place of exchange of knowledge, 
which makes clusters profitable. In an industry scale, this leads to agglomeration that 
compensates the transportation cost. The variation of disembodied technological 
progress and the level of accumulated knowledge and skill workers influence the growth 
rates and increase economic disparities. The transportation cost is crucial to influence 
the process of agglomeration in a complex and non-linear way (Krugman, 1991). If 
transportation cost is too low, there is no incentive for urban concentration despite 
manufacturing trade increases (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2006, p. 1205). Thus, 
geographical spillovers are crucial to accelerate technological mobility. Furthermore, 
the institutions and policies bound the geographical spillovers and prospective 
investments. In this sense, fiscal policies and public infrastructure determine the 
mobilisation of resource as the indigenous potential at the local and regional levels.  
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Another perspective on the human supply, the model argues that the accumulation of 
human capital is taken to be specific to the production of particular goods and required 
on-the-job-training or learning by doing (Lucas, 1988). There are two assumptions to 
argue that human capital determines economic growth. First, the model need to assumed 
that learning by doing as an environment in which new goods are introduced, with 
diminishing returns to learning on each of them separately. This assumption prevents 
that learning by doing follows diminishing returns function and preserve its role as the 
engine of economic growth (Lucas, 1988, p.28). The second assumption argues that 
human capital specialised to old goods being “inherited” to new goods. The inheritance 
within the ‘family’ of goods as well as within families of people. Hence, the initial level 
of each members begins with is proportional (not equal to) the level of already attained 
by older members of the family.  
This model has also influence the direction of local and regional policy with new 
emphasis on promoting localities and regional potential. For instance, the traditional 
donor-receipt model that failed to redistribute growth among regions has been replaced 
by the new growth-oriented regional policy that focus on levelling up the economic 
performance of each territories (Pike, et al, 2006, p.106). Thus, the model argues that 
national economic growth is achieve through reducing disparities and lagging regions 
with emphasis on economic growth of regions. The discussion above indicates the 
importance of the role of government to create policies that affect long term growth by 
investing on knowledge and providing incentive to create knowledge. The creation of 
knowledge could be channel through ensuring intellectual property on patents and trade 
marks that provide security for research and development activities. Another way is to 
subside the production of knowledge that private firms could produce that benefits 
social rather than private. For instance, is the reduction on R & D taxes. In addition, as 
economic growth depends, in some ways, on everything that happens in the society 
(Lucas, 1988), the creation social institutions that allows the creation and use of 
knowledge is also crucial. This is conducted through programs that reduce the cost of 
knowledge application and transfer cost such as investments in schools, universities, 
and workshop activities.  
The discussion above suggests that if different goods are assumed to have different 
potential for human capital growth, then the same assumption applies that comparative 
advantage. As this advantage determines product location, it will also dictate each 
region's rate of human capital growth. The model also implies that the initial level of 
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human capital in each region differs in a certain period, influenced by the knowledge 
attained in the previous period and predecessor actors. As a consequence, possibility of 
wide and sustained differences in growth rates among regions are not systematically 
linked into each country's initial capital level.  
Despite its attempts to introduce increasing returns and internally development, there 
are critiques on endogenous growth model. First, the critiques on the assumption that 
agents are rational through full knowledge on alternative choices and its consequences. 
Second, the model also lacks of evidence how increasing returns operate in specific 
industries and places, or address the role of historical change and institutional contexts 
that shape economic growth process (Pike, et al, 2006, p.107). However, the model's 
basic idea of within localities development has inspired the growing literature on 
institutional theories such as the territorial innovation model (Lagendjik, 2006) face to 
face and untraded-dependencies (Storper, 1997), and the learning region (Cooke and 
Morgan, 1998) that are discuss in the following section.  
In the convergence model developed by Barro (1990), there are two convergence 
concepts in economic growth, across country or region, which are the decreasing level 
of dispersion of provincial GDP per capita (! Convergence) and the growth of poor 
regions relative to rich regions (ß convergence). Initially, convergence happens when a 
poor country or region grows faster than the rich, which implies that the poor country 
can catch up with the rich country, this is known as the ß convergence type (Barro, 
1991). The theory has absolute and conditional convergence. Absolute convergence 
occurs when the growth model parameters are equal; the theory assumes that per capita 
income will equalise over time and rich countries grow slower than poor countries. 
Meanwhile the conditional convergence relates the movement of steady state growth 
with the exogenous factors (technology, population growth, and savings) with constant 
per capita income or consumption level and capital per labour ratios between regions. 
This is conditional because the external factors differ across regions. The second 
concept is a cross-sectional dispersion, measured by the standard deviation of the 
logarithm of per capita income or product across country or region. The ! Convergence 
occurs when the dispersion declines over time. The ß convergence tends to produce ! 
Convergence (Garcia and Soelistianingsih, 1998). The convergence occurs if the 
distribution of the growth rate among regions falls over time (Pike et al., 2006).  
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2.2.2 Divergence-Led Regional Development Theories  
This section discusses theories on divergence economic development based on three 
schools. (i) German regional scientists studied the geographical unevenness creating 
land use models. (ii) The American economic disparities school that concerns with the 
role of spatial economic concentration, and (iii) The Marxism theories approached 
uneven regional development in the absence of counter measures of congestion within 
the developed regions.  
 
Location Theory 
The location theory focused on production; the difference with the earlier models was 
its emphasis on exploring the relationship between geography issues and production. 
This theory provides an analytical framework for location choice for economic activity 
and inter-regional linkages. Location theory for location decision is important for 
efficiency transport cost; it enhances production and distribution. Location growth 
theory initiated by Von Thünen (1966) whose thesis was on studying agriculture 
activities in Europe, and extended by Weber (1929) with studies on industrial locations 
in Germany. These theories were then followed by Hoover (1948).  
While Von Thunen and Weber studied the supply side, Christaller and Losch were 
interested in the demand side of location theories. Christaller (1966) formed theories on 
city rank, city size, and its distribution. This theory assumes that (i) regions are smooth, 
(ii) they have isotropic surfaces, (iii) they have the same distributed purchasing abilities, 
and (iv) that consumers are rational agents. The market area is called the ‘range’ and the 
minimal market area for produce to do economic activities is called the ‘threshold’. 
Extending Christaller’s theory, Losch argues for a system of lowest-order (self-
sufficient) farms, which were regularly distributed in a triangular-hexagonal pattern 
(Losch, 1954). The market area theory argued that the largest market area should be the 
location of economic activity. This theory argue that location proximity to market is 
important for manufacturing industry to ensure the higher profit. The further the 
distance, the higher transportation cost and reduce the product's competition price. 
McCann and Sheppard (2003) concluded that the theory captures the market behaviour 
that dynamic relationships between spatial nature of the market, industry structure, and 
the economic strategies that are used.  
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Cumulative Causation and Growth Centre Theories 
The increasing returns idea introduced by Kaldor (1970, 1981) and refers to the region’s 
economic ability to specialise and intensify its economic potential. His idea was that 
increased input would generate a higher quantity of outputs, and, with accumulation 
over time, a region would produce products faster and more efficiently compared with 
other regions. This competitiveness results in regional specialisation (Armstrong and 
Taylor, 2000).  
The cumulative causation theory, developed by Myrdal (1957), emphasises growth in 
a circular and cumulative way, which brings unevenness and polarisation of 
development among regions. This theory views increasing returns as an effect of the 
agglomeration of external economics and the historical path of localities. Furthermore, 
Myrdal shows that effects between factors of production and growth in developed 
regions impacts peripheral regions. The development of the prosperous regions would 
benefit other regions through labour and resource linkages, known as the ‘spread effect’ 
or ‘trickle-down effect’ (Hirschman, 1958). The accumulation of this effect would lead 
to economic growth and development through channels of technological diffusion and 
markets. The opposite of this concept is the absorption of resources by rich regions , 
known as the ‘backwash effect’. In this concept, rich regions develop faster and higher 
economic growth rate by exploiting poor regions' resources. The effect is embedded in 
the nature of trade liberalisation in neoclassical perspectives (Hirschman, 1958). 
Furthermore, the lack of intervention and soft state has established increasing 
polarisation among regions  (Myrdal, 1957).  
The Verdoom effect states that the growth of labour productivity depends on the 
growth of output. Positive and strong growth in labour productivity and output become 
mutually reinforced in a circular causation way (Pike et al., 2006). In addition, the 
growth pole refers to mobilising natural, social, and economic resources to a particular 
industry that becomes the propulsive industry. The growth pole concept is also based on 
potential linkages between propulsive industries and local industries through forward 
and backward linkages on the supply chain (Hirschmann, 1958; Perroux, 1950). The 
geographically concentrated growth poles become the growth centres with a national 
policy on regional planning that allocates resources to selected industries in a few 
regions. This policy would expect to generate a leading region that promotes the trickle–
down growth effect to surrounding regions.  
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The modernisation theory argues that undeveloped countries should mobilise natural, 
social, and economic resources, and focus it on selected industries (growth poles) in 
certain regions (growth centres) (Perroux, 1955). This idea was a counter argument to 
Schumpeter (1951) that claimed that inter-regional transfer equalizes production and 
capital overtime. However, regional transfer is uneven and tends to concentrate on 
growth centres because of agglomeration economies. Hirschman (1958), who identified 
special regions as growth centres and lagging regions, supported this view argues that 
development can be achieve through the existence of trickle-down effects between 
regions. This concept has been a regional policy for developing countries with limited 
development budgets; it establishes a region that will grow rapidly and expects it to 
multiply and spread the effects (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000).  
 
New Trade Theory and New Economic Geography 
Recent literature on divergence theory is the new trade theory that studies specialisation 
and concentration and how they influence and shape trade (Martin and Sunley, 1998). In 
the imperfect competition, specialisation is the cause of increasing returns of the 
differential factor endowment (Krugman, 1990). The Marshallian externalities are more 
likely to occur in the regional level than at the national and international levels. Recent 
studies on this literature (Krugman, 1990, 1991; Martin and Sunley, 1998) claim that 
agglomeration and geographic concentration influence the growth of regions. The 
spatial clustering of regions with labour, capital, and the network of organisational 
technology are geographically localised rather than mobile. Furthermore, urbanisation 
causes growth spillovers that lead to agglomeration and shape the competitiveness of 
firms within the localised economic region.  
Another contemporary divergence theory is the new economic geography (NEG) 
theory that emphasises a core-peripheral economic relationship that is rooted in the 
theory dating back to late 1950s initiated by Hirschman and Myrdal that acknowledged 
a relationship between the two locations. The first relationship is the polarisation 
(Hirschman, 1958) and backwash effect (Myrdal, 1957) that shows a tendency of major 
industries to grow and act as a magnet with the ability to draw people and resources 
from other regions. The second relationship is the trickle-down or spread effect 
development, which refers to economic growth that spreads from the core regions to 
peripheral regions.  
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New economic geography (NEG) is an analytical theory that focuses on centripetal 
and centrifugal forces of power to balance development, determining the size and 
distribution of spatial concentration. The centripetal forces are described as forces that 
attract factor production to form geographic concentrations following Marshallian ideas 
about the advantages ‘people following the same shelled trade get from near 
neighbourhood to one another’. In his words, Marshall (1920) states ‘the mystery of 
trade become no mystery, but are as it were in the air’. The factors include (i) market 
size, with the larger the market the larger the attraction, (ii) linkage size, with the larger 
attracting more firms, and (iii) labour pooling to provide more unskilled and skilled 
workers. Krugman (1991) recognised that specialisation allows economies of scale and 
external economies (Perrons, 2004). This leads to the accumulation of growth, which is 
locked-in, and path-dependency that increases development unevenness between poor 
and prosperous regions. The other force is the centripetal that disperse economic 
activities from one region to another through various policies such as land and unwilling 
to move price and external of diseconomies, such as congestion. The balance of 
centripetal and centrifugal forces will establish spatial concentration. 
Moreover, when there is a trade barrier, the wage structure between regions will be 
the same. But when one region is more attractive (proximity to a market or a larger 
market) and the production factor moves to the region, that region’s wage will be higher 
than the other. Although the other region has a lower wage, firms do not move because 
of the benefits of proximity to a market and a larger supplier (Venables, 2006). As trade 
freeness increases, a clustering effect will be felt and location will determine price 
(dispersion force). The NEG theory also explains the importance of a pooled market as 
specialised labour benefits both labour and firms since an efficient labour force offsets 
the competition effect (Krugman, 1991). Labour pooling assists firms to look for skilled 
labour and triggers knowledge-spillover between similar firms within a region through 
labour mobility, direct social contact of workers, or observation of intensive activities 
(Venables, 2006).  
The main gap in the NEG theory is its consideration of tangible aspects to the cluster 
approach. Tangible aspects, such as a greater economic scale, tend to form a spatial 
concentration and lower transport costs will increase geographic concentration as firms 
can supply a range of products to markets from a single location (Krugman, 1991). The 
NEG views specialisation as arising from the accumulation of economic activities, 
efficiency, and comparative advantage, which leads to savings and revenue increase due 
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to internal locality interaction. Hence, the region will develop further than other regions, 
leading to unevenness of growth between regions or between core-peripheries.  
 
Dynamic Model 
The dynamic model was developed by Quah (1993) and it makes predictions on cross-
section dynamics by linking three observations: (i) countries are endogenously 
categorised into groups, (ii) specialisation production allows exploiting economies of 
scale, and (iii) ideas are an important engine of growth (Quah, 1996). The literature 
explains that the results are (a) growth coalitions, or a convergence club, the model 
delivers predictions on coalitions’ memberships across sections of economies; and (b) 
different dynamics are generated, depending on the initial distribution of characteristics 
across countries.  
In addition, the results also shows the characteristics of convergence club, which are: 
(i) polarisation, refers to the condition where the rich become richer, the poor poorer 
and the middle class disappears; (ii) stratification, where there are multiple modes in the 
income distribution across countries; and (iii) divergence, where two economies, 
initially has similar development level, separates over time so that one eventually 
becomes wealthier (Quah, 1996). When more than two coalitions form, stratification is 
more likely rather than coalition. With two coalitions, the distribution dynamics suggest 
that the economy moves into two main poles (rich and poor) while the middle class 
evaporates. Economy clusters occur at high and low parts of the income distribution. 
The outcome, the number of coalitions and their compositions, depends on the initial 
distribution of income across the entire cross-section. If the countries initial incomes are 
similar, a single coalition occurs, and if the income initial distribution differs, a multiple 
convergence forms. 
 
Marxism Approach on Regional Development 
The Marxist approach builds on the political critique of neoclassic economies as it 
views regional growth as episodic and historic for convergence and divergence process 
eras. Marxism argues unevenness forces regions to specialise in geographical function. 
A region has to be able to perform and grow at a higher rate over time in a particular 
industry that established the region as a centre of production, administration, or research 
and development (R& D). Transition in development refers to changes of the position 
and role of a region in spatial division of labour.  
 27 
The Marxist approach in regional development is interested in different periods of 
industrial restructuring and spatial division of labour at the regional level. The spatial 
division of labour suggests that places become specialise in a particular function, such 
as headquarters, R&D, and administration. Over time, this location specialisation leads 
to a hierarchical relationship between regions. Economic geography was one of the 
branches of geography that was the most dramatic example of the shift in thought.  
The debates on the unevenness of spatial development literature produced five 
schools of thoughts (Scott, 2000). First, the Anglophone and French Marxism urbanism 
school that studied inter-connections between land rent, housing provision, and urban 
planning. Other research includes poverty, job loss, and deindustrialisation. Another 
stream was on the uneven development at the regional, national, and international scale 
(Forbes, 1984; Harvey, 1982; Smith, 1984). A more orthodox Marxian studied class 
struggle and labour theory of value and structural crisis as the essential foundation of 
any viable research programme. On the other hand, the heterodox Marxian (with a 
background in spatial analysis) studied highly technical analyses of core process within 
the political economy and spatial effects. This quantitative term began in formal Neo-
Ricardian and Scraffan models of spatial structure of capitalist production’s impact on 
the capital investment, technological change, and employment relation with locational 
structure. In the socio-economics field, Harvey (2007) asked a geographic question in 
terms of Marxism political economy. In this, Harvey argued that spatial analysis and 
regional science, as an apologetic technocratic construction, appeared to be silently 
serving to mask the structurally determined injustice of capitalism. The socio-spatial 
dialectic concept was concerned with the role of space in social theory (Soja, 1980). He 
studied how forces of capitalism accumulate and related social structures create and 
recreate geographic realities in so-called ‘social-spatial dialectic’ and class tension.  
The spatial fix concept offers to restructure the geography of capital to 
counterbalance over-accumulation (Harvey, 2007). Spatial fix provides a way to 
transform the geography of capitalism that inherited over accumulation in the system. 
The notion suggests that incorporating more territories to access capital and production 
networks (Schoenberger, 2004). Furthermore, the expansion and improvement of built 
environment such as transportation networks, water supplies, and communication 
systems that enhance the system's ability to create wealth. The uneven development 
could not be separated from spatial fix as a means to restore the imbalance (Harvey, 
2006). In space terms, there are views on spatial fix, which is first, a way to allocate 
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capital to other regions to resolve over-accumulation of production, and second, a way 
that capital is invested in fixed and immobile infrastructure and suburbanisation 
facilities. However, Harvey argued that these two views of spatial fixes stimulated each 
other to further accumulation and if the flows failed, the fixed capital was devalued and 
lost, leading to further spatial disparities. The rise of periodic accumulation is inherited 
from capitalist development that forces new spatial, technological, and social ‘fixes’ of 
order. This underpinned further equally unstable configurations of regional growth and 
decline. Thus, because this is embedded in the capitalist system, it could end the long-
term regional divergence (Harvey, 1982; Storper and Walker, 1989).  
While spatial fixes are in process, unevenness is occurring simultaneously in a 
globalise world. For instance, in the 1970s global cities had property booms such as in 
London, New York and Tokyo; while huge debts in Eastern Europe, Latin America and 
Asia (Schoenberger, 2004). The study of UK economy in the 1990s by Martin (1988) 
argues that, besides politically and geographically, the southern part of UK was 
traditionally host to the R&D division, and it had more advantages with more skilled 
labour and managerial headquarters leading to flexibility of production, compared with 
the northern region. In the Marxist view, this case is an asymmetry condition where 
labours and machines reached its profit and accumulation maximums, leading to over-
accumulation and unavoidable downsizing of production. Thus, new locations for 
production are required to restore profits.   
2.2.3 The Organisation of Regional Innovation  
Institutional economic geography refers to the fundamental principle that underlies 
new economic structures that allow industries to contract out or have external 
production to improve flexibility and adaptability.  
 
Territorial Innovation Model  
The new production system is combined with fast changing technologies to differentiate 
demand compared with the previous industrial organisation. The internalisation occurs 
if the transaction is frequent and considered to be more beneficial to minimise 
transaction cost. The following discussions on regional innovation models are based on 
various frameworks by the territorial innovation model (TIM), the regulationist 
approach, cultural and cognitive turns, and creative regions (Lagendjik, 2006, Krätke, 
1999, Storper and Salais, 1997; Scott, 2000; Storper and Venables, 2004, Moulaert and 
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Sekia, 1999; Barnes, 2001, and Florida, 2008). This literature review on these theories 
and empirical studies suggest divergence development occurs due to the difference in 
structural organisations, socio-economy and policy, and cultural traditions at firm and 
regional levels. 
First, the study of innovation on individual firms concerns the impact of Fordism and 
post-Fordism on industrial development. The importance of the divide becomes obvious 
when certain appropriations of historical forms of capitalism can be described as 
distinctive regions of accumulation and ‘nodes of social regulation’. The research took 
this further with the addition of a moment when there is ‘window locational 
opportunity’. The debates occur when labour market flexibility and the glorification of 
the entrepreneur comes at the expense of worker rights and welfare.  
Flexible production can be viewed as a combination of a socio-economy embedded 
with a communication network in a disintegrated production. The socio-agents, formal 
and non-formal, shape local networks, and collective strategic capacities form by 
regulation of institutions at the production level (micro-level). Storper and Scott (1988) 
linked flexible production with agglomeration, assuming that being located in the same 
place would reduce externalities, improve transaction cost, just-in-time processing, and 
idiosyncratic and inter-unit transactions. They also viewed flexible production as a form 
of production with the developed ability to shift from one type of production or process 
to another, and adjust quantities of output without any major impact on efficiency. In 
addition, the post-Fordism Marshallian model and flexible specialisation influence the 
oligopoly power of multinational companies (MNC). This concept regarded regional 
uniqueness as a source of regional competition. The research aimed to respond to the 
policy roles in regional areas to increase the region in a globalise world and a condition 
where the nation could not provide further support in local interest. 
Second, the regional innovation characterized by territorial based agglomeration, 
innovation and local business interconnection growth in sectors on neo-artisans, high-
technology content, financial service, and specialized products. These industries 
identified as a spatial system of proximity of agents, action, interaction, communication, 
and adaptability when set in a wider socio-cultural context, creates a different angle of 
analysis. 
Dicken (2007, p. 22) defines a geographical cluster of economic activities as two 
types, sectoral based and spatial based. There are two types of agglomeration 
economies, urbanisation economies and localisation economies. The former, in general, 
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are clusters of economic activities and sharing of infrastructure. For example, urban 
areas and metropolitan areas, which are a clustering of firms within the same or related 
industry, and with its proximity, the cluster provides specialised networks and the 
sharing of knowledge that leads to skilled workers and concentrated activities to 
produce goods and services. In other words, the sectoral based leads to specialisation of 
activities and localisation economies, while a spatial based economy leads to a 
generalised cluster and urbanised economies.  
The externalities are divided into traded and untraded interdependencies between 
firms. Traded interdependency is a direct transaction between firms (supplier and 
inputs), thus, spatial proximity is important to reduce transport costs. Untraded 
interdependencies is a less tangible concept, where it ranges from a pool of labour, 
institutional existence, economic agglomeration with face to face (F2F) social and 
cultural interaction, and enhancement of knowledge and innovation between firms. The 
untraded interdependencies refer to social and cultural basis of an economic cluster that 
determines the process and progress of agglomeration (Storper, 1997). The approach 
views the tacit knowledge on know-how and ideas sharing as having a more 
determinant role in clustering progress and innovation than the codified knowledge, a 
know-how knowledge on tangible activities such as writings and diagrams. The 
untraded interdependencies approach argues that the tacit knowledge stays in a specific 
location and is accessed only through interaction and sharing ideas in untraded social 
and cultural interactions. Meanwhile, the codified knowledge is more tangible and can 
be transferred and travel by space and is non-location specific (Coe et al., 2007, p. 136).  
In the economic geography literature, the study of the impact of regional innovation 
is based on several basic theories. First, drawn up on institutional and organisation 
socio-economic theories, network concepts are studied as intermediate institutional 
firms of social organisation that are not market- nor organisational-hierarchical, but 
based on cooperation (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). This concept emphasises high trust 
among participants that enables the sharing of information and benefits without being 
tied to restrictive contracts. This high level of trust is viewed as leading to innovation 
and adaptation for development, through collabouration, reducing monitoring and lower 
contract cost for agents (Sunley, 2000). Second, the social capital force by trust may 
increase the ability to learn and adapt to change (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). The 
literature suggests there are influences of social capital and trust to development 
progress, within various disciplines, including economics, sociology, political science, 
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and education. Third, the network form of organisation has become more universal over 
time, as can be seen in Silicon Valley, where firms are linked through networks of parts 
of production processes, technology, human resources, and other factors of production. 
Fourth, the evolutionary theory approach regards how places change over time in terms 
of historical trajectories and the unpredictable nature of development as “gradual 
understanding allows to recognised types of path and place dependency that shaped the 
historical geography and their future development” (Sunley, 2000).  This leads to the 
thought that labour mobility follows economic activities. The last concept is a collective 
learning approach, which is the basic argument for recent theories on innovative milieus 
and learning regions. Collective learning is a dynamic process of accumulation of 
knowledge transfer among members through interactions with rules, norms, 
organisations, and procedures (Capello, 1999). This approach’s foundation idea is the 
interaction of human, social, economic, and supporting assets within the territorial 
context. Collective learning differs with learning in terms of forms of social interaction 
that are seen in the relationship between the strong link of supplier and the customer 
relationships continuity over time.  
From these theories, innovation theorists developed regional approaches to 
understand local economic divergence. First, the new industrial spaces (NIS), which are 
based on economic evolution and the regulation approach on technological changes, and 
industrial districts (ID) are tied together with technological changes that determine its 
flexible specialisation. The innovative milieu (IM) emphasises strong relations with 
social-cultural and collective learning through its embedded networks. The institutional 
thickness approach refers to the network web of public, quasi-public, and private 
organisations and the formation of bottom-up regional coalitions. The learning region 
approach argues that central to the regional adaptive ability to develop is the capabilities 
to learn and interactive relationships of knowledge production, learning, and the 
interaction of regions (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). 
Finally, the research on global division of labour is concerned with economic 
activities at the global level that influence local growth. At the global level, innovation 
activities are established with the integration of firms on research and development, 
production and supply of regional and national levels. At this level, there is evidence of 
division of labour, production and innovation (Dickens, 2007; Scott, 1999). The figure 
below illustrates the global innovation and production hierarchical system of cities (Fig. 
2-2). In the figure, London act as the global city as the centre for R & D, innovation and 
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finance, while Singapore act as the hub for production hub and Batam as the location of 
manufacturing sites for production. 
Present literature on global-impact analysis recognises cluster patterns that occur 
following a reduction in transport cost with high importance of face-to-face contacts and 
high externalities. The emergence of “superstar” regions reflected with large scale firms 
that are globally dynamic These regions developed because of spatially dependent 
transaction cost are heterogeneous of high externalities, expanded of high transaction 
cost other activities and low cost of transportation (Quah, 1996). These factors, together 
with market accessibility, create superstar regions that attract further talent and highly 
skilled people and economy (Florida, 2008). The agglomeration and economic 
concentration of highly skilled workers added with social interaction among them has 
led to a spiky world with large divergence between regions. This confirms the 
importance of social institutions for these new centres to compete at the global level 
such as innovation centres, skill transfers pools, and technological sharing (Scott, 2006). 
Thus, divergence and polarisation over time limits the number of super-regions 
following the accumulation and agglomeration of social capitals that accumulate as with 
physical capital.  
Figure 2-2. Illustration of the Global Division of Labour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Scott (1999) 
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2.3 State Restructuring Impact on Regional Growth 
This section explores theories and literature on the impact of devolution and trade 
liberalisation.  
2.3.1 The Role of the State on Regional Economic Development 
The World Bank report shows that devolution weakened the central government’s 
capacity to distribute growth, in both a political and financial way (World Bank, 2001). 
Prud’homme (1995) argues that a centralised government could produce a more 
balanced distribution of resources. The result is that the central government has been 
less successful in solving disparities across regions (Rondinelli and Neill, 1986). 
Furthermore, the authors found that the regional governments tend to be an additional 
layer of bureaucracy that will contract national economic growth. The following 
subsections discuss the impact of administrative and fiscal decentralisation in detail. 
Neoclassical regional growth theories have popularised the notion that uneven 
regional development is inevitable during national development. Among known authors 
are Hirschman (1958), Myrdal (1957), and Williamson (1965) who argued that selected 
sectors or locations would have a higher concentration and growth compared with 
others. Furthermore, as regions cannot develop themselves, there is a need to develop 
growth poles; this introduces inequality, with an inevitable concentration of economic 
activities. 
Myrdal (1957) viewed the state as the most important engine for growth and 
structural transformation. The state is the initiator and coordinator in relation to the 
private sector. In this sense, the state is created with political determination and 
comprehensive administration reform. Myrdal argued three non-economic conditions of 
state, which are the attitude towards life and work; institutions that favour economic 
growth, land tenure systems, private institutions, employment and trade, and voluntary 
organisation; and the political administration agencies that need to be efficient to 
manage development. 
While Friedman (1966) explained the role of state on different development stages: 
pre-industrialisation, transition, industrialised, and post-industrialised. In the first stage, 
the state has little attention on spatial arrangements and is devoted to creating human 
and material bases for industrialisation. In the transition period, the state begins to 
organise regional arrangements following early industry and resource exploitation and 
distribution. This effort continues in the industrialisation period where regional 
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problems continue and increase. The state also coordinates regional development and 
adjustments to ensure regions are complying with the common market organisation. In 
post-industrialisation, the state focuses on the service sector and emphasises the 
distribution of wealth at the urban and metropolitan levels, such as the metropolitan 
development in the United States of America (USA).  
In the 1960s western countries adopted the welfare state, where state policies were 
initiated towards greater regional equality while promoting spread and backwash 
effects. The concept follows Myrdal (1957, p. 39) that suggest the policies emphasised 
the critical role of the welfare state in reducing interdisparities through backwash and 
spread effects. The backwash effects occur when rich regions become more productive 
and absorb resources from its poorer neighbours. The spread effect occurs when rich 
regions stimulate economic production of poor regions. This increase in demand allows 
the poor regions’ economies to be included in the chain of circular and cumulative 
growth, making poor regions richer (Myrdal, 1957).  
The problem with the welfare state is that the spread effect in poor countries is weak 
due to poor integrated policies, while in the rich countries there is more success in 
maintaining economic programs. Hence, the more there are richer and higher income 
people, the more force to introduce rational generosity. The welfare state uses 
democracy to carry out egalitarian policies with sacrifices on the part of the rich 
regions. This leads to stronger capacity to offset market forces and promotes economic 
development.  
There are two channels in the system of causation with two types of influence, the 
market and policies. The more effective counter to backwash effect is a stronger spread 
effect, which leads to less regional inequality. Thus, this empowers the political base to 
propose egalitarian policies in the welfare state. 
The emergence of the regional policy was due to occupying settlements’ local 
endowments, natural resources, and an adaptation to external demand. As time passes, 
each region becomes autonomous economically and socio-culturally with its 
administration and commercial and trade activities. This continues with industrialisation 
where there is a concentration of investment at the centre. The role of the government 
on regional distribution of public investment is based on (i) the dispersal based on 
political decision and needs, and (ii) the concentration of growth of selected regions that 
cause shortages of urban facilities, thus public investment favours the region.  
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However, as Myrdal (1957) asserted, most developments exhibit characteristics of 
circular and cumulative causation; the external economies in the rich regions and 
backwash effects cause markets to increase interregional differences. To address this, 
government intervention to reduce disparities is crucial to support development in the 
lagging regions. In this sense, the state attempts to counter the polarisation effect of 
market forces, such as emigration of capital and talent and tax advantages, through 
public investments. State spending promotes convergence through spread effects from 
investments in education, transportation, and communication to strengthen centrifugal 
forces of economic growth. In addition, effective aid to the establishment of industries 
requires income tax reduction, tariff protection, and bank credit policies (ibid, p. 199). 
There are also preferential exchange rates and the protection of industries, which can 
help the lagging regions to satisfy their needs, and taxes, if importing to the lagging 
region. However, the economic relationship and trade networks with the advanced 
regions should also be preserved as it should be seen as a source of supplies and 
complementary, rather than as a competitor, to the advanced regions (ibid, p. 200). As 
economic growth is circular and cumulative causation, government investment can 
expand overtime through mechanisms of development.  
The least risky investment is infrastructure and social overhead capital as found in 
the advanced regions. However, this might not be correct as each region has a distinct 
economic structure with local endowment, such as entrepreneurship and mechanism, 
which influences its economic development. Therefore, intervention policies and 
spending should be grounded on the respective region’s economy structure in industry, 
agricultural, and service sectors (Hirschman, 1958, pp. 195–195).  
Currently, many developing countries have a state structure inherited from the 
colonial regime from laws and tax collection to administration and political order. There 
are two types of problematic states, the soft state and the oppressor state. The soft state 
has weak laws, as a rule, and the government defines it, which becomes the source of 
corruption (Myrdal, 1957, p. 226). This refers to the unwillingness among rulers to obey 
rules laid down by the democratic process and thus the state is not able to implement 
policies against the interests of bureaucrats or powerful groups. The oppressor state is 
defined as the condition in which the state’s economically advancing regions and social 
groups have the resources to use the state as a tool to advance their own interests 
(Myrdal, 1957, p. 44). Both of these problematic states fail to promote balanced 
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regional growth and are more likely to widen the gap between advanced and lagging 
regions.  
2.3.2 Administration Autonomy 
The impact of devolution to convergence has been somewhat diverse across the 
literature. Musgrave’s (1959) theory of public sectors states that there are three main 
objectives: efficiency in allocation of resources, income distribution, and 
macroeconomic stability. Gil Canaleta et al. (2004) thought that the first objective could 
be addressed through devolution, while the latter, two could only be performed by a 
central government. The decentralisation proponent's main argument is that 
decentralisation promotes economic efficiency (Calamai, 2009). At the social capital 
level, devolution would encourage effective civil society that, in turn, would be the most 
effective monitoring tool for government performance, based on society and the people 
themselves. Transparent and good governance can be established, leading to better 
public service.  
The problems occurred from the realization of devolution has been predicted and 
discussed widely in the literature (Fig. 2-3). Generally, it been argued that 
decentralisation promotes economic inefficiency and overlapping administration 
responsibilities  (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004). The first potential problem of 
decentralisation is the lack of expertise and human capital that might hinder the benefits 
of decentralisation. These factors are crucial to promote efficient allocation of 
government and resources deliver better policies  and strategies (Rodríguez-Pose and 
Ezcurra, 2010, p.622). Richer and more dynamic regions have more capacity to extract 
resources through tax collection or through political advantage to central government. 
Decentralisation also means more levels of bureaucracy that could reduce stimulation 
for private investments and efficient public service. Devolution is argued to impact 
competitiveness among local administrations, resulting in new ideas and innovative 
policies (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005).  
Islam (2003) argued that the result of the level of decentralisation was significant 
disparity, both among provinces and municipalities/regencies. In his example, effective 
and decent administration within a region would lead a region to earn large shares of 
provincial funds and left other regions to compete for the remaining funds. Furthermore, 
he claimed that decentralisation might also encourage inefficient development, with two 
or more neighbouring regions developing the same infrastructure. Decentralisation may 
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also limit people from one region to lose public service from another region (Islam, 
2003). The embedded social interaction and capital accumulation allows rich regions to 
have larger economic activities, capital, and skilled labour. These regions, with more 
abundant factors and resources, would develop faster and thus offset among regions 
would fade out. Inevitably, differences among regions would increase and divergence 
occurs.  
Second, literature on decentralisation mainly focuses on the actors’ demands and 
neglects the supply side. The supply side concerns the quality and skills of local 
government officers with limited skill and managerial ability (Prud’homme, 1995). In 
the centralise regime, the central government has better institutional capacities with 
greater salaries, experience and more efficient administration, which is in contrast with 
the regions' capacities. Furthermore, central government officers have higher human 
capital through better education level and on-job-training compared the local officers. In 
decentralisation, the institutional capacities influence the development mechanism that 
increase regional disparities (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005). While in decentralisation, 
regional development are operate by local officers with low education level and 
inadequate national policy knowledge hinders optimum public services at the local 
level.  
 However, in modern growth theory, there is much emphasis on the supply-side 
policies than the Keynesian theory, that put concerns on taxation, spending and demand 
(Armstrong and Taylor, 2000, p.356). This supply-side policy requires fundamental 
change social systems and political and institutional arrangements. For instance, 
networks of cooper, new norms of behaviour, institutional capacities and innovative 
policies. These examples are discussed in further detail in the following section of 
organisation of regional institutions.  
Hence, presently the institutional capacities issues have been considered to determine 
regional economic divergence. Different institutional capacities and social endowments 
may undermine the potential benefits to generate and implement policies that match the 
regions’ need and public service (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010, p.623; Rodríguez-
Pose and Ezcurra, 2011, p.622). Another potential impact of decentralisation on 
disparities is the different capacities of regional assemblies. In the devolution era, 
assemblies should enhance regional voice in the national level and monitor and guide 
the implications of national policies on the respective regions (Armstrong and Taylor, 
2000, p. 357). Their existence is crucial to improve coordination of local development 
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institutions and actors. Thus, direct election in decentralisation are important to produce 
local assemblies with appropriate human capital and institutional capabilities to support 
economic development progress.  
Third, the emergence of governments with particular private interests; these interests 
can lead to business relationships and even corruption of public servants. The focus on 
economic growth leads to inappropriate competition between local governments to 
attract labour and capital. As the degree of political power devolved, the distribution of 
finance influences over central policy making causes asymmetry of power between 
regions (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005, p. 412). In this condition, the centre 
government faced conflicting demand of the regions when the set of sub national 
governments are highly heterogeneous and different interest. Thus, the centre is likely to 
appease regional governments with the greatest threats, and opportunity to its own 
legitimacy. Poorer and less influential regions will be less protected by then centre, 
while richer and more powerful regions benefits the most from the decentralisation. 
This condition undermines the central government's role to ensure economic 
development equality between core and peripheral regions.  
 
Figure 2-3. Decentralisation Impact on Regional Disparities Framework 
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2.3.3 Fiscal Decentralisation 
Fiscal devolution has two impacts on regional disparities, financial and non-financial. In 
the financial impact, the difference in tax policies and welfare regulations will differ 
with the region’s economic performance. The autonomy that regions gain allows 
regions to customise taxes and welfare policies based on its development objectives, 
such as tax holidays, tax targets, and other financial policies. Different region sizes and 
regulations cause regions to earn revenue variation due to larger economic activities and 
taxed workers.  
While this seems to be a decent solution, one of the effects is the non-financial 
outcome which rich regions gain political power through significant contribution to 
DAU (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005). This situation represents factual divergence 
where rich regions have more voice and influence in central government policies. This 
confirms that a strong central government role is crucial in the devolution era. Strong 
central government decision-making is important to minimise the effect of competition 
and fiscal capacity. The central government is also important to mediate welfare costs 
that ensure zero-sum competition, fosters access to capital market and reduce tax bases 
for less advantaged regions (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005).  
The implementation of decentralisation has generated new tension and conflicts 
within the state that are shaped by the interplay of actors and related issues. Thus, 
regional competitiveness in terms of trade liberalisation and state agencies objectives to 
attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on the local level will be one area that tensions 
between devolution and efforts to maintain strong forms of national co-ordination occur 
(Tewdwr-Jones and Phelps, 2000). The core of this research is to understand the 
implication of globalisation from above and regionalisation from below. State agencies 
are the key in advancing globalisation.  
Devolution potentially causes regional disparity because of the lack of necessary size 
to deliver public service efficiently (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011, p.622). The 
economic scale and scope are required to provide public services that are capital 
intensive and large fixed facilities (Prud'homme, 1995; Rodríguez-Pose et al, 2009, 
p.2044). As smaller regions have smaller area and population with less cost-effective to 
deliver public goods and services, they have less capacity to deliver efficient public 
policies. The limited capabilities to guide and oversee the process to deliver efficient 
public policy potentially raise development gap among region. There are abundant 
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studies on the role of intergovernmental transfers has been associated with regional 
economic growth. The studies show different effects of fiscal decentralisation on 
regional disparities and growth. For instance, a study by Kessler and Lessmann (2010) 
shows that fiscal decentralisation in the OECD countries has a positive and significant 
impact. The cross-section and panel analysis found that countries with higher levels of 
intergovernmental transfers and grants have higher interregional disparity than countries 
with lower transfers. Thus, fiscal decentralisation per se has the capacity to increase 
economic gap among regions.  
Decentralisation also influences the region’s capacity to generate own source revenue 
(OSR), especially tax. In the short run, the transfer of power to tax will benefit regions 
with a more developed economic through greater tax base (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 
2010). Thus, this becomes incentive for regions to compete and deliver higher economic 
growth. This incentive are greater for less developed regions as they have more need for 
development by fiscal competition and flexible labour markets than the advance 
regions. This competing objectives need a strong system of redistribution of 
intergovernmental transfer fund and strong regulatory systems, which in the absence of 
this requirements will only increase disparities and growth divergence.  
Furthermore, limited tax base will also cause several development problems if the 
local institutions capacities are inadequate. First, weaker institutional system of local 
governments suffers more corruption and less transparent organisation. The government 
is also captured by elites that are rent seeking and collusion. This hinders the 
government to decide effective regulations and on contrary, introduce regulations that 
harm the economic development such as levies and other apportionment to raise 
revenue (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010, p. 625). The local government will also 
lack of qualified human resources as result of poor respond and efficient policies at the 
local level.  
As a result, inadequate or unfunded mandates are common in process of 
decentralisation, especially in a to down decentralisation that are earmarked fro certain 
expenditures (Rodríguez-Pose et al, 2009, p.2044; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011). 
This reduces the degree of regional governments to adjust spending on local preferences 
and compromise policies and services. In this sense, regions have to find their own 
revenue sources through taxes, decrease spending per capita, or increase efficiency 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005, p. 414). They will have to rely on more levies and 
compulsory appropriation to fund their limited economic growth potential (Rodríguez-
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Pose and Ezcurra, 2010, p. 625). This concerns over how poorer regions will challenge 
richer regions on attracting investments with their deficient infrastructure endowments 
and inadequate institution for revenue administration (Rodríguez-Pose et al, 2008; 
Oates, 1993).   
It has been long acknowledged that good OSR is crucial vertical assignment to ensure 
that local taxes do not distort movement of economic goods and activity and that they 
benefits to provide the right sorts of cost signal to the community on fiscal decisions 
(Oates, 1993). Importance of own local revenue for two reasons, first, Central fund 
always come with strings attached that will influence local programs. If local depends 
heavily on central transfers, local programs will be results of negotiations between 
central and local authorities. Second, heavy reliance on central transfer will discourage 
incentives for local responsibilities to expand programs with low impact to localities. 
Thus, OSR is crucial at the margin of local programs to play proper role of fiscal 
decentralisation (Oates, 1993, p.241).  
Regional capacities also influences the quality and effectiveness of the provision 
public services. Regional capacities become more important and crucial as each regions 
has different needs and preferences of public services. For instance, citizen have choice 
to increase their welfare by locating at the preferred combination of taxes and services 
(Armstrong and Taylor, 2000). People have freedom for political vote based on their 
preferred taxes and public services. Thus, further development difference become more 
apparent with these variety of public services. Another problem is the difference in 
catchments areas if the boundaries of tax jurisdiction of these public services are reaped 
(Armstrong and Taylor, 2000). For example, commuters into urban areas use and 
benefit from urban facilities financed by city citizens, while they pay lower taxes in 
rural areas (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000, p. 355).  
Other critiques argue that decentralisation would force local governments to compete 
with other regions leading to unnecessary inefficient development. Decentralisation 
often results in the separation of government units that take expenditure development 
and financing. These may fail to internalised source cost of spending decision and 
hinders welfare. For instance, by financing their expenditure, the incentive for sub-
national governments to exercise due discretion in spending is compromised since they 
do not have to be responsible for any excess expanses. Strong central government are 
required to avoid this overspending and enforce maximum spending. On the other hand, 
strong central government is also needed to implement budget plans regardless 
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Imprecise estimation of price of oil to forecast revenues and overestimation of current 
and capital regional spending. This additional revenue, which is shared with regions, 
increases their fiscal revenue that leads to unplanned regional savings. Furthermore, the 
restriction of expenditure budget, concerns of corruption charges, and difficulties on 
tenders to implement projects should be minimised by the central governments (Lewis 
and Oosterman, 2009, p.44-46). In this case, a strong budget constrain by the central 
government to control regions expenditure whilst maintaining regions incentive to 
spend development budget become a crucial determinant to avoid inefficiency 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005, p.410).  
In addition, related with the political and administrative power, fiscal policy that 
allocate intergovernmental transfer fund on a discretion basis provides richer regions to 
influence centre decision than a predetermine formula. With poorer infrastructure, tax 
base, and less influence over the discretion aspects of central government finances, the 
regions often lacks resources and power necessary to address local problems 
(Rodríguez-Pose et al, 2009; p.2044). As a result of weaker institutions and lower public 
spending, the influence that lagging regions over political process and territorial 
development are lower, including access to distribution of funds that are limited 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010, p.625).  
These limitations that smaller regions faced and the influential power that the rich 
regions are interested, leads to the political competition for central's patronage. As with 
private sectors that have incentives with profits, public sectors also have incentives to 
compete for central government patronage through fiscal and lobbies. These 
competitions for national resources will waster regional government's resources and 
leads to a dead-weight loss. The resources wasted by regions spent in lobbying the 
central government does very little for the national development as a whole (Rodríguez-
Pose and Gill, 2005, p.414-415). However, the competition to attract central 
government’s fiscal transfers and domestic and foreign investments are also positive if 
the regions improves polices for public goods and services. For instance, local electors 
will independently move to other regions, which drive the local governments to 
compete to provide better and more efficient policies (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 
2010). Competition also constrains inefficient, rent seeking, and corruption practices. 
Competition also encourages and accelerates innovative policies and practices to meet 
public service and development. Following this, the transfer and adoption of innovation 
to other regions promotes aggregate efficient. This will hinder zero sum development 
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that occur if regions are forced to compete inefficiently through diseconomy practices 
and poor policies to attract investment and human capital.  
The problematic implementations discussed above provide explanation how 
decentralisation has not realized a more balance economic development that the 
devolutionist hoped. Thus, social, cultural, and political benefit should be treated 
carefully as greater capacities to implement policies and deliver public goods does not 
guarantee positive effect on economic growth (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004, p. 
1926). As a result of regional initial differences, decentralisation benefits regions with a 
greater capacities fulfil allocative and productivity effective, such as better social 
endowments and institutions (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). In addition, 
inadequate local government capacities with fiscal decentralisation worsen the disparity 
that has already occurred (Silva, 2005). Consequently, this undermines the equalizing 
role of the central government to transfer economic activities from the core to peripheral 
regions. Thus, decentralisation and disparities are two side of the same coin, there is 
tension between pursuing goals of economic development equalisation and 
decentralisation of authority (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010, p.623). These 
problems shows there is lack of link and effect between decentralisation and higher 
economic growth.  
2.3.4 Trade Liberalisation Impact 
This section discusses theories and debates on trade openness and supranational trade 
integration. Currently, it is common for supranational integration to include trade 
liberalisation agreements as a prelude to further institutional process, such as NAFTA, 
ASEAN FTA and Mercosur.  
Trade integration has two effects on regions or countries, trade creation and trade 
diversion (Schiff and Winters, 2003). Trade creation refers to shifts of domestic 
production to more efficient imports and cheaper goods. This leads to welfare 
improvement through specialisation in production on comparative advantages. Trade 
creation also increases welfare for non-members because the members’ income and 
prosperity spills over to the rest of the world. On the other hand, trade diversion 
happens when the lower cost of imports is replaced by higher import costs from member 
countries. This occurs because of preferential trade agreements among member 
countries. Welfare is reduced and the efficiency of allocation of resources declines. 
 44 
Thus, trade liberalisation impacts regional growth, depending on the strength of each 
power, trade creation and trade diversion.  
Armstrong and Taylor (2000) added the accumulation effect to the previous effect, as 
with higher investment opportunities across member countries, there will be a higher 
rate of investment return and lower risk due to a variety of investment options, hence 
this attracts more and more investment to the regions. The impact from the 
administration is the establishment of public service agencies related with free trade. 
Regions can determine their trade advancement through the agencies they have.  
Schiff and Winters (2003) asked whether growth is caused by non-discriminatory 
trade liberalisation among members or by regionalism. To answer this, we need a 
method to evaluate Regional Integration Agreements (RIA) member countries’ 
economic growth. The first approach is a gravity model that measures trade between 
two countries using quantitative data on GNP, population, distance between the 
countries (proxies for transport cost and business contacts), and physical endowments 
(coastal borders, landlocked, or an island). The gravity model studies confirm that trade 
increases within the RIA members. Recent work by Frankel, Stem, and Wei (1997) on 
the analysis of eight RIA found that for 1970–1992, there is a significant increase in 
each year for inter-bloc trade (trade creation) and a decrease in the bloc’s trade with the 
rest of the world (trade diversion). Other studies conclude that free trade agreements 
tend to create core-peripheral regions based on its gains and one of the determinant 
factors is geographic distance (Paelinck, and Polèse, 2000; Elliott and Ikemoto, 2004).  
The following discussion explores the potential impact of trade liberalisation on 
regional disparities. There are two important factors that explains the impact of trade 
openness, external and internal factors (Ocampo and Parra, 2007, p. 110). First, the 
external economic shocks such as the effects of global economy that systematically on 
world market (P.104). The global economy condition influence economic growth 
fluctuation and changes through commodity price and cycles in international finance. In 
addition, external factor also influence regional economic growth as the efficiency of 
trade liberalisation is linked with the trade composition rather than trade per se by both 
New Economic Geography (NEG) and H-O (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2006, p. 1205). 
The paper studies the link between trade and disparities on eight countries found that in 
six countries there are evidence that changes in trade composition preceded regional 
disparities level. A higher ratio of manufacturing proportion to agricultural and raw 
materials on trade composition is associated with higher economic disparities.  
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Furthermore, the type of industry sector that dominate a region also influences the 
region's economic performance. The reason is that manufacturing industries tend to 
agglomerate and allocate proximate with urban areas, which leads to concentration of 
activities and labour. On the other hand, agriculture tend to spread activities and labour 
can be reallocate following new agriculture lands (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2006).  
This is more profound in the service sector as it requires location-specific factors to 
develop, such as institutions, socio-economic interaction among agents, and highly 
specialised labour within the locations. In addition, Sjöberg and Sjöholm (2004) pointed 
out that trade liberalisation may have affected convergence through the high 
concentration of activities it creates, although they realised that the effect may differ 
across countries and regions. However, even if trade openness does not have spatial 
consequences per se, the sectoral impacts lead to spatial impacts because each district 
has a different composition of industrial sectors. The level of the sector's development 
and the degree of the sector's composition in a district determines the district’s 
economic development. Thus, developing countries, with greater disparities dimension 
and larger reliance on primary sector, trade and protection market globally, faced further 
regional disparities (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2006, p. 1217).  
Another external factor is the dominant role of sovereign state that limits the 
regulating authority of supranational agencies to achieve its common agenda. The 
bargaining power between the sovereign and supranational agency are influenced by 
institutional arrangements and culture that the trade liberalisation are embedded. In the 
case of AFTA, the dominant role of sovereign state means that each state sets it own 
trade liberal commodity modules with undermines the sectoral integration. As a result, 
trade values among AFTA members are lower and stagnant growth rate compared with 
non-AFTA members (Tongzon, 2005). Furthermore, the regulation of trade 
liberalisation also influence the disparities level among regions. First, as only selected 
sectors that are included in trade liberalisation, regions that have small proportion or 
lack of such sector will have lower penetration rate on trade liberalisation. These 
regions will have smaller market access to promote their products as trade liberalisation 
provides larger market access for the selected sectors product. Thus, larger and more 
diverse economy regions have higher gain from trade liberalisation compared with 
poorer regions. As a result, these region's economy are less dynamic and lower 
incentives to develop which exacerbates regions disparities. Following the endogenous 
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growth model, higher market access implies higher product demands and revenues that 
finance research and grants (Lucas, 1990, p. 73).  
The other factor is the domestic factor that should be seen in terms of interaction 
with external factors. The first domestic factor are social factors such as institutions and 
human capital, and the availability of infrastructure that play passive role as “framing 
conditions”, rather than direct determinants of regional economic growth (Ocampo and 
Parra, 2007, p. 100-101). The effect of trade openness on economic growth depends on 
structural or institutional conditions (Rodriguez, 2007b, p. 200). Thus, regional 
disparities in the developing countries are also exacerbated by the political and social 
discontent (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2006).  
Another domestic factor is the specialization of regions that influence the production 
economic of scale and market access. This capacity is realized by factors such as the 
achievements to enter markets, economic scale and transforming production structure 
(Ocampo and Parra, 2007, p.101). In this sense, Schumpeter (1961) argues that the 
introduction of new goods and services, marketing strategies, and new market 
accessibility. Globally, the level of exposure to international trade have increased 
economic growth from 2.9 percentage in 1970s to 5 percentage in 1980s (Dollar and 
Kay, 2002; Rodriguez, 2007b, p.184). In addition, it should be noted that different 
character of technological change occurs between advance and lagging regions. For 
example, in the developed countries innovation are related with technological wave, in 
developing countries these technological innovation are linked with attraction of 
sectors, act and technology developed in the advance countries (Ocampo and Parra, 
2007, p.113). Thus, trade directly shapes and influenced the level of regional economic 
performance.  
Domestic factor also determine the trade impact by the type of manufacturing 
products that influence the capacity of exports to generate growth. To achieve this, the 
manufacturing goods and services should have high technology contents. In their paper, 
Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2005) confirms this argument that the importance of 
the quality of exports reflects regional's technological content which determinants their 
economic growth. While a study by Ocampo and Parra (2007, p.117) provides another 
evidence that during the period 1962-2000, per capita growth in developing countries 
was negatively correlated with continuity on the export of primary goods and natural 
resources. In contrast, countries that have higher economic growth are linked with 
exports on high and medium technology manufacturing. This confirms that the labour-
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intensive exports or stage in the process of high-technology production chain, 
diminishes the growth potential of these exports. The study shows that the highest GDP 
per capita growth moved from natural resources to manufacturing exporters. In the case 
of countries, for instance, Indonesia and Malaysia, despite relies on natural resources 
exports, also diversified to low and medium technological manufacture (Rodriguez, 
2007a, p.129).  
Similar story applies to the sub-national levels as regions with abundant local 
endowment and infrastructure accessibility have a higher capacity to attract investment 
and economic activities. A similar process occurs in regions with richer infrastructure. 
Based on a simple economy graph, one can see the impact of economic integration for 
regions: as demand increases, wages and working hours increase. The opposite event 
occurs in poorer regions with economic activities and wages becoming stagnant or 
declining. This leads to divergence among regions, but as neoclassical economics 
assumes, the economy will find its equilibrium and results in a balanced economy where 
the poor region will experience another economic development as the rich regions 
become too expensive for production (Baldwin and Wyplost, 2006).  
Another domestic factor is the geographical location of the region, especially 
bordering regions as it has distance proximity with the neighbouring countries. The 
bordering regions with a economic sector and local endowments could involved in the 
trade liberalisation. Literature argues that as trade integration increase, bordering 
regions become the the gate and hub to the inlands. However, studies shows that trade 
liberalisation impact on bordering regions are insignificant and largely depends on the 
trade integration level  (Logan, 2008; Rodríguez-Pose and Sanchez-Reaza, 2005). For 
instance, bordering regions had higher economic growth during the GATT period 
compared with the NAFTA regime. However, the economic growth rate remain lower 
than during the substitution era (Rodríguez-Pose and Sanchez-Reaza, 2005). The study 
also shows that higher economic growth in the bordering regions compared to inland 
regions increases the level of regional disparities.  
There are empirical studies on the impact of trade liberalisation on divergence. 
Findings from empirical studies show the impact of trade openness varies between 
studies. The paper by Sjöberg and Sjöholm (2004) using coefficient variation argued 
that trade liberalisation has a small impact on disparities but it promotes concentration 
as trade openness relies on FDI, which is expected to be more concentrated than 
domestic invesment. The opposite is true with domestic firms that are based on home 
 48 
localities before expanding and considering bigger cities. The research also emphasised 
the lack of international hub ports for industry and investment in the regions. The study 
by Sanchez-Reaza and Rodríguez-Pose (2002) introduced the idea of bordering states 
and found that oil and bordering states increase divergence among regions. However, by 
using absolute models this study neglects variation in the economic structure of 
economies.  
In a similar method, Fujita and Hu (2001) compared policies with the bias of open-
door policy of special economic zones and the infrastructure of the coasts. The 
descriptive statistics analysis indicates accumulation causation, as Myrdal argued, with 
the early FDI attracting more suppliers and products, which increased production and 
FDI that sought higher returns. The importance of technology transferred with the 
establishment of joint ventures in high technology industries between foreign and 
domestic firms. This was confirmed by Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2006) that found 
divergence or discontinuance of convergence in cross-country cases. Using the ratio of 
agriculture and manufacturing to approximate trade reform, the study has several 
implications. First, regions with manufacturing have higher growth and subsistence 
regions are lagging behind. Second, as manufacturing and FDI favour large and 
concentrated urban areas, it is likely that rich regions become richer and poor regions 
poorer. 
In Indonesia, Aswicahyono et al. (1996), using provincial data, found that trade 
reforms have little impact on distribution in regards to industrial sectors. Despite the 
changes, it does not differ significantly from the prior decentralisation period. Rivas 
(2007) studied the impact of trade liberalisation that NAFTA had on Mexican regions 
using econometric analysis and found that trade liberalisation is likely to benefit states 
with higher incomes and infrastructure. The study approximates trade openness as the 
ratio of trade activities with GRDP. The paper found that trade openness promotes 
convergence but trade openness increase disparities if it is interacted with other 
variables such as infrastructure and per worker income. However this measure neglects 
sectoral contribution and state policies. Using similar econometrics analysis, Madariaga 
et al. (2004) studies the impact of different free trade agreements on Mexico regions. 
The study shows that economic growth and convergence occur during the  Mercosur 
with macroeconomic stabilisation from 1994 to 2002. However, contrast economic 
performance during the NAFTA with less effect of convergence between Mexico and 
the USA.  
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Rich regions and bordering regions that have physical proximity to advanced 
countries gain the most from free trade agreements, as found by Juan-Ramón and 
Rivera-Batiz (1996). Trade will increase population and economic concentration 
following a cycle process where urban areas with extensive infrastructure and facilities 
attract people and economy leading to agglomeration, migration, and a brain drain, and 
this, in turn, causes centripetal forces for further economic development (Armstrong and 
Taylor, 2000; Florida, 2008). This agglomeration and cumulative of causation was 
confirmed by Logan (2008). He found that trade increased employment rate and labour 
concentration. However, the study did not confirm a spatial effect using tariff and local 
endowments data in the USA. The research used trade activities and lag variables to 
control for past economic conditions and minimised endogeneity with dependent 
variables.  
2.3.5 Institutional Change on State Restructuring  
The institutional approach offers a comprehensive analytical tool to overview 
institutional influence on divergence of economic performance. The institutionalism 
literature provides a complementary tool of mainstream economics to analyse 
institutions as rules of economic agent behaviour and to observe historical 
embeddedness (North, 1994b). While neoclassical economics focuses on the operation 
of the market as a single and independent subject, institutionalism provides additional 
analyses in understanding how and what determines economic development. The 
institutional analysis provides an analytical tool to understand the role of path 
dependence and feedback effects on institutions’ variations that determine economic 
divergence.   
Specifically, this research applies the historical institutionalism approach and refers 
to the study of how social and political institution structure interactions influence 
distinctive national trajectories (Hall and Taylor, 1996). The distinctive trajectories lie 
in the political theories, where institutions of polity and economic structure conflict and 
cause unevenness in the structuralism that saw policies and economics as the principal 
factor of collective action of generating different outcomes. This study employed 
historical institutionalism to overview ways of variation in pre-existing institutions, at 
local and national levels, that determined the degree of local capacity to establish 
institutions and policies necessary in economic development. This research studied the 
two characters of historical institutional approach, which are the critical juncture and 
 50 
feedback effects (Thelen, 1999, p. 394), in understanding the persistence of Indonesian 
regional economic divergence. Path dependence can be viewed as a path that certain 
institutions choose regardless of previous knowledge and restrictions. Another 
definition is the inability to break free from its own history or whose outcome evolves 
as a consequence from its history (Martin and Sunley 2006). The feedback effect 
suggests that, with past trajectories, institutions continue to evolve and respond to 
changing political conditions and thus, reinforcing distinctive patterns (Thelen, 1999). 
This research adopts North’s characteristics of institutions that determine economic 
performance (1994a, 2005). Institutional analysis application in economic studies 
emphasises the role of property rights and the transaction cost effect on economic 
performance Property rights fit in the neoclassical and endogenous growth theories as 
property rights act as a determinant factor to explain how investment and ideas affect 
economic growth. Weak property rights lead to low levels of investments and the 
consequence is poorer economic growth (Angeles, 2011). 
Property rights refer to the rights to use and optimise the property or investment that 
a person has for their own benefit. This is the right of the individual over their own 
labour and the goods and services they possess (North, 1990, p. 33). Thus, ‘the more 
likely a sovereign alter property rights for his or her own benefit, the lower the expected 
returns from investment and the lower in turn the incentive to invest’ (North and 
Weingast, 1989, p. 803). Property rights provide incentives and disincentives for 
individual actions through extending formal rights granted by the government 
(Hodgson, 2007, p.152). The human’s interest in property rights is a function of legal 
rules, organisational forms, and enforcements and norms of behaviour, as defined by the 
institutional framework. Some valued attributes are in the public domain and individuals 
have to pay to capture these resources, which is a transaction cost. Because a transaction 
cost changes radically between periods and regimes, the mix between the formal 
protection of rights and individual attempts to capture rights or devote resources varies 
significantly (North, 1990, p. 33). 
Institutions provide the structure for exchange and determine the cost of transacting 
and the cost of transformation. Institutions required to accomplish economic exchange 
vary on the level of complexity, motivation of the players, and the ability of the players 
to measure and enforce the environment (North, 1990, p. 34). Furthermore, the literature 
differentiates institutions that are necessary, based on the level of economic exchange. 
The small-scale production and local trade exchange requires repeat actions, cultural 
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homogeneity, and self-enforcement. The transformation cost is high as specialisation 
and division of labour is basic. As the size and scope increase, economic exchange 
requires impersonal exchange, trust, bonding, and a merchant code of conduct. 
Following the increase in complexity level, the increasing role of the state becomes 
apparent to protect merchants and the revenue of potential economic activities. 
However, the state becomes the source of insecurity and a higher transaction cost. 
Finally, the presence of third-party enforcement is critical to successful modern 
economies and economic growth. Effective third-party enforcement is maintained 
through a set of rules that then create effective informal constraints (North, 1990, p. 35). 
This adaptation of new institutional economics (NIE) into the historical 
institutionalism framework is required as the study’s aim to answer how pre-existing 
institutions determine current regional economic performance. Historical 
institutionalism was established in political science to understand public policy 
processes and outcomes (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Skocpol, 1979; Thelen, 1999). The 
application in regional economic development, as in this study, requires an integration 
of political and policy inputs and economic outcome. Thus, by applying this NIE 
perspective, this research provides a framework to explain the impact of variation in 
political institutions to economic divergence across regions. 
The analyses of historical institutionalism framework are as follows (Fig. 2-4), (i) to 
identify independent institutional variables as critical antecedent factors in the preceding 
conditions. These pre-existing institutions are identified as determinants and are studied 
in the first timeframe of an antecedent period. (ii) To combine the effects of causal 
factors, the pre-existing institutional capacities and the critical juncture, produce a long-
term divergence outcome. During the critical juncture, local governments faced 
different choices with a ‘usable past’ and capacities gained during pre-existing 
conditions. The AFTA and decentralisation act as external shocks that generates further 
different regional development paths.  
(iii) As a result, pre-existing government experiences influence divergence in 
institutional capacities that shape economic performance. At this stage, variation in 
institutional arrangements influence economic divergence through feedback effects that 
either differentiate the policy–making process or magnify the possibilities of a particular 
policy chosen. The study provides two case studies to view the antecedent institutions’ 
roles in regional economic divergence. The historical-comparative study follows 
previous empirical analysis by other research (Eaton, 2004; Sinha, 2004, Skocpol, 1979; 
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Sorensen,2010; Zukowski, 2004 ) to identify common causal factors and to explain 
common phenomena between regions. 
 
Figure 2-4 Model of Historical Institutional Analysis and Economic Performance 
 
Source: Adapted from Slater and Simmons (2010) 
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Chapter 3 Methods for State Restructuring Impact Analysis 
 
In investigating the impact of the ASEAN Free Trade Area AFTA and devolution on 
Indonesian regional economies, this research combines two methods: quantitative and 
qualitative. The quantitative economic geography methods involve the analysis of 
secondary statistical data along with econometric analysis to draw research conclusions, 
whereas the qualitative technique adopts case study research that explains causal links 
and investigates contemporary phenomena within real-world contexts. The specific 
historical institutionalist approach serves as an analytical tool for studying the role of 
institutions at different periods.   
3.1 Cases 
3.1.1 Indonesia 
The regional development of Indonesia was selected to study the effect of regional trade 
liberalisation and decentralisation. The country is considered to exhibit large variations 
in regional development rates, and has recently experienced a political and economic 
shift from a three-decade centralised regime to decentralisation (Fig. 3-1). The 
combination of globalisation, industrial re-organisation, and rise of local economies as 
the major effect of the economic dynamics of Atlantic Fordism (Jessop, 1997) has also 
affected the Indonesian economy through the AFTA implementation and 
decentralisation in the last decade. Furthermore, these events have given rise to the 
spatial selectivity of special regions (Brenner, 1999) and a shift in the decision-making 
process, from government to governance (Jessop, 2002). However, after almost a 
decade of state restructuring, differences in local policies and institutions determine the 
economic performance across regions.  
 Regional disparities are more pronounced in developing countries because these 
nations display a greater scale of disparity, which is rooted in political and social 
discontent (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2006). In 2001, Indonesia began shifting to a 
decentralised form of governance, in which the central government transfers significant 
political and administrative authority to the sub national level.  
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Figure 3-1 Map of Indonesia 
 
Source: Bertrand (2004). 
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Observing a decade of the implementation of Indonesian decentralisation, researchers 
state that this implementation appears to contradict arguments that this type of 
governance improves government services and public reforms (von Luebke, 2009). The 
country needs to learn to adopt democratic values and gain confidence in espousing 
such an approach. The study shows the continuity of non-transparent and elite-centric 
agreements on public employment, government contracts, and party list positions. The 
paper studies on districts in Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi shows increasing 
acknowledgement of public opinion and improvement of electoral incentives. For 
instance, higher demand for minimum service standard, and expansion of support 
programmes to promote independent and investigative journalism to ensure good 
governance. 
Involvement with the AFTA has forced Indonesia to reduce and eventually eliminate 
the trade barriers imposed on the manufacturing sector. The effect of this trade openness 
becomes more significant when the size of regions is considered. With more than 500 
districts and each with a local economic structure, it is expected significant differences 
and varying scales of trade liberalisation effect (Feridhanusetyawan and Pangestu, 
2003). Rich regions with large economy base and higher trade rate will gain wider 
market access from trade liberalization, while poorer regions with less efficient products 
will struggle to penetrate the market and compete with other regions. Thus, poorer 
regions potentially became market destination for import products as Ramasamy (1994) 
argues in the early stage of AFTA that the agreement would increase imports to 60 
percent.  
The literature provides insight to predict the impact of trade liberalization. This 
increase in imports will affect economy because ineffective industries will struggle to 
compete with cheaper and higher quality imported products. Furthermore, Rodríguez-
Pose and Gill (2006) argue that trade liberalization increase development gap for 
regions that are lagging in manufacturing industries as these industries allocate near 
industrial agglomeration and urban areas.  This could be expected for a substantial 
number of rural districts in Indonesia.  
Similar to economic issues, the size and scale of socio-political dynamic issues in 
Indonesia are broad. The decentralisation has caused regional splitting at the provincial 
and district levels. The splitting advocates argue that the provinces and districts are too 
large, which combined with poor infrastructure has isolate people from access to 
services such as health and education. Other reasons for regional division are religion, 
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ethnicity, and bureaucratic and political rent seeking (Booth, 2011; Fitriani et al., 2005). 
The transfer of political power to the regions has also caused instability in these areas. 
Direct elections have been criticised as monopolised by local elites rather than 
encouraging of accountable regional governments. In the early stages of the 
decentralisation, former civil servants successfully won elections at the district levels. 
These leaders are descended from the New Order and continue to exploit resources for 
self-enrichment or wealth accumulation to boost status rather than regional 
development. The scale of the territorial dynamics of Indonesian regions is reflected in 
the catch phrase Bhineka tunggal ika (Unity in diversity) as a consensus amongst 
disparate cultures in finding unity (Kingsbury, 2003, p. 99). With more than 700 
regional languages (Lewis, 2009) and 300 ethnic groups (Kuoni, 1999) spread among 
five main islands, Indonesia is a culturally and traditionally diverse country.  The lack 
of acceptance of diversity has been demonstrated by the numerous conflicts and wars, as 
well as considerable social segregation, throughout the nation. For instance, in 
Kalimantan, ethnic and religious issues have caused conflict between the Dayaks and 
Maduran immigrants because of the Dayaks’ differing civilisations and ‘unhealthy’ 
lifestyles (Kingsbury, 2003, p. 104). 
Indonesia was chosen as a case study in the current research because of its rich 
district-level statistical datasets. Available data include socio-economic statistics 
covering gross regional domestic product (GRDP), population, levels of education, road 
accessibility, and fiscal data. Furthermore, detailed data on plant-level manufacturing 
and complete AFTA tariff data for the period under observation are accessible. 
Manufacturing industry development in Indonesia regions is widely diverse on types, 
numbers, and advancement. In econometrics analysis, the manufacturing industry can 
be use as a proxy for regional economic level to analyze the impact of state 
restructuring on regional disparities. First, in trade liberalization variable, manufacturing 
industry data is crucial to construct input tariff data, which is based on manufacturing 
production proportion. Second, various variable from manufacturing industry also act as 
control variable to define regions’ economic structure, endowments and characteristics. 
The Indonesian district-level geographical map is also freely available from the 
National Agency for Survey and Mapping (Badan Koordinasi Survei dan Pemetaan 
Nasional/Bakosurtanal). 
The dynamic characteristics of Indonesia make it an appropriate case for studying the 
effect of state restructuring prompted by trade liberalisation and decentralisation on 
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regional development. First, statistical analysis that provides evidence of divergence in 
regional development is crucial for establishing the argument of this thesis. Second, this 
study intends to determine the extent of the effect of trade liberalisation and 
decentralisation on regional divergence across the periods under observation. Finally, 
the study explores the role of institutions, along with state restructuring, in determining 
the pathways for regional development. In the latter, particular focus is directed toward 
embedded institutional capacities that influenced the effect of state restructuring on 
local development. The current study explains the effect of state restructuring induced 
by trade liberalisation and decentralisation on the variations in regional development.  
3.1.2 Batam and Bandung 
Variations in regional development cannot be studied only at one particular period. 
These should be viewed as a continual and evolving process that progresses along a 
certain path dependence. The presence of an event as a disturbance to this path serves as 
an opportunity for further analysis of variations. To explore the impact of institutional 
arrangements of state restructuring on regional development, specific regions as case 
studies are required. Noting that Indonesia is a culturally and economically diverse 
country, two districts, City of Batam and Bandung (Fig. 3-2) are selected as case studies 
to explore the impact of state restructuring on regional development. The previous 
chapter on quantitative impact does not require such case study as the analysis does not 
consider local institutional arrangements and political situation that might influence 
state restructuring impact on the regions. 
There are two reasons that this thesis chooses both cities as the case study. First, both 
cities have large and significant manufacturing industries that has established since the 
centralized regime. The establishments of manufacturing industries in both cities 
received support from the central government Batam in 1978 following the creation of 
bonded zone by the central government (Keppres. No.41/1978; Phelps, 2004). While the 
Bandung manufacturing industries was accelerated by the Paket Oktober (Pakto) 1992, 
which provide funding and land for manufacturing activities in the city (Fromhold-
Eisebith and Eisebith, 2002).  
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Figure 3-2 Map of Batam and Bandung 
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Second, both cities also have main city neighbours that provide significant market for 
the manufacturing industries. Batam is in close distance and expected receive 
Singapore’s departing manufacturing plants following its shift as the region’s financial 
hub. While Bandung with only 122 km or 2 hours road distance from Jakarta, has a 
large market and transportation hub for its manufacturing production.  
These factors are considered to choose Bandung and Batam as the case study for this 
research. As they have similarity on economic structure, relationship with the central 
government, and market access, the hypothesis is that institutional arrangement of each 
city influences the impact of state restructuring. Following historical institutional, this 
chapter presume that past knowledge and culture bounded institutional shift that took 
place as a respond and adjustment to state restructuring (Thelen, 1999, 2004). Other 
research discipline has also recognized the importance of institutions and culture on 
economic performance such as community studies (Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2006), 
property development and housing (Doak and Karadimitriou, 2007) and technological 
innovation (Taylor, 2009) 
The development of Batam is an important regional case study in acquiring an 
overview of the state restructuring effects. The city is the only special economic zone in 
Indonesia for more than three decades, and its development is heavily dependent on 
state policy. The city also symbolises the location where trade liberalisation encounters 
regional autonomy in the post-decentralisation period. In addition to exploring the 
relationship between actors and institutions over the study periods, this research also 
analyses how historical institutions and path dependence determine the city’s current 
policies and future path.  
Meanwhile, the industrial region of Bandung is the subject of debate on regional 
development and path dependence. Once known as an industrial manufacturing region, 
the city changed gradually into a service and creative city. The presence of universities, 
which are near Jakarta, and the pool of highly skilled young professionals created a new 
economic mode and brand for the city. The institutional analysis emphasises how 
previous institutions determined the city’s response to governance and the creation of a 
new development path. Particular attention was paid to the networks amongst the local 
government, NGOs, and academicians to illustrate how such factors influenced the shift 
in economic mode. These case studies provide research insights through analysis on 
different institutional arrangements and embedded actor networks. Furthermore, by 
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acknowledging path dependence and historical differences, this thesis seeks antecedent 
institutions and past knowledge that bind local policies. This approach enables the 
elucidation of the economic policy and growth divergence amongst districts despite 
three decades of centralisation and devolution.  
3.2 Mixed Methods Analysis 
The decision to adopt the mixed methods analysis, and its combination with quantitative 
and qualitative methods, is based on the nature of the research question. The research 
questions, which were deduced rather than induced, were formulated through a critical 
review of relevant literature and current conditions in Indonesia. This thesis examines 
Indonesia regional development with the district (municipality and regency level) as the 
spatial unit of analysis. The dynamics of regional development in Indonesia should be 
understood and viewed through statistical analysis before elucidating the variations in 
the state restructuring effects.  
The mixed method enables comprehensive analysis and enhances the validity of 
research because one method serves as a test on another (Read and Marsh, 2002). The 
quantitative method, in which the econometrics analysis of local endowments is 
performed, explores the determinants of economic growth. This exploration is crucial to 
understanding the local economic structure and institutional arrangements as the 
foundation of the qualitative study. The qualitative method features the use of in-depth 
interviews to clarify the role of local endowments and institutional arrangements in 
economic growth.  
Because the empirical studies are based on distinct methodologies and research aims, 
the specificities of the methodology are explained in each of the chapters presenting the 
methods used. It should be noted that the hypothesis of this thesis is that state 
restructuring provides opportunity to accelerate economic growth through promoting 
property rights and lower transaction cost.  
Chapter 5 answers the first research question if the state restructuring affect regional 
disparities by presents formulas from economic growth literature and various graphs to 
enable visualisation of economic growth at the district level. In chapter 6, several 
econometric formulas are the primary tools used to examine the regional economics, 
industrial, and political variables as regional economic growth determinants. The 
econometrics analysis shows the extent of these determines effecting regional economic 
growth.  
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The qualitative analysis in chapter 7 studies the extent of institutional arrangements 
influence public policies and economic development. Institutional arrangements that 
prioritise improvement on property rights and reducing transaction cost leads to more 
innovative policies. This chapter adopts the historical institutionalist approach to 
interpret regional divergence with case studies on the districts of Batam and Bandung.  
3.2.1 Desktop and Quantitative Research 
The first specific question was approached by desktop research on descriptive statistics 
and regional economic distribution indices. In the data analysis, wealth distribution in 
Indonesian regions was examined using systematic inequality and inequality variations 
(Fan and Casetti, 1994). Systematic inequality comprises three types: dispersion indices, 
such as coefficient variations and standard deviation; the Lorenz approach, which 
includes the Gini coefficient and dissimilarity index; and the entropy index with 
deployment of the Theil index. Another measurement index is the rank size rule, which 
was used to examine inequality amongst regions with the same level of wealth. 
However, the systematic inequality approach is disadvantageous in that it explains only 
overall inequality and does not reveal sub-regional inequality dynamics. Inequality 
variations explore the expansion of the above-mentioned measurements.  
The first measurements are the decompositions of the Theil index to within and 
amongst regional inequalities; the second is the expansion of rank size, which shows the 
dynamics of inequalities amongst regions at different levels of wealth; the third involves 
mapping of the distribution of wealth amongst regions using the individual region’s 
inequality values. The regions under observation for this approach were defined at the 
regional (west, central, and eastern parts of Indonesia), provincial, and district levels. 
Finally, the industry concentration within a region is measured with the Herfindahl 
index (H-index) for the employment size and value added on three discrete years, 1993, 
1996, and 2005. 
3.2.2 Econometric Analysis 
In the econometric analysis, the effect of the decentralisation and AFTA on regional 
convergence from 1993 to 2005 was examined. To obtain the statistics data from the 
Bureau of Statistics/Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS), tailored requests and direct contacts 
with the Bureau was necessary. The second specific question on determinant of regional 
economic growth is answered with formal convergence equation following the neo-
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classical approach (Islam, 2003). Traditional convergence analysis and the spatial 
dependence effect with the GDP per capita growth rate in each districts is the dependent 
variable. This is the most common variable used and is considered the best proxy for 
economic growth, as indicated in non-spatial (Barro, 2000; Fan and Casetti, 1994; 
Sánchez-Reaza and Rodríguez-Pose, 2002; Rivas, 2007; Fujita and Hu, 2001; Garcia 
and Soelistianingsih, 1998; Resosudarmo and Vidyattama, 2006) and spatial literature 
(Arbia and Piras., 2005; Rey and Montouri, 1999; Rey, 1991). 
3.2.3 Institutional Analysis of Regional Development 
The analysis focused on the previous decentralisation and AFTA institutions, as well as 
on the overview of the evolution that shaped regional economic divergence (Fig. 3-1). 
Using historical institutionalist theory, the qualitative analysis proposes the argument 
that the regional economic variation in Indonesia is related to past institutional capacity. 
Following historical institutionalism, the analysis was concerned with the components 
of the framework, including critical antecedents, critical junctures, and reproduction of 
institutions, as adapted from political science (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Skocpol, 1979; 
Thelen, 1999; Pierson, 1996).  
 
Research Procedure 
The analysis of historical institutionalism and economic growth was illustrated with a 
context-based strategy and decision-making, as well as with networks and conflicts 
between actors. This illustration was directed toward the specific place of the Batam and 
Bandung municipalities in post-trade liberalisation and decentralisation. Furthermore, 
the case study was contextualised by connecting the analysis at this level of institutional 
evolution and policy innovation with key issues that occurred at higher governance 
levels and external processes that determined economic growth. This includes the 
supranational, national, and regional levels that were influenced through formal, 
informal, and cultural rules.  
In institutional analysis, narratives are essential to contextualising and constructing 
empirical situations (Healey, 2007). In this sense, narratives are sequences of connected 
events and the relationships between events and their consequences. After constructing 
such narratives, interpretation and conclusion are generated with coding techniques. 
This approach, as with other qualitative methods, is expected provide insights that 
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combine the effects of several factors and ‘multiple conjectural causation’ (Silverman, 
2005).  
To gather such narratives, semi-structured interviews were conducted with experts 
including government officers at all levels, NGO officials, and international consultants 
such as the APCO Worldwide and ASIA Foundation. All categories of interviewees 
represent agents at different stages of the institutional process (see Appendix D). Thus, 
each category of interviewees shows the roles, influence, path dependence, and path 
breaker that contributed to the regional economic growth differences. The interviews 
normally lasted for approximately 60 minutes.  
The interviews aimed to acquire historical data and reveal the individual subjective 
experiences of the respondents who were involved in institutional building. Emphasis 
was placed on institutional building, network, and discourses that prompted the actors to 
innovate economic policies. Furthermore, the interviews explored how the respondents 
constructed policies, networks, and innovation that determined innovation in policies. 
The information from the interviews was analysed using the standard coding technique 
and compared with other sources such as field observations, official documents, and 
newspapers.  
The interviewees selected based on their core competence and experience with the 
research topic. If possible, the chairman or highest rank bureaucrats were interviewed, 
as it is assume that institution leaders have comprehensive knowledge on its 
organization institutional issues. 
The interview structure is refers to institutional theories and additional questions are 
aimed to confirm findings from the quantitative chapter analysis. First, the interview 
explores the experts’ views on state restructuring issues and the role of economic 
variables on regional development. This is performed to support and justify the 
quantitative chapter analysis. Second, the interviewees explain about impact of state 
restructuring on their institution and institutional adjustment efforts to respond state 
restructuring. 
The respondents were contacted through the personal networks provided by the 
research supervisor, the author’s professional networks, and other colleagues. The 
snowballing technique was also employed to identify potential interviewees through 
suggestions provided by previous respondents; these potential respondents were also 
selected based on professional knowledge and job position. An informal relationship 
with gatekeepers is crucial for gaining access to key experts and ensuring effective 
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interviews. The snowballing and gatekeeper methods are regarded as the best 
approaches to distributing semi-structured questionnaires to senior government officers 
and other socio-economic stakeholders. The survey consisted of 15 questions grouped 
into three main parts: political and economic background, state and local policy 
discourses, and past and current effects on economic development. The interviews were 
conducted to select government agencies at three levels, NGOs, and higher education 
actors for a total of 32 interviewees.  
The empirical study does not represent overall regional institutional building and 
economic growth. The case studies were used to illustrate how institutional building, 
action, and innovation determined economic growth within a specific location. Thus, the 
narratives presented in the analyses were limited to a certain regional institutional 
capacity and to the external conditions that were considered. This study does not 
comprehensively describe the complexity and extent of regional institutional capacity 
and economic growth. However, it provides insight into the relationship between 
institutional building and economic growth in a developing country, which can be 
applied to conceptual frameworks and replicated in other cases.  
 
3.3 Validity, Reliability, and Ethical Considerations 
There has been concern over the reliability of measurements, specifically whether the 
statistical data are reliable. The extremely noisy nature of the GRDP data from the 
Statistical Bureau is noted by McCulloch and Syahrir (2008). Eng (2005) shows 
significant differences in the methods and survey collection coverage for the national 
account survey. The author argues that these changes have caused new accounts to be 
higher than those reported in earlier publications. Such changes include greater details 
in the input-output survey and data availability, more coverage on survey collection, 
more international cooperation and advice from international agencies such as the Asian 
Development Bank and IMF, and the high rate of expansion and diversification as a 
result of the Asian fiscal crisis in 1997. Therefore, careful use and interpretation of the 
statistical data in Indonesia are required. In the current work, several steps were taken to 
ensure that the limitations in the data do not severely diminish the research validity. 
First, more up-to-date statistics was used and frequently revised. For example, the 2004 
data were examined and compared with the 2005 and 2006 publications to ensure data 
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consistency. Second, additional data manipulation and adjustments were conducted 
following any change in policies, such as the expenditure budget that was integrated 
into a single variable in the decentralisation. In the qualitative analysis, attempts to 
reduce threats to validity and reliability were also made. Both validity and reliability are 
threatened to the degree of subjectivity in the measurements and observations of 
researchers. To reduce such threats in this study, data that support documents were 
collected and additional interviews were conducted to corroborate the interview notes. 
The interviewees chosen were those with prominent positions, and were asked about 
personal experiences and opinions regarding the topic to ensure internal validity. 
This research complies with ethical principles. Permissions were obtained before the 
interviews were conducted and before the reports were gathered. Several data were 
collected exclusively for this research and others are available publicly from the given 
organisation’s office or website. To ensure interviewee anonymity, the list of 
interviewees shows only job responsibility and date of interview, as requested by some 
of the respondents.  
 66 
Chapter 4 Background on Regional Development and State 
Restructuring in Indonesia 
 
 
4.1 State Restructuring’s Impact on Regional Development: Introduction 
The economic policy shift toward trade liberalisation and decentralisation has occurred 
globally. State restructuring should be viewed as a window of opportunity to promote 
regional development balance. However, presently there is a widening gap between 
regional developments because of variation on local capacities. Since the centralised 
regime came into power, regions have demanded equal development to level out the 
disparities they have encountered between the western regions versus the central and 
east regions. Poorer regions expressed their disappointment with the central 
government’s development policy and demanded larger income transfers and more 
authority to administrate their region. 
Following the financial crisis of 1997 and the fall of the New Order regime, 
Indonesia entered a new political order, one based on decentralisation. In the post 
decentralisation regime, regions separated and expanded into a greater number of 
regions based on economic and cultural backgrounds (Booth, 2011; Fitrani, et al. 2005). 
On the other hand, in 1993 the ASEAN FTA decreased trade barriers between the 
ASEAN members. The author selects the period spanning 1993–2005 because the 
implementation of decentralisation in Indonesia occurred beginning in 2001 and the full 
implementation of the AFTA-CEPT program for the original countries began in 2002. 
This chapter explores institutional changes at both the national and regional level. 
The chapter is organized as follows: The next section discusses institutional 
arrangements during the centralised regime while the following section addresses 
uneven development during the same regime. The final section explains institutional 
arrangements that came about as a result of state restructuring.  
4.2 Centralised Regional Development Institutions 
After the political riot in 1965, the new regime ruled Indonesia for more than thirty 
years (1966–1997). The New Order regime, under President Soeharto, represented its 
main political principle with an image displaying a free pluralistic society, symbolized 
by a parliamentary (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat
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The general election became a political ritual because for six consecutive elections the 
MPR re-elected President Soeharto by acclamation. Early on its power, the new 
regime’s political view was one of strong anti-communism, economic stability, and 
inward-focused development. The New Order formulated a ruling style based on 
Pancasila and UUD 1945, with constitutional order, political symbology and cultural 
cohesion (Canonica-Walangitang, 2004) at its principle. The idea was to promote order, 
stability, security and economic development to protect against the repetitive of chaos 
of 1965. During this period, the political ruling style immobilized any potential unrest. 
The controls it placed on institutions made it impossible to replace the President. 
The local parliaments (Dewan Pewakilan Rakyat Daerah/DPRD) had very limited 
political authority due to a lack of control over local official appointments and 
resources. Their political power was limited to recommend a governor or mayor 
candidate as it was the central government, with approval from the President, that 
appointed the heads of regions at the provincial and district level (Canonica-
Walangitang, 2004, p. 93). In addition, the MoHA, on the recommendation of the 
governor, appointed the regents and mayors. Another role of the provincial parliaments 
was to elect regional delegates to represent their respective regions in the People's 
Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/MPR). The provincial 
parliament’s representatives totalled 147 persons, with each DPRD province represented 
by at least four and at most eight members. The main task of these representatives was 
to elect the President.   
The military roles present throughout Indonesia’s state policy history were significant 
during the country’s various political periods, including in the old and New Order 
regimes. Under the Old Order, the military played an important role in maintaining 
national security and integration. Under the New Order, the military assumed the dual 
roles (dwifungsi ABRI) of military and political/social overseer (Rosser, 2001). This 
became the basic relationship between the military and economists, one that later was 
institutionalized, and its factions became known as “economic technocrats.” In the 
following subchapter, we explore the roles of “economic technocrats” in shaping 
Indonesia’s economic policies following the fall of politico-bureaucrats.  
During the New Order, the state re-formed into an integralist nation (Negara 
Integralistik) as an alternative to following liberal and social-based state ideologies 
(Canonica-Walangitang, 2004). The state emphasized unity, with no divide between the 
state and the people. According to this concept, the state controls the existing social 
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organizations and regulates the new ones. The decision makers are bureaucrats, not 
politicians, since the state has autonomy in both policy and decision-making. 
Specifically, the President’s economic advisors were divided into two factions, the 
technocrats and the nationalist/politico-bureaucrats. The technocrats are a group of 
western-trained economists supported by the IMF, which guaranteed Indonesia would 
receive development resources from the international economy. Despite skilfully 
balancing the differences between the two factions, this practice produced negative 
effects.  
The central government controlled regional politics and wielded administrative 
authority. There were 27 provinces and 306 districts level administration with a 
government organisation structure that are directed by the central government. The first 
tier of the regional government was the provincial administration, headed by a governor, 
and the second tier was the district level, which was governed by regents (bupati) in the 
case of regencies and mayors (walikota) in the case of municipalities.  
The main idea behind the New Order regime was unity and regional administration, 
which was considered an extension of Jakarta bureaucracy (Canonica-Walangitang, 
2004, p. 92). These local governments had only administrative roles and oversaw the 
implementation of policies, rules and regulations. This bureaucracy administration 
shaped the hierarchical system in which governments at the national level are 
subordinate administration units that fall under Jakarta-based departments and agencies. 
To fund this development program, 80% of the total public expenditure in the provinces 
was disbursed from the national budget by central government’s departments and 
agencies while the remaining 20% was administered through instructions from the 
President (Inpres). The latter was for infrastructure and other development proposes 
(Lewis, 2005).  
Economic development in the New Order regime began under the government 
known as the “Kabinet Pembangunan” (Development Cabinet). The first cabinet’s main 
attempts revolved around tackling economic affairs with the following policies: reliance 
on oil, revenue, export, foreign direct investment (FDI) and massive input on foreign 
aid. The period also witnessed a fundamental economic policy transformation at the 
hands of the western-trained economist technocrats, with assistance from IMF and the 
WB experts. There was also the establishment of intergovernmental group on Indonesia 
(IGGI) and its successor, the consultative group on Indonesia (CGI), which were 
dominated by the USA and Japan.  
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The economic policy of the New Order was divided into four periods: 1967–1973, 
1974–1981, 1982–1986 and 1987–1997. Because political and economic policies in the 
centralised regime determined the state restructuring process of the 1990s, this section 
explores only the first three periods.  The first period, spanning 1967 through 1973, 
marked an initial acceleration of economic growth in industrial development. The 
policies of this period emphasized an open door to foreign investment, foreign exchange 
and policy substitution.  
Regional cooperation and an inward-focused orientation, with heavy reliance on high 
revenues from the oil-based industries, marked the second period. During this oil boom 
period, Indonesia’s revenue improved significantly as a result of oil prices, which 
appreciated seventeen times over a seven-year period. The emergence of public 
enterprises as part of the national economy was also a hallmark of this period. The third 
period, spanning 1982 through 1986, marked the end of the oil boom, with Indonesia’s 
revenue dropping as a result of plummeting oil receipts, which had amounted to as 
much as three-quarters of export earnings and two-thirds of government revenue. This 
revenue decline became a huge problem, one that led to changes in policy framework. 
In the post-oil economy, that framework structurally shifted to a state-led one. The 
structural adaptation included:  
1) A reaction strategy that included devaluation  
2) An institutional adjustment of the financial and tax system 
3) Deregulation packages  
 
In the last period, that spanning 1987 through 1997, the economic policy gradually 
shifted from state-led protection to a competitive and market oriented industries 
(Canonica-Walangitang, 2004,). The period also marked the first time that non-oil and 
gas exports exceeded oil and gas exports. This economic performance was signify with  
the rise of foreign expatriates and investments in manufacturing industry. The policy 
shifted to a market-oriented economy in which the private sector became the driven 
sector. Various trade reforms followed such that Indonesia became one of the new 
industrial countries (NICs). Indonesia’s foreign economic policy during the New Order 
was one of economic liberalisation, growth in economic stability and a highly 
centralised government. 
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This period also witnessed the changing role of the President’s advisors from 
politico-bureaucrats to technocrats. In the 1970s, the nationalists and the engineers 
influenced national economic policy. This period witnessed the development of 
Indonesia’s development of high-technology industries under the leadership of B. J. 
Habibie whose notions became known as the habibienomics (Canonica-Walangitang, 
2004). In the last period of the New Order regime, technocrats drew a Program for 
Stabilization and Rehabilitation as Decree No. 23, which became Indonesia’s economic 
recovery and development guide. Throughout the New Order regime, members of the 
cabinet who heavily supported social and political reforms rather than economic- and 
market-driven reforms opposed the technocrats (Winters, 1996). 
4.3 Spatial and Industry Uneven Development 
Three decade of centralised regime leads to a wide and severe regional disparity. 
Indonesia experienced its most rapid development during the New Order regime, with 
income per capita increasing from US$ 50 to US$ 1000 between 1965 and 1997. 
Indonesia’s GNP during this same timeframe increased 7–8% annually and 3–4 % in the 
following decade. Because Indonesia is an open economy, external factors, such as the 
decline in oil prices and the world economy recession, affect the economy significantly.  
A study in pre state restructuring period in Indonesia regional development using 
neoclassical convergence analysis by Garcia and Soelistianingsih (1998) shows that 
convergence declined from 0.39 in 1975 to 0.28 in 1993. Meanwhile the ! convergence 
analysis showed that the annual converging rate is 2.4% annually for absolute 
convergence and 4.5% annually for conditional. These results explain that Indonesia’s 
income distribution is converging across time and thus heading toward Kuznets' curve 
(Tambunan, 2006).  Another study by Akita and Lukman (1995) renders opposite 
evidence with increasing disparities with the comparison of coefficient of variation 
(CV) between the richest and poorest provinces increased from 5.6 to 7.7 in 1975 and 
2002, respectively. This study also revealed that government investment and 
expenditure is uneven, with investment in Riau being 30 times that in the East Nusa 
Tenggara province.  
Data in transition period between 1998 and 2001 shows that the economic crisis 
impact most significant in Java Island (Akita and Alisjahbana, 2002). The paper shows 
an extreme comparison that Java Island, which only comprising 6% of total island area 
but it has 58.6% of the population and 54.1 % of the non-oil GDP, while Papua Island 
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with 20% of the total island area has 1.0 % of the population and 1.6 % of the non-oil 
GDP. This figures shows that Indonesian disparities are most significant between Java-
Bali and the rest of the country (Hill, 2000, pp.230).  In these Islands, the country's 
footloose industrial activities are concentrated, where both export-oriented and import-
substituting activities take place, such a pattern is consistent with the theory of sub-
national comparative advantage. The land prices and wage levels in these islands are 
higher as is the role played in commercial assets. The proximity to political powers is 
also greater. Furthermore, these islands are also providers of high-value services such as 
finance, education, health, and international transportation. For instance, the BPS 
provincial data in 2004 showed that the poverty rate in Jakarta was 3.18% compared to 
Papua at 38.69%. At the same time, the education rate was 9.7 years in Jakarta and 5.8 
years in the province of West Nusa Tenggara/Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB). In addition, 
economic disparities also occurred in 14 Indonesia metropolitan areas, with 11 of these 
being located in Java (Bappenas, 2006). 
Similar picture was found via sectoral analysis, with the manufacturing industry 
exceeding agricultural and service industries. Indonesia’s industrial structure change 
corresponded with the global industrial structure change, with less agriculture and 
increasing manufacturing and service industries (Kuncoro, 2004b). Agriculture’s share 
in the GNP declined between 1968 and 2004 from 51% to only 15.4 %. Meanwhile, the 
manufacturing sector contribution increased from 8.5% to 28.3% during the same 
period. In the early 1970s, the number of workers in the agriculture sector represented 
67% while manufacturing contributed 7%. Since 2006, the share of agriculture workers 
had declined to 44.5% while manufacturing labours had risen to 12.16%. This tendency 
illustrates that Indonesia is still an agricultural-based country with an emerging 
manufacturing and service sector.  
Indeed, between 2001 and 2005, the manufacturing GDP grew by an average of 
5.4% annually and contributed 29% of the total GDP. Moreover, manufacturing 
accounted for nearly 12% of the employed labour force, which reached almost 93 
million in 2004. In the same year, the large and medium industries (20 or more workers) 
employed only 40% of the total manufacturing workforce, an increase of 36% over 
1986. The manufacturing industry had higher labour productivity than the average 
overall industry, with a large variance taking place within the industry. The valued-
added of workers employed in manufacturing contribute on average twice as much as 
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the average whole sector workers. Relative productivity remained largely unchanged 
over the period 1988–2000.  
The data between 1976 and 1996 showed no major increases in the manufacturing 
industry’s labour productivity, except for small industries (less than 20 workers), which 
were mostly part of the informal sector. A study on Indonesian manufacturing estimated 
that medium firms (20 to 99 workers) experienced the lowest rate of increase at 0.3% 
(Berry, et al., 2001). Meanwhile, the productivity growth for large firms (100 workers 
or more) peaked at 3.4% between 1986 and 1996 during a period of significant inflows 
of foreign direct investment that ended with the 1997–1998 crisis. The differentials in 
productivity growth explain the persistence of the productivity gap between medium 
and large firms in Indonesia. That gap increased from about 220% in 1975 and 1986 to 
290% in 1996.  A summary of employment growth from 1994 to 2005 according to firm 
size is displayed in Table 4-1.  
In the trade sector, from 1971 to 1982 when the economy was dominated by natural 
resources and from 1982 to 1996 when various economic reforms (e.g., trade, 
investment and financial liberalisation) was introduced, Indonesia’s GDP rate increase 
by 3.27% to 5.26% annually. Later, the Asian monetary crisis slowed down Indonesia’s 
economy and fell an average of 0.39% annually during the timeframe spanning 1997–
2002. After the crisis, Indonesia’s GDP growth rose 4.78% to 6.3% annually, with the 
service sector experiencing the highest growth at rate of 7%. During this period, 
Indonesia GDP per capita is $1,003 and GDP growth of up to 5.4% annually (Kuncoro, 
2007). The country also had surplus trade activity, with a trade balance between US 
$11–24 million from 1997 to 2005. 
 
Table 4-1 Firm Employment Size in Medium and Large Manufacture, 1994 and 
2005 
Total Firm Firm Size 
(Employment) 1994 2005 
20-49 9300 10931 
50-99 3021 3305 
100-199 2276 2527 
200-499 1974 2180 
500-999 901 966 
1000+ 691 820 
Source: BPS, Author’s own calculation 
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4.4 Regional Institutional Shift in State Restructuring 
The institutional shift that resulted from decentralisation and the AFTA are discussed 
from regional perspectives. The decentralisation enhanced the role of local governments 
and introduced new governance between various levels of governments.  
 
The Role of Asian Financial Crisis 
To examine the politico-economy situation that leads to the state-restructuring in 
Indonesia, two factors should be reviewed. The first factor is the financial crisis that hits 
Indonesia economy that leads to the second factor, the latent social and economic 
unrest. The global economy situation that strikes Indonesia and East Asia in 1997 plays 
a crucial factor in shaping the politico-economic shift in Indonesia. The financial crisis 
became an external shock that shake the foundation of the New Order regime. Financial 
crisis destabilized the economy and increased inflation that plummeted the national 
economy.  
This thesis argues that financial crisis as a exogenous factor that triggers domestic 
politico-economy shift. In the economy side, the result of the on-going deregulation and 
trade liberalization was the new actors (business actors and conglomerates) that protest 
their objection on the financial situation that hampers their business and wealth. On the 
other hand, as the financial crisis pressures deepened, political and social unrest 
emerged. While politically, the crisis awaken the latent unsatisfactory regional actors. 
Intensive demands emerge to overcome uneven regional development as a result of 
three decades of the New Order regime. The regime's strong centralized and patronized 
governance were replaced by demands to locally manage local natural resources and 
taxes revenues. The unfair revenue sharing proportion and top-down governance with 
low political participation limits the regions' from its own development plans. 
Following the fall of New Order regime, new ideas and discourses emerge to shift 
political and administration responsibilities, especially the intensification of 
decentralization discourse across Indonesia. The result of this two events was the fall of 
the centralized New Order regime. Along with this, the dominant role of politico-
bureaucracy and technocrat ended marked with Habibie's lost in the general election 
1999.  
During the transition period, Habibie administration attempted to accelerate the 
regional decentralisation with the legislation of two decentralization law, which are the 
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No.22 for political and administrative devolution and 25 in 1999 for fiscal devolution. 
Decentralisation began in 2001 despite doubts regions' administrative preparedness and 
human capital capacities (Seymour and Turner, 2002). There are two reasons that sets 
decentralization applied at the district level. First, the political reason was to prevent 
provinces that might leads to independent conflicts.  
While the governmental and efficiency proponents claims that local are more 
proximate to understand and have the knowledge of local needs. The implementation of 
the decentralisation law is reflected with several administrative and fiscal transfers. 
First, the local offices (kantor wilayah) of the state ministries were converted as regional 
agencies, implying that the development are funded by central government and 
performed by regional governments, rather than by the central government as in the 
centralised regime. Second, the legislation of laws and regulations that are significantly 
different substantially and quality. Each regions have individual developmental 
objectives and interests that are channelled through the creation of these policies. 
However, these administrative and political autonomy appeared to harm economic 
growth climate such as more than 200 local regulations has been cancel by the central 
government because it threatens investment climate with more levies and additional 
taxes, promotes inter-region competition and increase rent seeking.  
There are two reasons that unpinned local development during the centralised 
regime. First, the head of regions, Governor, Mayors and Regents, are appointed by the 
central government without direct and transparent election process. This leads to the 
absence of political and economic responsibilities by the local governments to develop 
the regions. Second, as the head of regions are appointed by the central government, 
their have limited authority politically and economically. This hinders their capacities 
and responsibilities to established viable policies to mobilise local resources for 
economic development.  
 
Decentralisation and Government Administration Shift 
Following the financial crisis and political changes it experienced, Indonesia set up its 
decentralisation era. The implementation of law (Undang-undang) 22/1999 and 25/1999 
marked a new administration and fiscal decentralisation in Indonesia. The 
decentralization was conducted at the local level as political and government reason. 
Political reason was that the provincial level might leads to independent conflicts. While 
the governmental and efficiency proponents claim that local governments are closer to 
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understand to the people and have the knowledge of local needs. This law marked the 
abolition of a hierarchical relationship between the central, provincial and district 
governments. Meanwhile, Law 25 regulated the financial relationship between the 
regional and central governments (Booth, 2003). Undang-undang 22/1999 had several 
points, which boiled down to reducing the central government’s power and increasing 
the power of the DPRD/local parliamentary.  
According to the decentralisation Undang-undang 22/1999, decentralisation at the 
provincial level was of the de-concentration and devolution form. On the other hand, 
municipalities/regencies and villages work from the devolution form. The local 
governments are responsible for transportation, health, local economics, and other local 
region-specific sectors (Chandra, 2008). Decentralisation, however, includes several 
sensitive sectors such as foreign policies, national security and defence, national 
finance, law, religion, macro economy policies and macro political policy. The law 
enables regions to form cooperations with other organizations in a foreign country, both 
public and private owned. These opportunities should to be an opportunity for the 
regional governments to expand local development through domestic and international 
cooperation agreements. 
The district governments are responsible for making political decisions such as 
government acts and regulations. They also hold responsibility for implementation. The 
functional office is autonomous and falls under the municipal/regency government. 
While the provincial government, in addition to administrating its own provincial 
government offices, also coordinates the central government’s provincial agencies, such 
as the field administration offices in education, religion and port administration. The 
decentralisation law granted higher authority and responsibility for the local parliaments 
(DPRD). At both the province and municipality/regency levels, the members of 
parliaments are elected through direct political election. The local parliament is 
responsible for representing the people and observing the government administration. It 
is also charged, together with the government, with generating acts and regulations.  
The undang-undang 25/1999 has several points, which revolve around fiscal laws on 
shared revenues for local governments. The fiscal decentralisation law also provides 
local governments with the ability to borrow domestic and foreign funds for regional 
governments, The law, however, does not specify whether the regional government 
means provincial or district governments. Furthermore, the law does not specify how 
much funds the regional governments are allowed to borrow. Following literatures on 
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decentralisation (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005; 
Seymour and Turner, 2002), the fiscal decentralisation in Indonesia has five main goals. 
First, to decrease fiscal imbalances between the national and regional government 
(vertical imbalances) and between regions (horizontal imbalances); second, to improve 
public services; third to enhance national resources’ exploitation efficiency; forth to 
improve governance, transparency and accountability in fiscal transfers to regions; and 
fifth, support fiscal in macroeconomic policies. Furthermore, fiscal decentralisation 
extends the power to raise local taxes and promote local finance management 
accountability to regions.  
Currently almost a decade of decentralisation, there are numerous cases that hinders 
regional growth including local regulations that harms investments, natural resources 
related social and political conflicts, and overlapping administration and 
responsibilities. These problems and its impact on regional development are discussed 
in the following empirical chapters.  
 
The ASEAN Free Trade Area in Indonesia 
The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was established at the ASEAN summit in 1992. 
Its council supervises, coordinates and reviews the implementation of the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme for ASEAN FTA. The main objective of 
this agreement is to increase the international competitiveness of ASEAN industries and 
the region as an investment destination. This aim is pursued by minimising the costs of 
investing and business to attract more FDI and intra-regional investment and trade 
activities. The AFTA has four key measurement goals for trade liberalisation: (1) reduce 
tariff rates under CEPT-AFTA; (2) eliminate non-tariff (NTB); (3) prohibit quantitative 
restrictions; and (4) enhance trade facilitations such as standard harmonization and test 
and certification of products.  
The main tool for the ASEAN free trade area’s success is the common effective 
preferential tariff (CEPT) that established in 1993. The CEPT gradually lowering and 
abolish intra ASEAN trade tariff based on industrial sector rather than product-by-
product. This approach is more reliable and easier to implement as studied by Elliot and 
Ikemoto (2004). This regime stipulated that all products from ASEAN country members 
must have at least 40% ASEAN content. Research by Narjoko and Amri (2007) shows 
that the tariff under AFTA remains progressive. It has fastened the zero tariff targets as 
of 2003, which have ranged between 0% and 5% in the 15 years since 1993. AFTA 
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responded to the Asian financial crisis of 1997 by accelerate the zero percent tariff 
target, which is to be achieved in 2010 for ASEAN-6 and in 2015 for new country 
members. This former objective has been applied with exception on commodities 
included in the sensitive list (SL) of individual original members. The intra-trade is 
enhanced through the reduction and eventual elimination of trade barriers while 
allowing members to preserve domestic trade policies toward the rest of the world. 
Hence, AFTA is meant to be a rallying point for greater economic integration within the 
member countries. It is also intended to make the countries more competitive for foreign 
direct investment (FDI).  
The ASEAN FTA (AFTA) CEPT consists of four main product categories, the 
inclusion list (IL), the temporary exclusion list (TEL), the sensitive list (SL), and the 
general exclusion list (GEL), all included either in the Fast Track Programme or the 
Normal Track Programme (Chandra, 2008). The IL category is composed of products 
under immediate CEPT liberalisation and should be included in the Fast Track 
Programme tariff-reduction measure. The TEL consists of products that are protected 
for a certain period of time and should be transferred into the IL by January 1996. The 
SL specifically consists of agricultural products as well as other non-tariff barriers. The 
sensitive list appears because several member countries are agricultural producers and 
consumers. Lastly, the GEL is a list of products that were excluded from the national 
trade liberalisation programme for security reasons. 
Products that can benefits from the CEPT procedures are as listed below (ASEAN 
Secretariat):  
1. The product should be in the inclusion list of both the exporter and importer 
country and the tariff should be either above 20% or below 20%. 
2. The product has experienced declining tariff progress that has been approved 
by the AFTA commission. 
3. The product should have, at least, 40% ASEAN content. 
4. All products with tariffs between 0% and 5% are automatically included in 
the CEPT. 
The tariff lines and reduction policies in AFTA as individual countries sets their own 
tariff schedules and choose list of goods and commodities that are included in the CEPT 
tariff.  For example, the Fast Track Programme stipulates that product with a tariff 
higher than 20% should be reduced to 0%–5% in 10 years (in January 2003). Similarly, 
products below a 20% tariff will be reduced to 0%–5% percent within seven years. 
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Under the Normal Track Programme, products with tariffs above 20% may be reduced 
to 20% in five to eight years, and then further reduced to 0%–5% in the subsequent 
seven years. Moreover, products with a tariff below 20% would be reduced to 0%–5% 
within 10 years. As for ASEAN-6, in 2005 there 99% of CEPT IL target was reduced to 
a 0%–5%  tariff and 64.2% achieves the zero tariff. In 2005, all CEPT lists were 
transferred to IL and the average tariff was 1.87% compared to 12.76% in 1993. Despite 
the tariff being lowered, export performance within ASEAN member countries 
remained at a low level coming in at 22.5% in 2005,  a slight increase over the 21.1% in 
1993 (Chandra, 2008).  
There is also a difference in schedule deadlines for original and new member 
countries. The original members achieved the deadline for a 5% tariff reduction in 2002. 
Only those products that were included in the inclusion list (IL) in 2002 were not 
reduced to 0%–5%. The new framework advised that the original six countries eliminate 
the CEPT in 2007 and that the new members do so in 2012. Overall, in 2002 the CEPT 
product list’s 2003 deadline was met and more than 99% of the ASEAN six countries 
are now subject to a rate between 0% and 5%. An extension for the new members to 
realize CEPT and schedule deadlines was granted. For instance, in 2005, Cambodia, 
Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam (CMLV) countries had achieved 87.2% on the CEPT IL, 
and 71.05% are currently are at the 0%–5% tariff. 
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Chapter 5 Dynamics of Indonesian Regional Disparities  
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Competition due to economic globalization has encouraged Indonesia to deregulate 
industrial tariffs and enter trade liberalisation such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area in 
1992. Another event, following the financial crisis 1997 and the fall of the New Order 
regime, the country has shifted into a highly decentralised system. Regional 
development in the state-restructuring era is determined by international economy and 
local capacities. Studies of the regional disparities have been widely linked with 
devolution and trade liberalisation across the world. International studies show that 
industrial types (Fan and Scott, 2003), and main economy sector and political order 
(Shankar & Shah, 2003), affect the level of disparities between and within countries.?
Consequently, theories and econometric analysis on regional inequality and 
convergence have also been developed in the last two decades, for example, Quah 
(1993), Martin and Sunley (1998), and Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004). 
There are two aims for this chapter, first, to understand regional spatial disparities; 
second, to explore the presence of sectoral-based spatial divergence. This chapter argues 
that the institutional shift that occurs in Indonesia should not be seen only in regional 
economic disparities, but also as geographical and sectoral differences. Given the 
change of political regime and the increasing trend towards devolution and trade 
liberalisation, it is important to examine whether such institutional shifts influence 
regional development in Indonesia. This chapter found evidence of geographical 
disparities with significantly higher economic growth difference between Western and 
Central and Eastern regions. The sectoral analysis shows high industrial agglomeration 
in the Western region. 
The chapter starts with a section on data and methods of statistical analysis. This is 
followed by a distribution indices analysis across regions that includes coefficient 
variation (CV), Theil index, and " Convergence. The next section explores geographical 
and sectoral convergence analysis. Finally, the conclusion draws on the findings from 
this chapter. 
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5.2 Research Data and Methods 
 
The study uses district-level statistical data of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
for geographical analysis, and uses firm-level data for industrial sector analysis. Based 
on the reference year 1999, the study used 292 districts as the initial condition before 
the decentralisation. While there are more than 20,000 firms annually for the 
manufacturing statistics data.  
Table 5-1 displays statistics of variables used in the chapter. The dependent variable 
is growth per capita GRDP, which is used as a dependent variable for the convergence 
in section four. The other variables are GRDP per capita and population variables that 
will be used throughout the chapter for various disparities and convergence analysis. 
This study follows several regional convergence studies on Indonesia (McCulloch & 
Syahrir, 2008; Miranti, 2010) that divides the economic period into three eras: 
liberalisation (1990-1996), transition (1997-1998) and recovery period (1999-2002).  
 
Table 5-1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Growth per capita .6435281 1.067996 -1 24.9815 
GRDP per capita, initial year 14.5959 .8375872 12.17857 18.22126 
Population, initial year (log) 13.1002 .8619931 10.03162 16.00864 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
Graphical Distribution 
To observe regional economic distribution, I use the Lorentz curve by using the 
initial GDP per capita level and its growth. This method calculates the area between the 
Lorenz curve and the 45° line. The further the Lorentz curve is from the line, the higher 
the disparities (Gil Canaleta et al., 2004). 
 
Distribution Index 
Distribution index is a generalisation of three indices that relate distribution and 
disparities across regions. The first index is the coefficient of variation (CV) following 
Williamson (1965) as the dispersion index to describe the variation in the income of a 
region. The higher the CV index the larger the disparity among regions. The formula is 
written as follows:  
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Where xi is the x variable of the ith region (province or municipalities/regency), n is the 
number of regions, pi is the population of the ith region, and P is the total population. 
Since this research studies the disparities among regions, CV is constructed from 
regional income or gross regional domestic product (GRDP) per capita (Fujita & Hu, 
2001). The weakness of this method is that it considered only initial and end points of 
the period that do not take into account fluctuations within the period. Thus, any 
coefficient measured should be seen as an indicator the dynamic between periods 
(Azzoni, 2001).  
An alternative measurement for regional inequalities is the Gini Coefficient. The 
equation of Gini coefficient as follows:  
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The Theil index is an entropy calculation that decomposed inequality index analysis 
from a higher spatial scale to lower level regions, as well as between and within groups 
of regions. In some literature, the group could be regions of a country while others are 
groups of provinces. Many studies have used this method to analyse factors determining 
income inequality (Gil Canaleta et al., 2004). Following Akira and Alisjahbana (2002), 
this study considers hierarchical structure of inequality in Indonesia: region, province, 
and district. With district as the underlying regional unit, the inequality measures 
province as the sum of district inequality, and region as the sum of all provinces.  This 
is measured by Theil inequality index as below:  
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Where:  P is the total population 
Y is GRDP per capita 
Subscript i is provinces 
Subscript d is districts 
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 n=26 for the number of provinces in this empirical analysis.  
 
This research requires this index to exhibit and compare inequality at three spatial 
levels of administration (region, province, and district), and to allow analysis of a 
certain district contribution to provincial inequality. With these analyses, the research 
can reveal convergence progress among regions within a particular country across time. 
The offset of using this index is that it requires large data at various spatial levels over a 
long time-period with complex mathematical methods. 
The last index in the distribution indices is to view presence of income convergence 
among regions. There are two types of convergence analysis, the " convergence and ß 
convergence. The " Convergence is measured as the standard deviation of GDP per 
capita within province and district, and ß convergence is a regression analysis to study 
the convergence rate (Barro, 1991). The ß convergence analysis is discussed and applied 
further in the following quantitative chapter.  
The " Convergence analysed dispersion of GDP per capita in each administration 
level. While ß Convergence explains that the faster the poor regions grow relative to the 
rich regions, the sooner they catch up, therefore, convergence will be faster. The cross 
sectional dispersion of per capita income or product is measured with its sample 
variance of log given by:  
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Where µ is the sample mean of ln(yi,t). If N is large, the sample variance will be close 
to the population variance. From equation (1) we can write the equation for the 
evolution of "2: 
 
! 
" 2 = (1# $)2" t#12 +" t2  
 (5) 
 
However, this is not a satisfactory condition as new disturbances may arise whether 
the value of " is above or below the steady state. (Petrakos et al., 2005; Barro et al., 
2004). As an empirical study, this study will be applied to a cross section of 
convergence analysis across province and municipality/regency in Indonesia between 
1970-2005.  
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Geographical Distribution Indices 
This chapter uses geographical distribution indices to acknowledge spatial variation of 
regional economic development. The first method is the rank size method that ranks the 
regions’ GDP per capita gradually, and regresses the GDP per capita with its rank. The 
rank size function allows us to describe the highest and lowest level of disparities across 
time based on regional ranks (Fan & Casseti, 1994).  
Another geographical distribution index is the cross section dynamics in economic 
growth models (Quah, 1993, 1996). This method adopts technical calculation from the 
Markov transition matrix, in which a square matrix describing the probabilities of a 
particular value moves from one state to another in a dynamic system. By substituting 
the transition matrix with a stochastic kernel, we can show the probabilities of transition 
between a hypothetically. The stochastic kernel is obtained by estimating the density 
function of the distribution in a given period, t+K, conditioned on the values 
corresponding to the previous period. Hence, the joint function at moments t and t+K is 
estimated and divided by the implicit marginal distribution to obtain the current 
conditional probabilities (Ezcurra et al., 2006 p. 406). In the matrix, each row represents 
the probabilities of moving from a respective row to the other states. The first column 
explains the number of provinces in a particular GDRP per capita state in the initial 
year. This method measures income, Ft, at a given time t+1, Ft+1, using M to map 
distribution into another.  
This study is important to analyse the dynamic position of a particular region within 
the regional system. Over time, the analysis of cross section dynamics could show the 
presence of convergence or divergence of regional economic development. Using this 
method, Quah (1996) concludes that there is divergence among regions, with a limited 
number of regions having higher growth rate than other regions. This evidence leads to 
bi-polarisation of coalition of the club convergence and the divergence convergence 
dynamic rate. The ability to demonstrate the dynamic position of each region across 
time while integrating neo-classical B convergence analysis is the strength of this 
measurement. The weak point is that the measurement category depends on the 
knowledge level of the researcher. The more experience researcher has with this 
calculation, the more accurate the calculation and analysis will be. 
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The evolution is describe by the following motion:  
 
Ft+1=M ·Ft 
(6) 
 
Sectoral Distribution Indices 
The Herfindahl index (H-index) is utilised in order to measure industrial localization 
within a region. The measurement calculates Pij, which represent the proportion of 
industry sector i in region j (Equation 5). The symbol Pij is defined as Xij/Xi, where Xij 
is the activity of sector I in region j and Xi is the total amount of activities sector i in a 
region (Rhoades, 1993).  
The H-index has the highest value of one; this explains that activity in sector i is 
concentrated in one region.  The lowest value of zero shows that the activity of sector i 
is perfectly dispersed. In this research, the H-index analysis covers the industry 
establishment and employment data. A small index indicates a competitive industry 
with no dominant players. If all firms have an equal share, the reciprocal of the index 
shows the number of firms in the industry. When firms have unequal shares, the 
reciprocal of the index indicates the ‘equivalent’ number of firms in the industry. There 
is also a normalised Herfindahl index where it ranges from 0 to 1. An H* index below 
0.01 indicates a highly competitive index; an index below 0.1 indicates an un-
concentrated index. It is computed in Equation 7. However, this index fails to observe 
the relationship between regions and their spatial dependence. An economic spill-over 
from region A to region B will be considered as a decline of economic growth in region, 
hence a close observation is needed to accompany this index. Furthermore, the index 
neglects to draw an absolute conclusion based on the comparison between industries 
within a region (Sjöberg and Sjöholm, 2004). 
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5.3 Regional Economic Distribution Indices 
5.3.1 Spatial Pattern of Wealth and Growth  
As decentralisation is at the district level, this research also analyses the provincial level 
to get an overview of the distribution of inequality as determined by common traditions, 
and to understand this within provincial inequalities. Following Fan and Casetti (1994), 
this chapter examines wealth distribution in Indonesian regions using two approaches: 
the systematic inequality, and the inequality variations. 
The first method measures the regional distribution using the Lorenz graphs shows 
the inequality level between Indonesian districts using constant price year 2000 (Fig. 5-
1). The further the Lorenz curve is from the normal line, the higher the disparity level. 
Thus, we can see that in the first graph, which is the non natural resources GRDP, per 
capita has a larger area of Lorenz curve. This indicates higher disparities compared with 
the natural resources, shown in the second graph. This explains why we need to be 
cautious when measuring disparity levels using the natural resources GDP, as it might 
cause a bias result as been shown here: 
  
Figure 5-1 Lorenz Curve GRDP per capita and GRDP per capita (non-natural 
resource) 
        GRDP per capita  (Non Natural Resources)        GRDP per capita (Natural Resources Included) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
The second method uses the " convergence analysis to measure the standard 
deviation of the log provincial GDP per capita between 1971-2005 for all provinces 
except East Timor (Fig. 5-2). The graph indicates that Indonesian disparities increased 
with the start of the oil and natural resources trend in early 1970s. The regional 
dispersion of provincial GDP per capita increased from 0.25 to 0.3 between 1971 and 
1975. After the oil boom period in 1984, the dispersion fall and hit the lowest in 1995, 
when it reached 0.25. Afterwards, financial crisis causes dispersion between the 
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provinces, but presently the " Convergence levels are similar to those before the 
financial crisis. It can be seen that the inequality index in Indonesian provinces based on 
coefficient variation are around 0.8. During the early 1970s, provincial GDP per capita 
dispersion was about 0.9 and it fell in the mid 1970s as the economy developed. In the 
early 1980s, the oil boom and change in Indonesia’s account record led to sudden 
growth in the disparity indices (Resosudarmo and Vidyattama, 2006). Almost two 
decades later Indonesia experienced the financial crisis in 1997. This had a significant 
effect on Indonesian disparity and increased the index to 1.01. The disparity increased 
because several provinces still experienced growth in their economy: Jakarta, Riau, and 
East Kalimantan. Besides that, decentralisation and trade liberalisation may also have 
caused an increase in the disparity index before it decreased in 2005.  
Figure 5-2 Dispersion of per capita Provincial Incomes, 1971-2005 
 
 Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
The third method uses a comparison between administration levels. Inequality rates 
between districts are higher than between provinces, and after decentralisation, there is 
convergence between districts (Fig. 5-3). Inter-provincial inequality has been relatively 
stable except during the financial crisis that peaked at 0.388 before it declined. On the 
other hand, there were rapid declines in inter-district inequalities after the 
decentralisation period. The graph shows that there is evidence of inter-provincial and 
inter-district growth convergence. The three measurement graphs indicate a decline in 
inequality during the periods and sub periods under observation (Fig. 5-4). The two 
references in 1998 and 2001 explain inequality dynamics during the sub periods with 
inequality declining rapidly during 1994-1997 before it increased again in 1998. During 
the transition period, inter-district inequality dropped slightly, and it continues to 
decline throughout the post-decentralisation period.  
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Fourth, the distribution indices figure indicates that districts disparities among 
provinces in Indonesia have declined over the years (Table 5-2). However, if we 
decompose to three types of regional division–within province, between province, and 
between regions-we can observe that disparity among districts within provinces has 
declined sharply, whereas disparities between provinces have also declined although not 
significantly over the period. An interesting finding is that disparities between regions 
(Indonesia’s regions are commonly separated into the western, middle, and eastern parts 
of the country) increased from the early 1990s and peaked during the early 2000s before 
reaching its current position. This supports that the eastern region of Indonesia has been 
severely left behind in terms of its economic welfare.  
To indicate spatial disparities, the distribution indices are measured by province and 
major island (Table 5-3). The GDP per capita of Indonesian regions has increased 
slightly by about 12%, that is, 2.3% annually between 1995 and 2000. Table 5-2 
indicates that the richest group of regions accounts for ten times that of provinces in the 
poorest group in each observation year. An interesting analysis is that after the financial 
crisis in 1997, Indonesian regions experienced a divergence, with increases in the log 
variance of regional GDPs of 31%. In 2005, the regional disparities gradually 
converged, although not at the same level as before the crisis, with a convergence rate in 
the log variance of regional GDP of 7%.  
Figure 5-3 GRDP Province and District Inequality index 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
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Figure 5-4 Inter-district inequality per capita GDP, 1993-2006 
 
 Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
 
Table 5-2 Measurement of Disparities 1993 - 2006 
Year CV Theil Gini Coefficient 
1993 1.40413 0.56381 0.47917 
1994 1.67420 0.63149 0.49103 
1995 1.39815 0.52686 0.46629 
1996 1.45366 0.52556 0.46721 
1997 1.41834 0.45913 0.44085 
1998 1.54714 0.49618 0.45442 
1999 1.50618 0.48322 0.45155 
2000 1.41737 0.43366 0.42807 
2001 1.41751 0.42757 0.42469 
2002 1.36499 0.40980 0.41909 
2003 1.31536 0.39587 0.41564 
2004 1.22128 0.36179 0.40444 
2005 1.24887 0.36790 0.40438 
2006 1.16180 0.33914 0.39596 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
To overview provincial disparities between different levels of wealth, I use the rank-
size and cross-section dynamics analyses. The graph below (Fig. 5-5) shows the 
relationship between the rank of provinces and distribution of GDP per capita in 
Indonesia between 1993-2006. The graph indicates that distribution between the highest 
GDP per capita provinces is more scattered than the distribution between middle and 
low GDP per capita provinces The pattern has remained relatively stable across the 
period under observation, except during the financial crisis from 1997-1999 when the 
distribution between rich provinces was less steep compared with other periods. While 
the range of GDP per capita in the rich regions increased on average during these 
periods, the average GDP per capita for middle and poor provinces remained the same.  
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To show the dynamics of regional wealth and growth, I use the cross section 
dynamics model as proposed by Quah (1993, 1996). Equation (6) calculates for 
Indonesian provinces during one five-year transition between 2000 through 2005 using 
provincial GRDP per capita and the national average (Table 5-4). The results of the 
estimations are reflected in the graph, in which the GRDP per capita is compared with 
the annual averages of Indonesian regions (100). The table’s first column is the total 
number of transitions with starting points in that province’s income. For example, the 
second row shows that in the overall sample—across 26 provinces during one 10-year 
transition—15 provinces are in state 2, with incomes between 40 percent and 80 percent 
of the Indonesian GRDP per capita average. The next columns in the same row indicate 
that 50% of these 2 provinces remained in the same state, and another 50% became 
wealthier and transited to state 2.  
The analysis shows that province levels remain less persistent, as argued by Quah 
(1993), since only less than 80 % provinces in state 2 and 4 stay in the same state. This 
fact shows that Indonesia’s provinces experienced a dynamic development, both growth 
(for middle income provinces) and decline (for the rich province). It is interesting to 
note that there are more provinces in the middle-income range that increase or decrease 
compared with those that remain in the same state. To conclude, with higher state 
provinces moving to lower state, and low and middle state provinces transiting to higher 
states, it can be assumed that the convergence process might be operating among 
Indonesia regions. 
 
5.3.2 Spatial Distribution of Manufacturing Industry 
This section explores the agglomeration level of an industry in order to understand its 
industrial contribution to a region. This research follows other studies that used the H-
index to study industrial contributions to spatial disparities with different concentration 
measurements, such as income, population land use, worker productivity and value 
added rate (Fan and Scott, 2003; Sjöberg and Sjöholm, 2004). 
The geographical distribution of manufacturing in Indonesia at provincial levels is 
shown in Table 5-5. The table indicates that the highest concentration of the 
manufacturing sector is in Java. In 1993, the island accounted for more than 80 percent 
of employment and value added total shares in Indonesia’s manufacturing sector. In 
2005, the employment share increase to 84.3% but the value-added share dropped to 
79.2%. A study by Balisacan and Fuwa (2004) explains a significant increase in 
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employment and value add share in West Java province was due to structural change in 
the manufacturing sector and this influences the fluctuation. From this analysis, it can 
be revealed that although employment share increased in the post state-restructuring 
period, the value-added share decreased to 33.5% in 2005. The shift in manufacturing 
sector shows that it is moving from Jakarta to West Java as indicated with a decrease of 
Jakarta’s employment share from 11.7% in 1993 to 9.1%. However, the value added 
share has increased slightly to 18.6% although it has not reached the initial level.  
Two other provinces that have substantial amount of manufacturing is North Sumatra 
and Riau province. In North Sumatra, there is a decreasing trend for the period for both 
employment and value-added share from about 5.3% to 3.6%, and 3.6% to 3.5%, 
respectively. The Riau province provides an interesting finding, as there is evidence of a 
persistent increase in the value-added share despite the employment share that has 
decreased from 1.9 % in 1993 to 1.5 % in 2005. This finding confirms the region’s 
economic advantage earned by being in a free trade zone (FTZ), and a part of the 
Singapore-Riau-Johor growth triangle.  
The intra province concentration pattern is shown in Table 5-6. The figures indicate 
the largest districts within the provinces and the district’s manufacturing employment 
and value-added shares. Several points can be concluded from the data shown in the 
table. First, the largest districts indicate differences in employment and value-added 
shares; the situation illustrates different spatial distribution and manufacturing 
industries. Second, there is a dynamic of the largest districts over time, with 15 of 26 
provinces having different largest districts in manufacturing employment and/or value 
added shares. Third, the manufacturing employment and/or value added shares in the 
largest districts decreased in 13 provinces. The case of West Java shows that the 
industries have expanded to the border districts and have moved from the traditional 
provincial capital. The figures show that the highest employment and value-added 
shares shifted from Bandung and Serang to Bekasi, which borders on Jakarta. In Riau 
province, however, the Batam district retained the highest employment and value-added 
shares within the province, which confirms the previous argument regarding its status as 
a FTZ and its inclusion in the Singapore-Riau-Johor growth triangle.  
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Table 5-3 Districts GDP per Capita Variation of Log, Theil Index, and Gini Coefficient (in thousand Rupiah) 
 1995 2000 2005 
 CV Theil GC CV Theil GC CV Theil GC 
Aceh 0.839 0.420 0.352 1.006 0.323 0.356 0.561 0.138 0.283 
North Sumatra 0.267 0.037 0.151 0.340 0.057 0.189 0.326 0.051 0.171 
West Sumatra 0.466 0.091 0.225 0.347 0.058 0.186 0.282 0.037 0.147 
Riau 0.893 0.286 0.354 0.734 0.258 0.389 0.675 0.205 0.342 
Jambi 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.192 0.018 0.105 0.224 0.024 0.122 
South Sumatra 0.317 0.049 0.177 0.371 0.069 0.211 0.334 0.057 0.191 
Bengkulu 0.330 0.055 0.165 0.345 0.061 0.182 0.382 0.075 0.209 
Lampung 0.513 0.106 0.220 0.213 0.022 0.114 0.234 0.026 0.124 
Jakarta 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
West Java 0.703 0.197 0.336 0.727 0.211 0.350 0.709 0.204 0.345 
Central Java 0.731 0.215 0.353 0.655 0.171 0.310 0.686 0.183 0.318 
Jogjakarta 0.500 0.107 0.235 0.462 0.092 0.213 0.448 0.087 0.207 
East Java 1.603 0.561 0.470 1.725 0.608 0.478 1.623 0.565 0.468 
Bali 0.489 0.097 0.221 0.376 0.062 0.184 0.358 0.057 0.182 
West Nusa Tenggara 0.206 0.022 0.115 0.727 0.202 0.316 0.741 0.212 0.331 
East Nusa Tenggara 0.512 0.100 0.214 0.480 0.088 0.198 0.481 0.091 0.210 
West Kalimantan 0.513 0.112 0.248 0.393 0.070 0.200 0.399 0.072 0.190 
Central Kalimantan 0.671 0.186 0.314 0.267 0.039 0.134 0.207 0.021 0.115 
South Kalimantan 0.355 0.061 0.192 0.426 0.086 0.231 0.430 0.085 0.227 
East Kalimantan 0.353 0.058 0.185 0.890 0.309 0.405 0.839 0.277 0.382 
North Sulawesi 0.353 0.061 0.194 0.601 0.173 0.329 0.574 0.159 0.312 
Central Sulawesi 0.316 0.051 0.171 0.304 0.052 0.163 0.296 0.048 0.159 
South Sulawesi 0.334 0.048 0.159 0.347 0.055 0.181 0.412 0.075 0.210 
Southeast Sulawesi 0.242 0.029 0.126 0.335 0.054 0.179 0.413 0.081 0.223 
Maluku 0.457 0.098 0.242 0.444 0.100 0.249 0.412 0.083 0.226 
Papua 1.650 0.872 0.630 1.916 0.979 0.636 1.673 0.782 0.578 
Sumatra 0.645 0.147 0.272 0.966 0.276 0.354 0.752 0.184 0.299 
Java & Bali 1.141 0.345 0.406 1.318 0.389 0.410 1.265 0.375 0.406 
Kalimantan 0.650 0.177 0.326 1.332 0.456 0.452 1.234 0.407 0.429 
Sulawesi 0.348 0.054 0.178 0.456 0.090 0.233 0.465 0.097 0.245 
Maluku and Nusa 
Tenggara 0.611 0.148 0.288 0.680 0.172 0.302 0.692 0.173 0.300 
Papua 1.650 0.872 0.630 1.916 0.979 0.636 1.673 0.782 0.578 
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West?Indonesia 0.962 0.272 0.370 1.308 0.417 0.434 1.196 0.361 0.408 
Central Indonesia 0.774 0.234 0.368 0.592 0.164 0.323 0.585 0.162 0.320 
East?Indonesia 2.029 0.632 0.432 2.010 0.618 0.432 1.610 0.467 0.398 
Off Java 1.193 0.316 0.371 1.434 0.442 0.428 1.221 0.352 0.392 
Java 1.206 0.372 0.416 1.369 0.418 0.424 1.311 0.402 0.420 
Mean 1.197 0.335 0.389 1.421 0.437 0.430 1.252 0.370 0.405 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
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Figure 5-5 Provincial Rank and GDP per capita (Constant Price, IDR) 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
 
Table 5-4 Real GRDP per capita (relative to national average) 
First order (2000 to 2005) 
Grid: (0,0.4,0.8,1 and !) 
Upper Limit 
(Number) 40 80 1 ! 
(2) 50 50 0 0 
(15) 0 80 13.3 6.7 
(4) 0 50 25 25 
(5) 0 20 20 60 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
Although some provinces show signs of industrial dispersal, concentration increased 
in some provinces. A more detailed analysis of spatial distribution and industrial 
dispersal is discussed below.  
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Table 5-5 Spatial Distribution of Manufacturing (Share of Total Labour and Value 
Added Percentages) 
Share of Employment Share of Value Added 
Province 1993 1996 2005 1993 1996 2005 
Aceh 0.5 0.4 0.1 1.0 0.6 0.3 
North Sumatra 5.3 4.3 3.6 3.6 3.9 3.5 
West Sumatra 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 
Riau 1.9 2.9 1.5 2.5 3.8 4.8 
Jambi 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.4 1.4 
South Sumatra 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.2 2.2 
Bengkulu 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Lampung 0.9 0.9 1.4 0.9 0.7 1.5 
Jakarta 11.7 10.6 9.1 20.2 17.7 18.6 
West Java 34.7 36.3 38.3 29.9 40.3 33.5 
Central Java 12.6 12.9 15.2 10.5 5.6 5.7 
Yogyakarta 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.4 0.5 0.5 
East Java 21.1 20.9 20.6 22.0 19.5 20.9 
Bali 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 
West Nusa Tenggara 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
East Nusa Tenggara 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
West Kalimantan 1.2 1.0 1.2 0.9 1.0 0.9 
Central Kalimantan 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 
South Kalimantan 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.6 1.0 0.8 
East Kalimantan 1.6 1.4 1.3 2.2 1.3 2.4 
North Sulawesi 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 
Central Sulawesi 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
South Sulawesi 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.9 
Southeast Sulawesi 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Maluku 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 
Irian Jaya 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Source: Author’s own calculation and adapted from Sjöberg and Sjöholm (2004)
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Table 5-6 The Largest District within Province and its Share of Total Manufacturing (Employment and Value Added) 
Employment Value Added 
Province 
Number 
of 
Districts 1993 2005 1993 2005 
Aceh 10 East Aceh 53.9 East Aceh 36.0 North Aceh 47.6 
North 
Aceh  63.9 
North Sumatra 17 Dairi 31.3 Deli Serdang 35.8 
North 
Tapanuli  30.8 Medan 27.4 
West Sumatra 14 Padang 60.5 Padang 51.1 Padang 72.9 Padang 85.5 
Riau 7 Batam 37.7 Batam 61.4 Batam 57.3 Batam 34.1 
Jambi 6 Batang Hari 42.0 
Batang 
Hari 60.0 
Batang 
Hari 51.9 
Batang 
Hari 85.7 
South Sumatra 10 Palembang 39.4 Palembang 41.4 Palembang 53.1 Palembang 65.8 
Bengkulu 4 South Bengkulu  63.3 
South 
Bengkulu  59.4 
South 
Bengkulu  42.1 
South 
Bengkulu  45.9 
Lampung 7 Cemntral Lampung 40.2 
Tanggamu
s 32.8 
Tanggamu
s 46.5 
Tanggamu
s 32.8 
Jakarta 1 DKI Jakarta 100.0 
DKI 
Jakarta 100.0 
DKI 
Jakarta 100.0 
DKI 
Jakarta 100.0 
West Java 26 Bandung 18.6 Bekasi 30.3 Serang 17.2 Bekasi 29.4 
Central Java 35 Semarang 14.9 Semarang 12.6 Semarang 50.3 Semarang 25.1 
Yogyakarta 5 Sleman 46.4 Sleman 43.3 Sleman 43.8 Yogyakarta 58.7 
East Java 37 Sidoarjo 19.2 Surabaya 18.0 Surabaya 30.1 Kediri 24.1 
Bali 9 Denpasar 46.5 Denpasar 34.3 Denpasar 52.1 Denpasar 33.9 
West Nusa Tenggara 7 West Lombok  44.2 
East 
Lombok  30.8 
West 
Lombok  34.3 
Central 
Lombok  32.4 
East Nusa Tenggara 13 Kupang 58.4 Kupang 51.4 Kupang 77.1 Kupang 55.1 
West Kalimantan 7 Pontianak 65.7 Sambas 53.4 Pontianak 65.3 Sambas 46.9 
Central 
Kalimantan 6 
East 
Kotawarin
gin  
48.7 
West 
Kotawarin
gin  
50.7 
West 
Kotawarin
gin  
52.6 
West 
Kotawarin
gin  
73.2 
South 
Kalimantan 10 
Barito 
Kuala 41.8 
Banjarmasi
n 42.2 
Barito 
Kuala 48.1 Kotabaru 35.7 
East Kalimantan 6 Samarinda 61.6 Samarinda 39.4 Samarinda 44.5 Kutai 64.5 
North Sulawesi 7 Bitung 49.2 Minahasa 58.2 Bitung 54.5 Minahasa 87.5 
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Central Sulawesi 5 Donggala 49.5 Palu 50.5 Donggala 54.4 Banggai 46.8 
South Sulawesi 23 Ujung Pandang 48.0 
Ujung 
Pandang 44.4 
Ujung 
Pandang 33.1 
Pangkajen
e Islands 38.0 
Southeast 
Sulawesi 5 Kendari 53.7 Kendari 38.8 Kendari 51.0 Kolaka 81.1 
Maluku 5 North Maluku  51.1 Ambon 52.9 
North 
Maluku  58.5 Ambon 64.8 
Irian Jaya 10 Sorong 40.4 Sorong 28.8 Sorong 47.3 Merauke 37.2 
Source: Author’s own calculation and adapted from Sjöberg and Sjöholm (2004) 
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The Herfindahl index for the total manufacturing sector at the province and district 
level is presented in Table 5-7. The figure shows a constant increase of manufacturing 
concentration. For example, the employment data shows that the Herfindahl index value 
was 0.199 in 1993 and increased to 0.211 in 2005. The figure for value added data 
reveals similar result, although the figure increased before the financial crisis, it 
returned to its initial value in 2005. The results indicate increasing regional 
manufacturing growth divergence at district level.  
Table 5-8 displays changes in the Herfindahl index in the provinces between three 
periods. The table shows that after trade liberalisation and decentralisation, 
manufacturing concentration remained concentrated in a few districts. Concentration 
was high in provinces with small manufacturing and lower in provinces with large 
amount of manufacturing. For example, East Java, Central Java, West Java and Riau 
provinces had a lower concentration rate compared with other provinces. However, as 
Balisacan and Fuwa (2004) acknowledge, this result may be biased by the number of 
districts within a province affecting the measured rate of concentration, that is, 
provinces with small number of districts tend to score higher in concentration levels. 
Thus, the literature suggests further analysis using change in concentration is needed. 
Yet, no clear pattern of concentration has developed, a decreased concentration is found 
in 15 provinces for employment and in 13 provinces for value added. Comparing results 
between the periods shows that before the financial crisis the concentration rate for both 
indicators increased, while afterwards the provinces had developed a different pattern of 
manufacturing concentration. For instance, before state restrictions, provinces located in 
the Central region of Indonesia, such as Bali, Nusa Tenggara, and Kalimantan had an 
increase in employment and value-added concentration. After the state-restructuring, 
manufacturing concentration rate decreased by 15 % in employment, and 19% in value-
added.  
Using a similar method as in Balisacan and Fuwa (2004), which resorted to data 
from the period 1991 to 1996 and found an increase on spatial income for the 
Philippines, this analysis showed that significant decreases for these manufacturing 
provinces between 1993 and 2005.. The main manufacturing provinces in Java Island 
had increasing concentration rates during the period under study, except for East Java 
province. The West Java and Central Java provinces showed increased concentration 
rates by 40% and 11% between 1996 and 2005, respectively. In all periods, employment 
concentration in East Java province decreased slightly, while the value added 
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concentration peaked before the financial crisis and then decreased slightly in 2005. The 
Sumatran provinces showed contrasting concentration development, with an increase in 
the employment concentration rate and a decrease in the value added concentration rate. 
In particular, Riau Province had higher values with 19 % in the employment 
concentration rate and more than a 27% decrease in the value-added concentration rate.  
 
Table 5-7 Concentration of Manufacturing – National Level (Herfindahl Index) 
Employment Value Added Administration 
Level Province District Province District 
1993 0.199 0.035 0.193 0.064 
1996 0.207 0.033 0.238 0.063 
2005 0.211 0.040 0.191 0.063 
 Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
Table 5-8 Concentration of Manufacturing – Provincial Level (Herfindahl Index) 
Employment Value Added 
Province 1993 1996 2005 1993 1996 2005 
Aceh 0.351 0.254 0.279 0.339 0.347 0.481 
North Sumatra 0.217 0.215 0.226 0.196 0.224 0.196 
West Sumatra 0.386 0.373 0.303 0.557 0.646 0.735 
Riau 0.268 0.341 0.406 0.399 0.447 0.324 
Jambi 0.333 0.330 0.436 0.382 0.298 0.743 
South Sumatra 0.314 0.300 0.292 0.363 0.428 0.460 
Bengkulu 0.484 0.311 0.451 0.309 0.380 0.391 
Lampung 0.347 0.350 0.254 0.360 0.339 0.258 
Jakarta 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
West Java 0.119 0.114 0.190 0.117 0.142 0.205 
Central Java 0.064 0.064 0.068 0.283 0.102 0.114 
Yogyakarta 0.346 0.331 0.318 0.366 0.466 0.421 
East Java 0.100 0.109 0.097 0.184 0.196 0.143 
Bali 0.280 0.241 0.210 0.323 0.358 0.249 
West Nusa Tenggara 0.281 0.205 0.199 0.238 0.346 0.224 
East Nusa Tenggara 0.380 0.315 0.301 0.610 0.751 0.345 
West Kalimantan 0.466 0.465 0.355 0.466 0.393 0.321 
Central Kalimantan 0.365 0.378 0.350 0.393 0.429 0.556 
South Kalimantan 0.318 0.312 0.285 0.374 0.313 0.283 
East Kalimantan 0.425 0.371 0.253 0.354 0.315 0.453 
North Sulawesi 0.303 0.257 0.474 0.354 0.359 0.777 
Central Sulawesi 0.358 0.283 0.325 0.390 0.345 0.308 
South Sulawesi 0.265 0.298 0.247 0.239 0.293 0.261 
Southeast Sulawesi 0.373 0.401 0.256 0.342 0.529 0.673 
Maluku 0.383 0.266 0.502 0.449 0.274 0.544 
Irian Jaya 0.260 0.243 0.226 0.313 0.235 0.250 
Source: Author’s own calculation and adapted from Sjöberg and Sjöholm (2004) 
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A Study of Sectoral Inequality: Case of High-Technology Manufacturing 
 
This section provides a case study to show sectoral unevenness in the high 
technology industry. The high technology industry is regarded as an innovation industry 
and has been linked with regional economic growth. A higher share of high innovation 
industry sector is expected to have more impact on regional development. Literature 
suggested that sectors that are particularly high in technology have innovations in 
electricity, manufacturing, and transportation equipment. In Indonesian statistics data, 
these industries are included in the classification, ISIC 38. 
The summary of innovation activity levels and regional economic growth can be 
viewed in Table 5-9. For both periods, the Jakarta province has the highest patent, value 
added levels, and the highest GRDP per capita, followed by West Java, East java, and 
Riau. Among the regions, Riau has the highest concentration of industries (LQ) 
explaining that high-tech manufacturing is highly clustered within the region (Fig. 5-6). 
It can bee seen that the high-technology industry has a positive impact on economic 
growth. Riau has the highest cluster, and by increasing its patent and value added rank, 
it gained a two-fold increase in GRDP per capita, industry activities, and employment 
from 1993 to 2005.    
To provide an overview of the impact of high-tech spatial concentration on regional 
economic development, this research uses the correlation model following Florida 
(2002) and Capone (2010). The spatial concentration of this high-tech industry has a 
positive correlation with growth in population, employment, and manufacturing value-
added growth. The correlation graphs in Figure 5-6 shows the linkages between 
industrial activities with regional economic performance.  
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Table 5-9 Economic Performance in 1993 and 2005 
 Riau Jakarta West Java East Java 
 1993 2003 1993 2003 1993 2003 1993 2003 
GRDP per 
capita 66.7 149 233 273 115 153 244 173 
Industry 
Output 
(Billion Rp) 
7600 24900 35400 46200 65100 119000 60700 42800 
Industry 
Employment 163576 573762 88201 84705 3666286 6152146 3891068 2752171 
Patent rank 4 4 1 1 4 3 4 2 
Value added 
rank 7 4 1 1 2 2 3 3 
LQ 3.267579 2.100142 2.046888 1.400626 1.103143 1.288283 .7865382 .9569725 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
 
 
Figure 5-6 LQ and Population Growth 
LQ and total Employment 
 
 
LQ and Employment in Industry 38 
Growth 
 
 
 
LQ and Population Growth 
 
LQ and Value added growth 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
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Table 5-10 Regional Dispersion of Innovation Activities and Labour Productivity 
Industry Innovation1 Labour Productivity2 Correlation3 
Province Number of Observation 
1993 2003 1993 2003 1993 2003 
Riau 7 0.39 0.46 1.20 0.87 0.28 - 0.13 
West Java 25 0.40 0.81 3.66 1.72 - 0.12 0.31 
East Java 37 0.53 1.14 1.68 1.73 0.11 -0.02 
Indonesia 292 1.51 3.92 2.66 2.20 0.02 0.11 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
Notes: 1. Coefficient of variation of industrial value added per input 
2. Coefficient of variation of GDP per worker per input 
3. Correlation coefficient between spatial distribution of innovation activities and labour 
productivity 
 
Regional dispersion in innovation activities and labour productivity across three 
selected regions and the whole of Indonesia are displayed above (Table 5-10). The 
distribution on innovation activities appears to be highly concentrated (CV=3.92. At 
individual regions, there is a significant increase in dispersion since 1993 with the 
highest dispersion is found in East Java (CV=1.14), while Riau has the highest spatial 
concentration of innovation activity (CV between 0.46 ). 
The degree of labour productivity dispersion is lower than innovation activities level. 
At the country level, productivity rates across Indonesian regions have a weak 
convergence rate (from 2.66 in 1993 to 2.2 in 2003). The regional figures show again, 
that East Java has the highest degree of dispersion (1.73) while Riau shows the highest 
concentrated productivity (0.87). The last two columns provide the degree of 
association between regional distribution of innovation activities and labour 
productivity. The two events are positively correlated for Indonesia and some of the 
regions. The correlation has increased form 0.02 in 1993 to 0.11 in 2003. However, 
there are no constant associations within the regions explaining the limitation of 
industrial innovation in Indonesia, or that labour productivity increases are due to 
imported technologies, rather than a result of local innovation.  
This discussion shows the diversity of Indonesia’s manufacturing distribution 
activities and cluster industries. The results confirmed that Indonesia has limited 
innovation activities and cluster industries in selected sectors within regions. However, 
this should not be linked directly with regional innovation and knowledge spill-over 
levels. Regions with high concentration and clustered manufacturing do not necessarily 
  102 
indicate dense innovation and research activities; rather they merely show more links 
between industries in the regions.   
 
5.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter shows the persistent disparities following uneven development and 
industrial location. At the provincial level, higher economic growth are found mainly in 
western part of Indonesia and significant lagging districts in the central and eastern part. 
In addition, the analysis also shows that higher industrial agglomeration in poorer 
provinces, which hinders dispersion of districts economic growth.   
There are several conclusions that we can draw from this chapter. First, this 
research uses several distribution indices that give evidence about regional disparities 
that persisted during the period under observation. In general, all analyses indicate that 
there were patterns of increasing regional disparities during the height of economic 
growth between 1993 and 1996. These figures decrease in the decentralisation period, 
which suggests a catching up process with regard to wealth by the poorer regions.  
Second, several analyses were conducted to observe a geographical regional 
disparities pattern. First, the dynamic cross-section analysis (Quah, 1993) indicates that 
at the provincial level, there is shift of states, with lower regions transferring to higher 
state and vice versa; this shows convergence process. Second, distance proximity to 
capital shows no significant evidence of regional economic growth. This result confirms 
McCulloch and Syahrir’s (2008, p.14) finding, which use the spatial distance from 
Jakarta, has no obvious impact on a district’s economic growth.  
Third, using the standard deviation of GDP per capita, this study shows that the 
western part of Indonesia has a higher growth rate compared with the central and 
eastern parts. Indirectly, this confirms that manufacturing regions such as Riau, West 
Java, and East Java provinces have higher economic growth than rich natural-resources 
provinces such as Papua and East Kalimantan in the east part of Indonesia. 
Fourth, regional government ability to specialise its sectors determines its local 
development and competitive advantages. Whilst the regional level has more authority 
and responsibility for its respective regions, national policy on trade liberalisation and 
development budgets remain important. This chapter provides evidence that high 
technology industry locations are concentrated into four regions in Indonesia that have 
advance infrastructure and market access. In the last section, a case study with the 
electricity, manufacturing, and transportation equipment industries (ISIC 38) shows that 
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industrial concentration has weak positive correlation on labour productivity. In 2003, 
West Java is the only region that has a stronger correlation between these factors. This 
finding could imply that, between 1993 and 2003, the growth of innovative industries in 
the respective ISIC in West Java are higher compared with industries in Riau, East Java 
and the rest of Indonesia.  Both national and regional governments should cooperate to 
improve hard and soft infrastructure in order to enhance regional development, and 
strengthen its competitiveness in the globalization era. 
The next two empirical chapters study the differences in economic structure and 
industrial endowments that have significant divergence in the regional economic 
development in Indonesia.  
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Chapter 6 Decentralisation and ASEAN FTA Impact on 
Regional Economic Performance 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Devolution and trade liberalisation are seen as policies to promote regional economic 
growth. This research studies the democratisation and post-authoritarian Indonesian 
regional development. However, devolution and trade liberalisation do not always 
accelerate regional economic growth, as each region has different local endowments, 
institutions, and economic structures. Thus, given the large differences in cultural and 
economic endowments, Indonesia, with more than 290 districts, is an interesting case 
study to explore the determining factors of sub-national growth. 
Decentralisation introduce higher transaction cost for manufacturing firms with 
regulatory burdens including bribes and the worsening situation of firms in Indonesia 
(Asia Foundation, 2002; Kuncoro, 2004a). Fixed cost on regulations impose a larger 
burden on small firms and contribute more to the informal sector. A study by the Asian 
Development Bank (2008) showed that firms spent ten percent of their time completing 
forms and more than half of their time is spent in dealing with local government 
regulations. Lengthy liquidation procedures impose additional costs on the process of 
reallocating resources to more productive uses. According to a World Bank (2008) 
report, Indonesia ranks 135 out of 175 countries in terms of the ease of closing a 
business. Beside regulatory burdens, manufacturing firms in Indonesia faced domestic 
challenges of trade tariffs and non-tariff barriers elimination in ASEAN FTA. However, 
the regions are also under pressure, as local products that struggle to compete with 
import products will threat local economic development.  
There are limited studies available on developing countries that question the impact 
of devolution and trade liberalisation on regional economic growth. This study 
continues to research economic convergence analyses like De Hoyos and Iacovone 
(2011), Logan (2008), Fujita and Hu (2001), Sanchez-Reaza and Rodríguez-Pose  
(2002), and Rivas (2007). The study also incorporates studies on the impact of trade 
liberalisation including those of Azzoni (2001), Gil Canaleta et al. (2004), McCulloch 
and Syahrir (2008), Resosudarmo and Vidyatamma (2006), Rodríguez-Pose  and Bwire 
(2004), Rodríguez-Pose  and Gill (2005), and Silva (2005).  
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The purpose of this study is to understand the economic impact of state-restructuring 
on Indonesia’s regions between 1993 and 2005. The econometric analysis is used to 
observe the effect of devolution, ASEAN FTA variables, and selected control variables 
on the growth of district GRDP. The research finds that there is evidence of regional 
convergence throughout the period under observation. While devolution has 
significantly increased economic divergence, the ASEAN FTA appears to have an 
insignificant impact on Indonesia regional economic growth.  
The rest of this paper is divided into five sections. The next section discusses the 
methodology models and stylised formulation. The third section discusses the data for 
the econometrics analysis and descriptive statistics of the variables. Section four 
analyses the OLS and panel regressions for three periods: 1993-2000, 2001-2005, and 
1993-2005. The final section presents concluding remarks, and contributes to the debate 
about regional disparities in Indonesia.  
 
6.2 The Theoretical Model  
6.2.1 The State-Restructuring Impact Model  
This section shows the model of the state restructuring impact on regional economic 
growth. The model is derived from a simple Cobb-Douglas production function using 
several variables related with decentralisation and AFTA trade openness. The model in 
this research follows a basic estimation model suggested by Rivas (2007) with slight 
adjustments to Indonesian districts. The model begins with a Cobb-Douglas production 
function:  
 
Yit=AitK!itL"it#it 
(1) 
 
With the i and t represent region and time period. Y is the real income, A is the level of 
technology, K represents the physical capital stock, and L is the number of workers.  
If function (1) is expressed in per worker terms and factors in natural logarithms, the 
function becomes:  
 
ln yit= ln Ait +! ln kit + ("+!-1) ln Lit + ln #it 
(2) 
 
Where all the variables are the same as in function (1), but the lowercase are 
expressions in per worker terms.  
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Following Rivas (2007), I modified the function (2) to calculate income growth per 
capita and take natural log differences for each period as follows:  
 
ln yit - ln yit-1= (ln Ait - ln Ait-1) +! (ln kit - ln kit-1) + 
                               (" + ! - 1) (ln Lit - ln Lit-1 ) + (ln #it - ln #it) 
(3) 
 
The equation expanded as the capital is divided into two terms, C and I. Term C is 
used to represent capital such as government and private investments that is used in the 
production function that determines economic growth directly. Meanwhile the I term 
reflects physical capital that effects the production process indirectly, for example, 
public infrastructure and change of political order. Thus, the function becomes:  
 
ln kit - ln kit-1= f(ln Cit - ln Cit-1) + w(ln Iit -ln Iit-1) 
 (4) 
 
Where f and w are linear functions.  
 
In order to capture the economic growth from state-restructuring, the physical capital 
is shown as a function of two terms. The first term is private investments in each 
district. The second term is the level of GRDP per capita as the initial income variable, 
and used to capture the convergence level, as seen in the convergence literature. The 
function is:  
 
f(ln Cit - ln Cit-1) = d(ln Cit-1) ) + z(ln yit-1) 
(5) 
 
Where d and z are linear functions.  
 
While to capture indirect effects variables, this research uses state restructuring of 
decentralisation and trade liberalisation. Two other variables that supports the economic 
development are the public infrastructure and government politico-bureaucracy 
condition, which is represented by the lobbying capacity by local governments. These 
variables are explained in the empirical analysis chapter in page 117. The last variable is 
the bordering effects which is the interaction between AFTA CEPT tariff with dummy 
variable of regions in the border. The function becomes:  
 
w(ln Iit -ln Iit-1) = p(ln Iit) + q1(Dit) + q2(Tit) + l (ln Nit) + s (ln Cit*S) 
 
(6) 
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Where p, q1, q2, l and s are linear function.  
 
Combining function (5) and (6) into (4), the overall function for capital function is:  
 
ln kit - ln kit-1 = d(ln Cit-1) ) + z(ln yit-1) (7) + p(ln Iit-1) + q1(Dit) + q2(Tit) +   l (ln Nit) 
 
(7) 
 
In addition, to measure the growth in technology, (ln Ait - ln Ait-1), the following 
equation is conducted:  
 
(ln Ait - ln Ait-1) = g(ln hit) + m(Ait) + u (ln U) 
(8) 
 
Where g, m, and u are linear functions. The first term expresses the direct and 
independent effect of human capital to the technology level. The second term represents 
technological levels of each district. The last term indicates the effect of the share of 
people living in urban areas on economic growth.  
The full econometrics equation for the impact of state-restructuring on regional 
economic growth is as follows:  
 
ln yit - ln yit-1= g(ln hit) + m(Ait) + u (ln U) + d(ln Cit-1) ) + z(ln yit-1) + p(ln Iit-1) + 
q1(Dit) + q2(Tit) + l (ln Nit) + s (ln Cit*S)  + (" + ! - 1) (ln Lit - ln Lit-1 
) + (ln #it - ln #it) 
(9) 
 
The model in equation (9) is estimated with simple OLS and panel data fixed-effects 
to address unobservable factors related to economic growth in each district. To 
investigate the spatial relationship between districts, the analysis also includes a spatial 
lag variable, 
! 
"(Wy), with 
! 
"  is the spatial lag coefficient, W is the spatial weight matrix 
based on population of neighbouring districts, and y is a vector of district’s per capita 
GDP.  
 
6.2.2 The "  Convergence Model 
 
Absolute "  Convergence Regression. The ß Convergence is tested with regression 
analysis and it is calculated to encompass the absolute convergence (poorer regions 
grow faster than rich regions) that exists. The equation includes the variable of natural 
logarithm of an end year (yt) and initial year of GDP per capita (y0). It is important to 
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note that ß convergence can occur without $ convergence, but it is not sufficient enough 
(Barro, 1991). The regression equation for Absolute ß Convergence is as follows:  
 
! 
ln(yt / y0)
t = " + # ln(y0)
 
(10) 
 
Where the dependent variable is the logarithm of per capita income or product, % and ß 
are constants, with 0< ß <1, and #i as the random disturbance term. At ß >0 implies 
negative convergence since the annual rate of growth is negatively related with ln(yi,t), 
with the higher value of ß showing convergence.  
Conditional and Spatial "  Convergence Regression. Conditional convergence 
occurs (poorer regions grow faster than rich regions if other variables are taken into 
accounts besides initial income level). For conditional " convergence, the empirical 
model is suggested by Resosudarmo and Vidyatamma (2006) as:  
 
! 
yit " yit"1( )
yit"1
= #1 + $ ln yit"1 + X 'it # x + Z 'it # z + C'it # d +%i + uit  
(11) 
 
! 
yit " yit"1( )
yit"1
= #1 + X 'it # x + Z 'it # z + C'it # d + $Wy +%i + uit  
(12) 
! 
yit " yit"1( )
yit"1
= #1 + X 'it # x + Z 'it # z + C'it # d + $W% + &i + uit  
(13) 
 
This regression equation (11) is for convergence analysis as included in the 
conditional variables and regression specification for the trade impact spatial lag model 
equation (12) and spatial error model (13).    
The i represent the district administration, t is the index of time, yit is GDP per 
capita, the X’it are the vector of variables that are used to understand growth regression. 
Z’it are the main variables that this research are interested, which are the free trade and 
devolution variables, and Cit is a group of control variables. The model needs the 
individual effect, &i, to capture all the determinants of growth for various regions in 
panel data analysis. The uit is the random disturbance not to be correlated when the time 
or region is not the same. It assumes uit is constant.  
The ' refers to spatial lag coefficient, while ( is the spatial error model coefficient. 
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To show whether spatial convergence is present, this research follows Rey and 
Montouri (1999) that employ robust Moran’s I and robust Lagrange multiplier (LM). 
The significant of '-value of robust Moran’s I provides strong evidence of spatial 
dependence; the strategy from Anselin and Rey (1991) elabourates to determine 
whether it’s a partial error and spatial lag type of spatial dependence.  
Besides OLS methods with fixed effect, this research employs maximum likelihood 
(ML) for the spatial lag and spatial error models. Technical methods in spatial 
econometric convergence include spatial autocorrelation and spatial growth 
convergence. Spatial convergence is calculated in the form of speed of convergence " 
and half-life (Equation 14 and 15). Speed of convergence confirms the presence of 
convergence across time annually and half-life explains the amount of years to reduce 
disparities among regions (Arbia and Piras, 2005). The " refers to the coefficient of 
convergence and the T is the number of years under observation.  
 
! 
b = " ln(1+ #)T  
(14) 
! 
thalf " life = ln(2)b  
(15) 
 
Spatial autocorrelation analysis is divided to global and local autocorrelation. While 
spatial convergence methods using autocorrelation, known as I-Moran's, relates with 
autocorrelation of spatial areas for regional income over a period of time, also found in 
the non-spatial autocorrelation as $ convergence of per capita income dispersion among 
regions. The methods used are CV of log real income per capita and local I-Moran's that 
plots standardised income of regions against its spatial lag (also standardised). 
Meanwhile spatial convergence studies the spatial convergence growth with OLS 
and LM techniques in term of spatial lag and spatial error modelling. Spatial lag is 
concerned with the expected value of growth rate of each region’s per capita income, 
depending not only on its initial value, but also compared with other regions. This 
method answers how the growth in a region could relate to its neighbours and to what 
extent it influences (Rey and Montouri, 1999). Another method is the spatial error 
dependence convergence analysis that occurs when the dependence works through an 
error process, in that, the errors from different regions might result in spatial covariance. 
Hence, this approach focuses on estimating parameters for the independent variables of 
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interest, and disregards the possibility that the observed correlation may reflect some 
information about the data generation process. In other words, instead yj directly 
affecting yi, the spatial error model assumes that the errors of the model are correlated 
(Ward and Gleditsch, 2008).  
Estimation of spatial lag and spatial error using OLS will cause unbiased estimates 
when non-spherical errors are present, but biased estimates of the parameters variance 
lead to a misleading estimation by OLS. This leads to a conclusion that spatial error 
models should be based on ML or GMM. The spatial structure change could also be 
seen in the SUR models with ML in the spatial method. The model can describe 
structural changes occurrences between sub period times of study.  
To consider which regression model is the best fit, it is common to use the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC). The AIC is used 
to compare the values of estimation between OLS and the spatial dependence model 
with the lowest AIC value is chosen as the preferable estimation. In addition, the 
criterion may also use the BIC to solve over-fitting in maximum likelihood estimations, 
due to adding additional parameters, by introducing a penalty term for the number of 
parameters in the model. This penalty for additional parameters is stronger than that of 
the AIC. The BIC was developed by Gideon E. Schwarz who gave a Bayesian argument 
for adopting it (Schwarz, 1978).  
 
6.2.3 The Panel Convergence Model 
The next econometrics model is the panel data analysis that contains repeated 
observations over the same units (districts) for over a number of years. The availability 
of repeated observations allows the specification and estimation of complicated and 
more realistic models than a single cross-section of time series data (Verbeek, 2008). 
The panel data offers an opportunity to address unobserved heterogeneity related to 
economic growth in individual districts. Panel data eliminates omit variable bias when 
the omitted variables are constant over time within a given state. However, when the 
observations are repeated for each individual, there are independent issues, and often 
the data suffers missing value observations.  
The general formulation of a panel data model is express by the following equation:  
 
! 
yit = " i + X 'it #+$it +% it  
(16) 
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With i (i=1,…,n) representing individual districts and t (t=1,…,t) representing time 
periods. The X’it is the observation of explanatory variables in district i and at time t. 
The !i is time invariant and denotes district-specific effects that are included in the 
equation. The error term is a composite error, 
! 
" it = # i +$ it , combining individual 
heterogeneity (
! 
" i) and an idiosyncratic error term (
! 
" it ) that is independent across all 
observations.  
The !i interpretation can be distinguished by two different types of panel data 
estimations: the fixed-effect, and the random-effect estimation. If the !i is assumed to 
be a fixed parameter estimate, the equation’s estimate is termed fixed-effect panel data 
model. The fixed-effects is used to capture all unobserved time-invariant district factors 
such as geographic areas, institutions, interregional heterogeneity and cultures 
(Suwanan and Sulistiani, 2009). This model eliminates endogeneity problems and 
control for unobserved districts characteristics.  
If the !i is assumed to be random in its error, "it, the estimation is termed random-
effect panel data model. The use of fixed-effect model is in the regression analysis that 
is limited to precise individuals or districts, regions, or firms. On the other hand, the 
random-effect model is used particularly if we are interested in drawing certain 
individuals randomly from a large population of reference (Arbia and Piras, 2005). 
In this chapter, I use the fixed-effect model following a Hausman test to prove 
statistically which model is appropriate for the data. If the Hausman test statistic is 
large, the appropriate model will be a fixed-effect model, and if the statistic is small, a 
random-effect model is suggested. 
The use of panel data and a fixed-effect model in the convergence study has been 
common since Islam (2003). The literature suggests that convergence rate using panel 
data that uses fixed effects, tend to have larger coefficient estimation than cross-
sectional model, with estimates of 2% per year (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991). The 
model that I estimated is expressed in the following equation:  
 
! 
ln yit " yit"1yit"1
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( = ) i + *ln yit ++ it  
(17) 
 
Where the dependent variable is the annual growth rate of per capita GDP, the regressor 
is the (log) GDP per capita for region I, at time t, and !i represents a parameter to be 
estimated in the panel model.  
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6.3 The Empirical Model and Data  
Raw statistics data was collected from various government and international institutions 
such as the BPS, Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ministry of Trade, and the ASEAN 
Secretariat. The BPS data includes gross domestic and national products (GRDP and 
GNP), population, plant level data, and revenue from oil and gas The BPS statistics data 
also provides the plant-level data on Indonesian large and medium manufacturing 
industries with a rich array of data such as input and output costs, productivity, and 
labour. The MoF website provides data on regional budgets, data on local revenue, 
central allocation fund/dana alokasi umum (DAU), and routine and development 
expenditures. The tariff trade data was obtained from the Ministry of Trade for the 
MFN tariff, and from the ASEAN Secretary for the AFTA-CEPT tariff. Finally, 
geographical map data were purchased from a private mapping firm.  
To construct the regional variables, this research is based on the BPS publication of 
regional list in 19971 that includes regions before decentralisation in 1998. The paper 
uses the time-series data to provide the analysis of impact trade to regions between 1993 
and 2005. After decentralisation, there was significant regional splitting (Booth, 20011; 
Fitriani et al. 2005). The 1997 regional list consisted of 26 provinces (after the 
separation of East Timor in 1999) and 292 districts2, made up of 232 regencies and 60 
municipalities, with 4088 overall observations for the period 1993 to 2005. All data is 
available for these districts in the observation period, except for the regional budget 
data, which is available from 1994. 
The study of the AFTA CEPT tariff impact is conducted using econometrics models 
other than the computed general equilibrium (CGE), although CGE models are widely 
used to calculate the tariff impact of trade agreements including bilateral and trade blocs 
(Feridhanusetyawan and Pangestu, 2003). Despite the common use of equations, 
techniques, and explanatory variables, this study argues two reasons not to utilise the 
CGE models. First, this study aims to understand the impact of tariff changes on 
Indonesian districts throughout the period. The input-output statistics data between 
Indonesian districts is considered limited and has not been widely used, thus as CGE 
models is derived from input-output models, CGE models is not preferable. Second, as 
CGE studies link regions under a particular regime, the impact of trade changes which 
should also calculate trade value between districts in ASEAN members, is considerable 
                                                
1 Available at www.bps.go.id 
2 The Special Region of Capital Jakarta is province with five non-autonomous districts. 
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unavailable. With these reasons and limitations, this research studies the impact of the 
CEPT tariff using data approximated from plant-level data available for large and 
medium manufactures, and from a series of tariff reduction with micro econometrics 
analysis. As the AFTA CEPT tariff regime aims to reduce tariff barriers in the 
manufacturing sector, the analysis is expected to explain the impacts on individual 
district’s development based on its manufacturing share and its advancement level for 
periods under observation. 
This research follows Gil Canaleta et al. (2004, p. 79) who suggest decentralisation 
should analyse both political and financial issues. The analysis divides the research into 
three periods under observation following McCulloch and Syahrir (2008). The first is 
the pre- and during crises of 1993-2000, the second period reflects the state-
restructuring era in 2001-2005, and the third is the whole period from 1993 to 2005. 
This chapter extends the McCulloch and Syahrir paper in the following ways:  
 
1. It displays data analysis with more approaches to inequality. In addition, to 
spatial convergence, it also studies industrial sectors.  
2. The study provides additional variables for regional manufacturing, economy, 
and politics such as the labour productivity, AFTA impact on industries in the 
bordering regions, and local government’s ability to lobby politically.   
 
6.3.1 Dependent Variable 
 
The GDP and population data is ordered exclusively from the national statistics Bureau 
(BPS) and is unpublished for district level annually for period under observation. These 
data are also used to obtain the GDP per capita. The data is available for constant and 
current price. The constant data base year is 1993 for the 1993 to 2001 analysis, and 
base year 2000 for the 2001 to 2005, and 1993 to 2005 analysis. This data is available in 
this way because the statistical bureau does not publish the GDP and population data at 
the district level annually.  
However, as found in any developing countries, statistical data in Indonesia suffers 
from several weaknesses. In their research, McCulloch and Syahrir (2008), argue that 
the GRDP calculations are conducted separately at the national, provincial, and district 
level, although using a common method could impact in the quality of data compiled. 
The regional offices also do not ensure that the aggregate data adds up to the sum of its 
results. Furthermore, since the decentralisation, there has been regional splitting at 
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provincial and district levels that determine the number of research observation and data 
availability. Following their paper, these weaknesses are tackle by using the number of 
districts before decentralisation in 1997 and constant GDP per capita in 1993, published 
by the BPS, as the base year. This enable to analyse regional economic growth between 
1993 and 2005 with 292 districts.   
 
6.3.2 Explanatory and Dummy Variables 
 
Fiscal Decentralisation Impact Measurement. The research uses data of 
government budgets from the Ministry of Finance website. The data consists of local 
budget and expenditure (APBD), local revenue, and intergovernmental grants. The data 
needed to be cleaned due to several technical problems such as duplication of codes and 
aggregates of districts before decentralisation. The data also suffered from different 
levels of detail, as the data between 1994 and 2000 does not detail the routine 
expenditures (Code 40) while the data afterwards, 2000 to 2006, has eight types of 
codes (402-409).  
There are two fiscal decentralisation measurements, which are the district fiscal 
dependency and financial capacity (Darise, 2009). The district fiscal dependency is 
calculated as the annual percentage change of DAU transfer amount from the central 
government. As DAU transfer amount is based on development indicators formulation, 
a decline in the annual percentage of DAU transfer amount indicates a decline in the 
transfer fund and improvement in economic performance. The local financial capacity 
refers to the region’s own source revenue (OSR). The OSR represents two local 
capacities, the level of local economy and local revenue institutions.  
Export Import Measurement. To provide robust analysis, the ASEAN FTA is also 
approximated by the value of export and import of the manufacturing sector in districts. 
The variable allows us to view a district’s integration and openness into ASEAN FTA, 
as it reflects changes in trade restrictions such as tariff quotes, licensing, non-tariff 
barriers, and labour dynamics. Furthermore, Rivas (2007) argues that this variable also 
represents non-trade policy influences including transport cost, production, and global 
trade levels. Thus, due to its wide influencing factors, this variable should be used 
carefully as an alternative variable to approximate ASEAN FTA. This alternative 
openness variable is constructed as the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP 
within a year (Rivas, 2007). The export and import data is based on plant data for
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municipalities with plants, for municipalities without plants, the data is input as national 
trade openness.  
This variable has a negative correlation value with the tariff impact variable because 
both variables show different behaviour to economic growth. Regional economic 
growth increases following lower tariff and higher trade activities.  
Tariff Impact Measurements. The tariff variable measures direct impact of a trade 
liberalisation quantitative barrier reduction. The analysis assumes that the increase in 
imports due to lower trade barrier in AFTA CEPT tariff increases trade activities and 
manufacturing productivity, which eventually will affect the regions in which the 
manufactures are located. However, tariffs neglect the other trade restrictions and non-
trade policies that determine the level of openness that are addressed by the export-
import measurement above.  
The AFTA CEPT tariff data used is available from the ASEAN Secretariat. By 
combining the tariff data and the proportion of industries within a region, we obtain the 
approximate profits of the region from the AFTA tariff within a particular industry. The 
measurement is obtained using three statistics data on districts’s manufacture plant 
share, which are share of industry output, share of industry productivity, and share of 
export value of the district. 
Following Amiti and Cameron (2004), and Amiti and Konings (2007), this research 
requested the BPS to make data available on each industry - intermediate inputs and the 
amount on each in Rupiah from its SI questionnaire. This information is not routinely 
prepared and this research uses the data from 1998 and 2002. For all other years, the SI 
data provides total expenditure on domestic and imported inputs, but not by individual 
type of input. The 1998 and 2002 data is available in five-digit industry, and is used to 
create a 228 manufacturing input/output table. The mix of inputs by industries are 
assumed to be fixed over time3.  
To analyse the impact of tariff on local economic development, this research uses the 
AFTA CEPT tariffs obtained from the ASEAN Secretariat. In trade liberalisation, there 
are output and input tariff, which the output tariff measures the import value of a 
product and the input tariff measures the import value of raw material of sectoral 
industry within a districts. The input tariff calculation also follows Amiti and Konings 
(2007), which uses the MFN tariff. First, we construct a five-digit output tariff by taking 
                                                
3 Assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology (Amiti & Konings, 2007) 
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a simple average of the HS nine-digit codes within each five-digit industry code, by 
using unpublished concordance between HS nine-digit and five digits ISIC available by 
Amiti and Konings (2007). Second, for each five-digit industry, we compute an input 
tariff as a weighted average of the output tariffs (equation 18 and 19).  
 
 
! 
input
! 
tarifftk = w jk1998"    x 
! 
output
! 
tarifft j  
(18) 
 
 
 
! 
w jk1998 =
i inputijk1998"
ij inputijk1998"
 
(19) 
 
The weights, 
! 
w jk1998 , are the cost shares of industry j in the production of goods in 
industry k, based on data in 1998. If industry k uses 60% of sacks of paper and 40% of 
cement, I calculated a 60% weight to the sacks of paper tariff and 40% weight to the 
cement tariff. 
Third, a similar calculation is performed to obtain the tariff impact on individual 
districts (equation 20 and 21). I computed an input and output tariff impact as a 
weighted average the industry’s share within the district.  
 
! 
district
! 
tarifftl = wl1998"    x 
! 
output(input)
! 
tarifftk  
(20) 
! 
wl1998 =
i input(output)kl1998"
ij input(output)kl1998"
 
(21) 
 
The weights, 
! 
wl1998 , are the cost shares of industry k in district l, based on data in 
1998. If district l output consisted of 70% of textile industry and 30% of food industry, I 
calculated a 70% weight to the textile tariff and 30% weight to the food tariff. In 
addition, to address concerns about trade structure post-decentralisation, I also 
constructed the input/output table for the 2002. The data needed to be cleaned due to 
missing variables for some observations and for large output and input growth 
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distribution numbers. The available dataset is an unbalanced panel of around 21.000 
firms per year with a total of 274.061 observations.  
The impact of AFTA on regions based on the number of industries in 1993 and 2005 
is not significantly different (See Appendix A). In each row, the number of industries 
that benefit from AFTA decrease at the level 0-5%, and increase significantly at the 
level more than 5%. To be more specific, the sub-sector that benefits the most are 
DISIC 31 and 39, which are the food industries and other industries (including light 
equipment), respectively. The table indicates that the CEPT tariffs are much lower than 
the MFN tariffs, even the metals products (ISIC 36) had no tariff barrier to enter 
Indonesia in 2005. The table below also notes the changes in average tariff rates and 
growth for each sector in the manufacturing industry. From the table it can be seen that 
Indonesian industry has been liberalised since the early 1990s and peaked during the 
second half of the decade. The tariff on paper products (ISIC 34) had the most tariff 
reduction with an average 35% in each period.  
Regional Control Variables. The variables in the regional control followed the 
study by McCulloch and Syahrir (2008). The share of people in urban areas is used to 
observe the effect of agglomeration. While measuring impact human capital, this study 
used the share of people who are or who have been in junior high school as the stock for 
human capital in economic activities. Infrastructure data is approximated using 
infrastructure data availability such as water debit, road length, and road ratio (Rivas, 
2007). This research use the road access variable because it serves as a proxy for a 
district’s spatial connectivity and an access for economic activities. The road access 
variable may also be perceived as a factor for industry location (Balisacan and Fuwa, 
2004). 
This thesis offers an original variable to observed the impact of decentralisation with 
the lobbying capacity variable (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005; Rodríguez-Pose et al, 
2009). The variable is constructed as an interaction between the sum of earmarked fund 
that districts received with a dummy that represent the district’s level of financial. A 
district is considered rich if it has a GRDP above the GRDP average and the dummy 
value for a rich district is 1. The dummy value is 0 if it is a poor district. For example, 
the state ministry of forestry provide earmarked budget for districts for local forests 
management and development. Thus, this variable captures the influence of district's 
fiscal resources and political power on lobbying the central government to earn 
additional development budget.  
  118 
 
Industrial Control Variables. As ASEAN FTA tariffs targeted manufacturing 
industries, contrary to other Indonesian regional studies, this research does not include 
the presences of natural resources (oil, gas, and minerals), but rather uses the share of 
manufacturing activities in the GRDP. While the labour productivity variable is 
measured the ratio of labour per output, thus this variable is expected to have a negative 
association with the economic growth. The higher ratio of the number of labour to 
produce one unit output implies inefficiency of factor of production and thus, lower 
economic growth. 
The level of technological availability is approximated by the total factory 
productivity (TFP). This approach has been widely used to estimate the role industry 
technological level on economic growth such as in India and Indonesia (Amiti and 
Konings, 2007; Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011). This thesis follows the assumptions 
and methods used by the above papers to construct the industry TFP for each region. To 
construct the firm-level TFP, the approach by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) are used 
with data on firm’s raw material inputs as proxy for unobservable productivity shocks 
to control for the simultaneity in the firm’s production function. The construction of this 
follows a Cobb-Douglas production function and this requires the data on physical 
quantities of output, capital and intermediate inputs. Because we do not have the firm-
specific price deflators, we must use the industry-specific deflators. Thus, the TFP 
measure captures both technical efficiency and price-cost mark-ups (Topalova and 
Khandelwal, 2011) and as long as price cost mark-ups are correlated with true 
efficiency, the TFP measure captures technical efficiency. The TFP is constructed by 
subtracting firm’s I predicted output form its actual output at time t4. Following the 
endogenous growth model, a positive sign of the industry TFP implies that a regions 
industries’ technology level is associated with higher economic growth (Romer, 1986, 
1990, 1994). 
To capture the spatial effect of location proximity, this research constructed a 
dummy variable of bordering regions. Literature suggests that these regions have 
location advantage to seize trade liberalisation with its proximity to markets (Logan, 
2008; Sanchez-Reaza and Rodríguez-Pose, 2002). To capture the effects of spatial 
locations, I use the dummy variables for international borders. The bordering districts 
                                                
4 All of these technical procedures are performed using the STATA software command “levpet” with all 
variables are in the logarithms form.  
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are listed as prioritised regions based on Undang-undang no. 43/2008 and Government 
Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) No. 26/2008. Since the research aggregates the 
regions to the number before decentralisation with total of 25 bordering districts. The 
dummy variable has a value of zero if it is a bordering region, and has a value of one if 
otherwise. The trade spatial effect variable is constructed as an interaction between 
bordering districts and import tariff.  
Spatial Analysis. The area data is available from the Agency of Coordination of 
National Survey and Spatial Planning (Bakosurtanal) digital map5. To model spatial 
interactions, I have constructed spatial connectivity between regions using the spatial 
weight matrix. Spatial weight matrix is a matrix in which each region is connected to its 
neighbours by means of a purely spatial pattern introduced exogenously in this spatial 
weight matrix as W. This matrix is a square matrix with an even number of columns 
and rows, in which the diagonal elements are set to be zero. To normalise the external 
influence of each region, the weight matrix is standardised so that the sum of the row is 
one. The spatial weight matrix is based on k-neighbours computed as the distance 
between district centroids (Ertur & Koch, 2006). The spatial weight matrix is 
constructed using Geoda6 software with the inverse distance because of Indonesia’s 
physical characteristics that consist of discontinuous islands and oceans. The output is a 
sparse matrix, which is then converted into full matrix using the MATLAB software 
and eventually constructed as a matrix file in STATA.  
 
6.3.3 Indices Variable Construction and Pattern 
 
In this section, I will construct the index variables for the decentralisation and AFTA 
variables. The aim of these indices is to show the comprehensive impact of an event or 
variable on regional economic growth, and as an alternative variable if multicollinearity 
is found between the proxies. Index variable construction formula is as follows:  
 
! 
DIkt = D1 *D2  
(22) 
Where  DIkt is the decentralisation variable index, D1 is the normalisation of local 
revenue, D2 is the normalisation of central allocation fund 
 
                                                
5 The digital map is freely available at www.bakosurtanal.go.id 
6 A freely download statistic-geography software, available at www.geoda.com 
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The normalisation of each variable is constructed with the following formula.   
Normalisation formula:  
! 
Dkt =
x " X
SD  
(23) 
Where D is normalisation of an individual variable, x is the district’s share of an 
individual variable,
! 
X  is the mean of share of an individual variable, SD is the standard 
deviation of an individual variable, k is the district, t is the time variant (year) 
 
Decentralisation and AFTA Variables Indices 
To observe the impact of decentralisation, the index variable is constructed as the 
combination of district fiscal dependency and financial capacity. Both fiscal 
decentralisation measurements has been discussed in the fiscal decentralisation impact 
variables in page 114. A positive sign of this variable shows that decentralisation is 
associated with regional development and confirms neo-classical theories on 
convergence. However, a negative sign indicates that decentralisation hinders regional 
economic development. Meanwhile, the ASEAN FTA index is a combination of 
ASEAN CEPT output and input tariff with trade integration. The output tariff measures 
the import value of a product and the input tariff measures the import value of raw 
material of sectoral industry within a districts.  
Hence, the index variable reflects the impact of the CEPT tariff on input and finished 
imported and trade activities of regions. These indexes are visualised on maps in 
individual regions for 1993 and 2005 (Fig. 6-1 to 6-4). In addition, the AFTA CEPT 
tariff impact growth on Indonesian districts is widely divergent (Appendix Fig. B-1). 
During the period between 1993 and 2005, the AFTA tariff rate is applied the most in 
the bordering districts of Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi. In Java, the districts that 
experience high tariff impact growth are located in industrial provinces such as Jakarta, 
West Java and East Java.  
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Figure 6-1 Decentralisation Index 1993 
 
 Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-2 Decentralisation Index 2005 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
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Figure 6-3 AFTA Index 1993 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
 
 
Figure 6-4 AFTA Index 2005 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
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6.3.4 Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics of variables used in economic growth regression are displayed in 
Table 6-1. The explanatory variables are grouped into four types of variables. First, the 
local endowment variables that includes share of people in the school, share of people 
in urban areas, and share of roads that are accessible by four wheels vehicles. Second, 
the economic structure group that includes share of non-natural resources industries, 
size of manufacturing activities, and municipality authorities type. The decentralisation 
is approximated by variables that shift significantly during the period such as ratio of 
local revenue and GRDP, and the amount of central government transfer funds. The 
ASEAN FTA variable includes CEPT tariff reduction and bordering regions, with 
regions in the border tend to benefit more from the free trade agreements.  
 
6.4 Analysis 
The regression analysis includes three regressions that are the OLS regression, 
cross-section spatial analysis, and fixed-effects of panel regression analysis. For this 
analysis, the period under observation ais divided into three sub-periods, before 
decentralisation (1993-2000), after decentralisation (2001-2005), and the whole period 
(1993-2005). To provide integrated and comparable analysis, I present the exact same 
variables and models for these three regressions. To achieve this, a technical 
econometrics manipulation is performed following spatial analysis that requires a 
balance panel data. The missing data is replaced with the mean value of the variable in 
its respective period.  
 
6.4.1 The ! Convergence Analysis on State-restructuring Impact 
This sub-section conducts " convergence analysis that explains that the faster the 
poor regions grow relative to the rich regions, the sooner they catch up, thus, 
convergence will be faster. The neoclassical economist believes that economic growth 
convergence with low initial economic regional levels will have higher economic 
growth rate, and will eventually catch up with the rich regions. This leads to a same and 
stable rate of economic growth. However, the recent analysis by Barro (1991) reveals 
that conditional convergence, which shows that the growth rate of an economy does not 
depend on initial levels, but depends on the dynamics relative to an ideal economic 
growth. 
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Table 6-1 Statistics of Variables in Economic Growth 
 Mean SD MIN MAX 
ln per capita 
annual real GDP 
growth, 1993-
2005 (%) 
0.1108922 0.2970897 -1.371927 1.974901 
ln annual initial 
real GDP per 
capita, 1993 
14.72125 0.8596739 12.17857 18.22126 
Decentralisation 
Index -7.08E-10 1 -5.265774 3.089771 
AFTA Index 7.87E-10 1 -4.588324 2.627548 
Share of people 
in urban areas 0.366581 0.4171881 0.0027391 1 
Share of people 
in, or who have 
been in junior 
high school 
0.0559157 0.0722787 0.0001528 0.8630365 
Road 
Accessibility -0.1082484 0.213032 -3.135494 0 
Lobby 
Capacities 2.64797 6.790617 0 27.12186 
Share of 
Manufacturing 
GRDP 
-0.0723108 0.2232145 -2.75199 0 
Industry 
activities in the 
borders   
(Tariff*borders) 
-0.230142 0.8048133 -4.385548 0 
Labour 
Productivity -10.80044 1.335976 -14.9665 -5.010635 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
(TFP) 
7.97439 1.137472 1.6286 15.34754 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
  
 
equilibrium. Thus, multiple equilibriums may exist in a regional economic system.  
Absolute ! Convergence Analysis. The absolute ß Convergence is measured with 
regression analysis, and it is calculated to determine whether absolute convergence 
(poorer regions grow faster than rich regions) exists and whether conditional 
convergence occurs (poorer regions grow faster than rich regions if other variables are 
taken into account beside initial income level).  
The table below (Table 6-3 Column 1) shows that the evolution of absolute 
convergence between periods with regressions has a very low R2 variant between 
0.018% and 0.281%. As can be seen, the convergence rate increased from -0.272 in 
decentralisation period compared to the centralised period at -0.028. Furthermore, the 
transition period sign is that which has the highest convergence rate because of the 
  125 
national economic growth decline that resulted from decreases in disparity between 
districts.  
The following graphs show more analysis, and the plot below illustrates the log 
annual change of real GDP per capita (1995-2005) with the log of initial GDP per capita 
(1995) (Fig. 6-5). From the data of 26 provinces in Indonesia during the period, the 
downward pattern of points represents the correlation value -0.44, which shows that 
there is a negative relationship between the two variables and a significant absolute 
convergence. The speed of convergence is about 2.5% per annum, which is slower 
compared to Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991). On the other hand, the graph below (Fig. 
6-6) shows a wide range of growth district rates for two periods; before financial crisis, 
and after decentralisation. The central line on each axis indicates mean growth rate, 
whilst the lines on the other part of the axis shows one standard deviation above and 
below the mean.  
I performed an unconditional convergence model with the year pooling dummies, the 
result show that the convergence rates are lower compared with the initial year in 1994 
(Table 6-2). 
 
 
Figure 6-5 The ß Convergence between log annual change of real GDP per capita 
and initial GDP per capita (1995-2005) 
 
 Source: Author’s own calculation 
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Figure 6-6  Districts growth rate between 1993-1997 and 2001-2005 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
Table 6-2 Districts Growth Year Pooling Analysis 
GRDP initial year OLS 
  
1995 0.018 (1.94) 
1996 0.008 (0.83) 
1997 -0.019 (-20.6) 
1998 -0.109 (-11.64) 
1999 -0.046 (-4.97) 
2000 0.994 (106.72) 
2001 -0.031 (-3.32) 
2002 -0.027 (-2.95) 
2003 -0.032 (-3.41) 
2004 -0.023 (-.245) 
2005 -0.013 (-1.41) 
Cons -0.019 (8.22) 
  
  
N 3688 
R2 0.8655 
Adj. R2 0.8650 
Significance at * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001, N= 338, T = 13,; t-values in parenthesis 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
 
Conditional ! Convergence Analysis. Using three econometric models, this 
research provides an extensive analysis of Indonesian regional growth (Table 6-3). With 
the original variables, this research test found no evidence of heteroskedasticity and 
multicollinearity.  
The variables that are consistent significant between the models and over time are 
the initial GRDP, index variable of decentralisation, lobby capacities and level of 
technology the electricity availability. The initial GRDP and decentralisation index 
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variables are significant in explaining diversity in regional economic growth. The result 
confirms that the convergence speed (equation 14) in the state-restructuring period is 
0.2% annually which is faster than the pre-state restructuring and whole period, 0.16% 
and 0.11% respectively. The consistent negative signs of the decentralisation index 
indicates that decentralisation contract economic growth. This finding confirms the 
negative impact of decentralisation on regional disparities (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 
2006; McCulloch and Syahrir, 2008). The coefficient is higher in the decentralisation 
period than the whole period suggesting that regional autonomy significantly hinders 
regional economic performance. While the AFTA index has a negative significant effect 
in all periods with higher effect in the state-restructuring period, as a reduction of 1% 
AFTA index will increase economic growth by 0.08%. This finding is opposite with 
other researches that argue trade liberalization benefit regional economic growth 
(Feridhanusetyawan and Pangestu, 2003; Logan, 2008; Rivas, 2007).   
The following detailed analyses of significant variables provide more insights. The 
variable population share in urban areas are insignificant all three sub periods; this 
finding rejects literature that argue that state restructuring shifts investments and 
economic activities that leads to a more distributive of economic growth between 
regions. The education variable has an insignificant effect on economic growth, which 
is contrary to expectation. However, as Rivas (2007) explains, this result has been 
widely found in the growth literature and that a negative effect on the initial level of 
human capital refers to an exogenous change in its return (Krueger and Lindhal, 2001). 
While the road accessibility variable is negatively significant in all periods. This finding 
is contrary with expectation as road accessibility should associate with higher economic 
growth. This can be explained with the presence of a backwash effect of regional 
development as argued by Myrdal (1957). These regions absorb the economy of 
neighbouring regions that have average road accessibility and poor market access. 
The lobby capability variable shows that additional development funding has 
positive effect on regional economic growth for richer regions. This additional 
development funding reflects the rich local government’s capacity to lobby the centre 
government, which determine economic performance significantly. However, this sign 
is opposite with pre-decentralisation that lobbying contracts economic growth. A 
negative sign in the pre-decentralisation period is explained earmarked and additional 
fund, additional funds to approximated the lobbying variable, in the pre-decentralisation 
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period only given to the poor and lagging regions through the Inpres Fund. 
Furthermore, trade liberalisation has insignificant effect on bordering regions. This 
finding rejects findings from other research that bordering regions have more impact 
from trade liberalisation.  
In addition, the analysis shows that a higher share of manufacture industries is 
associated with higher economic growth. As the manufacturing industry is capital 
intensive than agricultural and natural resources industries, this might imply the 
manufacturing industry’s technological level influence regional growth. However, the 
manufacturing share variable has lower positive effect on economic growth in the 
decentralisation period than in the centralised regime. On the other hand, the level of 
technology variable, represented by the TFP, has insignificant effect on development 
for all periods. This might indicates that the TFP of Indonesia industries do not 
determine regional growth. 
The labour productivity variable, approximated as a ratio of labour and output, shows 
that the variable has a negative and significant supporting effect on economic growth. 
This implies that the lower the ratio of labour required to produced a certain output 
leads to a higher economic growth. The significance of these variables provides 
evidence for the endogenous growth model that emphasises on human capital, 
technology and the role of manufacturing for economic growth. (Lucas, 1988; Romer 
1986, 1990).  
The R-squared measurement shows the OLS models explained more variation in 
regional economic growth in the pre-decentralisation period (1993-2000) than the post 
decentralisation period (2001-2005). The whole period analysis has the lowest R-
squared calculation, indicating there are other significant variables that are omitted from 
the model, such as political and administration shift issues that occur significantly and 
crucially determine regional economic growth within the 12 years of observation.  
Furthermore, this chapter conducts spatial regressions to explain the variation in 
economic growth by considering geographical location. Following the spatial 
econometrics literatures claim that a better model has lower AIC, the pre 
decentralisation, and overall period are better explained by the spatial error model 
(SEM), and the after decentralisation by the spatial lag model (SLM). As Rey (2001) 
suggested, this shows that the unconditional model suffered from misspecification due 
to the absence of spatial dependence.  
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In each periods, the columns 3 and 4 reports the spatial lag and spatial error 
dependence regression. As the spatial econometrics requires complete observation to 
perform matrix calculation with the spatial weight, the data missing are replaced with 
the imputation approach. The appropriate univariate imputations methods are perform 
for each variable using imputation function in the STATA software. The AIC corrects 
the log likelihood function for over-fitting and the best fitting model is the one with the 
lowest value of AIC (Anselin, 2003; Rey, 2001). As found in other studies, the spatial 
error model fits best for each of the periods.  
The spatial analysis confirms OLS main finding that there is regional economic 
convergence over the period under observation. In contrary with the OLS, the spatial 
regression found that the convergence rate is lower in the decentralisation period than 
with other periods. The two main variables in this thesis, in the decentralisation period, 
the decentralisation and trade liberalisation variables have insignificant effect on 
regional economic growth, holding other variables constant and considering spatial 
autocorrelation.  
In the pre-decentralisation period, the findings confirm results from the OLS analysis 
that labour productivity are associated with higher economic growth. As found in the 
OLS analysis, the negative sign share of manufacturing shows that high dependence on 
manufacturing contract economic growth. Furthermore, the analysis also found that 
lobbying capacities in the pre-decentralisation period has negative effect. However, the 
analysis found that the role of industrial technology level is significant geographically 
and positively influence regional economic growth. This finding confirms that 
endogenous growth theory argument that distance positively influences regional 
technology spillovers. The opposite is found in the state restructuring period, as there is 
lack of significant explanatory and control variables.  
The spatial lag variable (rho) is insignificant implies that geographical factors are not 
significant on regional economic growth. A positive and significant effect of share of 
urban population and share of manufacturing suggests more manufacturing industries is 
associated with population concentration in the urban areas that leads to higher regional 
economic growth. In the long run, these regions absorb the economy of neighbouring 
regions that have poor road accessibility that implies the presence of a backwash effect 
of development as argued by Myrdal (1957). Overall, the spatial analysis argues that 
regional convergence are evidence and there is lack of variables that determine regional 
economic growth in all periods.  
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6.4.2 Panel Analysis on State-restructuring Impact 
To capture how economic growth and explanatory variables change over time, this 
chapter also conducts panel estimations to exploit the richness and better understand the 
nature of the data. Similar to the OLS analysis above, panel data analysis is also divided 
into three periods of observation, the pre-decentralisation, decentralisation, and whole 
period analysis. The Hausmann test result suggests a fixed-effect panel analysis rather 
than the random-effect. The analysis does not suffer from heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation, as in the methods developed by Wooldridge (2002, p. 282-283). There 
are missing data in almost all control variables that leads to reduction number of 
observation in the OLS and panel data analysis. For example, whilst there are 4088 
observations in the full dataset, there are only 656 observation for 292 districts over the 
period 1993-2005. The panel analysis use variables in Model 1 in the OLS regression, 
and are presented in Table 6-4.  
The panel regression analysis confirms that regional economic growth are 
converging statistically significant in all periods, providing evidence that poorer 
districts grow faster than rich ones. This result confirms the distribution analysis in the 
previous chapter and the OLS results.  Similar to the OLS analysis above, panel data 
analysis is also divided into three periods of observation, the pre-decentralisation, 
decentralisation, and whole period analysis. In the post-restructuring period, there are 
more determining factors, which are: 
 (i) The decentralisation index has a negative effect implying that decentralisation 
contracts economic growth significantly. The finding also confirms OLS result that 
there is insignificant effect of fiscal autonomy in the pre-decentralisation period. While 
there is insignificant effect from the AFTA variable, this result confirms the findings 
from OLS analysis. 
(ii) Regional economic growth is also significantly determined by local economic 
structures such as manufacturing output and labour productivity.  
(iii) The analysis result shows that bordering regions is significant for the pre-
decentralisation period, which is agrees with the literature that argues that these regions 
benefit most from trade liberalisation. The interaction variable on bordering regions and 
AFTA tariff reveals that regions located in the borders had higher economic growth 
from trade liberalisation compared with the inland regions. As both OLS and panel 
analysis found this significance only during decentralisation period, this could imply 
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that the authority to mobilise resources and effective governance has accelerate AFTA 
tariff effect on bordering regions development. This finding confirms the economic 
gains promoted by political and fiscal devolution as argued elsewhere (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Bwire, 2004; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005). However, this result is unexpected 
for Indonesia, as the bordering regions, except for Batam, are economically lagging and 
remote. The bordering regions are also challenged by persistent socio-political conflicts.  
 (iv) The lobby capability variable has a significant impact on regional disparity in 
this period. This confirms that additional development funding is crucial to regional 
development. 
(v) The panel analysis also confirms the OLS finding that the TFP that represent the 
level of technology is insignificant for economic growth. This explains the poor 
technological level and progress in Indonesia manufacturing industries. 
 
Overall, the panel analysis explains more variation in Indonesia’s economic growth 
during the post-decentralisation compared with the pre-decentralisation periods, 98.4% 
compared with 77.9%, respectively. This high R2 in the post-decentralisation period 
might indicate that the model and the variables are appropriate to estimate the 
determinant factors of regional growth in the post-decentralisation than for other 
periods.
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Table 6-3 Absolute, Conditional and Spatial Regression 
 1993-2000 2000-2005 1993-2005 
 OLS OLS SAL SEM OLS OLS SAL SEM OLS OLS SAL SEM 
GRDP initial 
year -0.028** -0.168** -0.324** -0.330** -0.272** -0.203** -0.049** -0.046** -0.063** -0.115** -0.343** -0.349** 
 -0.004 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
Decentralisation 
Index  -0.325** -0.123** -0.120**  -0.238** -0.01 -0.007  -0.274** -0.119** -0.120** 
  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 
AFTA Index  -0.079** -0.03 -0.022  -0.081** 0.001 0  -0.052** -0.03 -0.018 
  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
             
Regional 
Control 
Variables 
            
Share of people 
in urban areas  -0.013 0.195** 0.206**  -0.002 0.025 0.024  -0.029 0.142** 0.147** 
  -0.04 -0.04 -0.04  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 
Share of people 
in, or ever in 
junior high 
school 
 -0.985** 0.147 0.447  0.079 -0.417 -0.405  -1.373** -0.815 -0.908 
  -0.19 -0.61 -0.64  -0.29 -0.25 -0.25  -0.11 -0.66 -0.66 
Road 
Accessibility  -0.290** -0.074 -0.058  -0.262** 0.052 0.039  -0.192** -0.172 -0.219* 
  -0.08 -0.08 -0.08  -0.05 -0.04 -0.04  -0.05 -0.1 -0.1 
Lobby 
Capacities  -0.003 0.011* 0.013**  0.009** -0.002 -0.002  -0.004** 0.018** 0.019** 
  0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 0.002 
             
Industrial 
Control 
Variables 
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Share of 
Manufacturing 
GRDP 
 -0.426** -0.701** -0.734**  -0.198** 0.039 0.041  -0.216** -0.583** -0.621** 
  -0.1 -0.07 -0.07  -0.05 -0.03 -0.03  -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 
Industry 
activities in the 
borders 
 -0.036 -0.067* -0.079**  0.007 0.015 0.015  0.001 -0.032 -0.047 
  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03  -0.02 -0.01 -0.01  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
Labour 
Productivity  -0.104** -0.095** -0.084**  -0.041** -0.005 -0.005  -0.081** -0.061* -0.062* 
  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
(TFP) 
 -0.02 -0.026 -0.027  0.004 0.009 0.01  -0.025 0.011 -0.002 
  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03  -0.02 -0.01 -0.01  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
Constant 0.458** 1.560** 4.657** 4.684** 4.321** 2.758** 0.810** 0.734** 1.047** 1.225** 5.200** 5.487** 
 0.07 -0.37 -0.46 -0.46 -0.16 -0.22 -0.21 -0.2 -0.09 -0.2 -0.49 -0.49 
Spatial lag (rho)   -0.137    -0.222    0.092  
   -0.13    -0.15    -0.14  
Spatial error 
(lambda)    0.255    -0.193    0.345* 
    -0.15    -0.18    -0.14 
Obs 1936 341 292 292 1751 476 292 292 3396 656 292 292 
R2 0.018 0.796 0.408 0.404 0.281 0.89 0.134 0.125 0.031 0.81 0.356 0.352 
AIC   95.661 94.08   -454.133 -453.249   107.196 102.227 
BIC   147.136 145.555   -402.658 -401.774   158.671 153.702 
Significance at * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001, N= 338, T = 13,; t-values in parenthesis 
Note: Growth rates for 1993-2000 and 1993-2005 are based on constant 1993 prices; growth rate for 2001-05 is based on constant 2000 prices. 
Source: Author’s own calculation
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Table 6-4  Fixed effects regression of per capita GRDP Growth 
 1993-2000 2001-2005 1993-2005 
GRDP pc, initial year -0.378* -0.862** -0.157** 
 -0.16 -0.02 -0.03 
Decentralisation Index -0.404** -0.019* -0.305** 
 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
AFTA Index -0.170** 0.013 0.002 
 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 
Share of people in urban 
areas 0.091 -0.003 0.067* 
 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 
Share of people in, or have 
been in junior high school -0.307 0.055 -1.336** 
 -0.26 -0.32 -0.15 
Road Accessibility -0.834 -0.146* -0.078 
 -0.51 -0.07 -0.17 
Lobby Capacities -0.006 0.005* -0.006* 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Share of Manufacturing 
GRDP -0.558 -1.314** -0.922** 
 -0.41 -0.15 -0.19 
Industry activities in the 
borders (Output*borders) 0.21 0.111** 0.03 
 -0.37 -0.03 -0.1 
Labour Productivity -0.187** -0.023* -0.119** 
 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 
Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) -0.055 0.001 -0.046+ 
 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 
Constant 3.671 12.928** 1.505** 
 -2.33 -0.31 -0.48 
Number of observation 341 476 656 
Number of groups 212 214 242 
Adj. R2 0.779 0.984 0.832 
 Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
6.4.3 State-restructuring Impact on Regional Convergence: A Discussion 
 
Decentralisation is believed to promote regional distribution as Rondinelli (1990) wrote: 
“Decentralisation is the transfer of planning, decision making, or administrative 
autonomy from the central government to its organization, local administrative, semi-
autonomous, and parastatal organizations, local government, or non-governmental 
organization”. The efficiency has been a long-time supporter of decentralisation as the 
arguments are mainly based on augmented economic efficiency (Calamai, 2009). For 
instance, there has been evidence that devolution has brought citizen participation into 
planning, progress, and decision-making. In the individual level discussion, Tiebout 
(1956) argues that that the ability of people to move between regions could be treated as 
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a market-like solution to local public good problems, as individuals can choose the 
public service and taxes that suits them. 
The OLS and panel econometrics analysis provide evidence that regional 
convergence are operating in Indonesia between 1993 and 2005. The regional 
convergence rate are higher in decentralisation period compared with pre-
decentralisation and all periods. This implies two important findings. First, this 
confirms the Neo-classical arguments that the process of catching up by lagging regions 
to advance regions is evidence in Indonesia. The GDP per capita in lagging regions 
have higher growth rate compared with the advance regions. Second, lower 
convergence rate in the all period compared with other periods provide evidence the 
presence of economy and political shift within the periods (McCulloch and Syahrir, 
2008).  
The OLS analysis confirms endogenous literature that labour, technology and share 
of manufacture have positive association with regional economic growth. However, if 
we isolate individual regions with the fixed-effects panel analysis, the labour 
productivity is the only variable that have positive significant on economic growth.  
This confirms that endogenous model literature that emphasis the role of labour and 
technological progress as an action of economic agents that positively determine 
economic growth (Lucas, 1988; Romer 1986, 1990).  
On the other hand, Islam (2003) argues that the administration level of 
decentralisation at the district level tends to increase disparity. He claims that the 
decentralisation law may also encourage inefficient development, with two or more 
neighbouring regions developing the same infrastructure. Not just overlapping and 
oversupply services, this decentralisation may also limit people from one region to loose 
public service from another region. Other critiques argue that decentralisation will 
provoke local governments to compete with other regions leading to unnecessary and 
inefficient development.  
This can be seen in Indonesian decentralisation where newly established provinces 
are willing to develop seaports in an attempt to secure higher local revenue (Seymour 
and Turner, 2002). The literature also suffers a significant weakness as it only observes 
the demand side and neglects supply side of devolution (Prud’homme, 1995). Limited 
skill and managerial ability, reflected with lower education level and national policy 
knowledge, has lead to inadequate public service. The autonomy that regions gain 
allows them to customise tax and welfare policies based on their development 
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objectives, such as tax holiday, tax target, and other financial policies. It assumes local 
governments have in-depth knowledge about its region and convergence. In Indonesia, 
there are arguments that districts should have higher revenue through taxes and other 
local incomes, as argued for Indonesia by Suwanan and Sulistiani (2009) and 
McCulloch  and Syahrir (2008)  However, this remain limited as several strategic taxes 
(value added tax and income tax) are administered by the central governments. 
At the administrative level, devolution has enabled rich regions to enhance their 
resources and financial intensity compared to the period before devolution. With higher 
economic activities and financial support, rich regions will achieve economies of scale 
in all development sectors. Hirschman (1958) and Myrdal (1957) argue that growth 
centres will establish regions with better infrastructure and policy developments. 
Despite the decentralisation index have a negative sign, which indicates 
decentralisation contracts regional economic growth, the OLS and panel analysis shows 
evidence of regional convergence (Tables 6.3 and 6.4). This paradox finding can be 
explained with presence of other development factors such as institutional capacities 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010), the society arrangements (Rodríguez-Pose and 
Storper, 2006) and knowledge of local values (Rodríguez-Pose and McCann, 2011) as 
other factors  that influence economic growth beside local autonomy per se.  While a 
positive sign between of lobby variable suggest that the lobbying capacities promotes 
further economic growth for richer regions. However, further analysis are need in the 
future as starting in 2008 the decentralisation Undang-undang No. 33/2004 has 
eliminated the ‘no hold harmless’ policy, to ensure that the allocation funds to poorer 
regions (Brodjonegoro, 2003).  
On the other hand, the analysis also confirms that trade liberalisation do not always 
benefit the regions. First, manufacturing industries have a strong positive effect on 
disparity (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004). The findings suggest that trade 
liberalisation may have affected convergence through the high concentration of 
activities it creates. Second, the institutional approach claims that the effects of trade 
openness are determined by the preferential trade agreement, the agreement's capacity 
to produce  trade creation, and trade diversion, and economic power of nation-states. 
Third, in the economic impact analysis, regions with abundant natural endowments and 
infrastructure accessibility are more able to attract investments and economic activities. 
This leads to divergence among regions until the economy finds its equilibrium and 
creates a balance economy where poor regions can experience economic development.  
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The regional initial economic level and standard deviation (SD) growth for the three 
periods are presented in following maps (Fig. 6-7 to 6-12). First, the district initial 
GRDP 1993 map (Fig. 6-7) shows that Java have higher economic level compared with 
districts in other islands. This illustrates that regional economic growth disparities has 
occurred prior to decentralisation. A similar picture also found in the SD growth map 
between 1993 and 2000 (Fig. 6-8) shows that districts in the Java’s economic growth 
rate closely to national average, while districts in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi 
have a more dynamic growth rate. Specifically, districts in the Riau, East Kalimantan 
and West Sulawesi provinces have higher economic growth during the pre-
decentralisation period.  
Figure 6-7 Districts Initial GRDP per capita 1993 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
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Figure 6-8 Districts growth 1993-2001 (Standard Deviation) 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
Figure 6-9 Districts Initial GRDP per capita 2001 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
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Figure 6-10 Districts growth 2001-2005 (Standard Deviation) 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
 
Figure 6-11 Districts GRDP per capita 2005 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
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Figure 6-12 Districts growth 1993-2005 (Standard Deviation) 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
A similar picture is shown in the districts in Java during the decentralisation period 
(2001-2005). In the beginning of decentralisation in 2001 (Fig. 6-9), Java districts have 
lower economic level compared with other regions that results from the economic 
growth in the previous period. This low performance continues with lower economic 
growth in the state restructuring period (Fig. 6-10). These districts economic growth are 
at the national average with exception of Jakarta and several districts in Central Java. 
The districts economic growth in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi are similar with 
the pre-decentralisation period, however, there are high economic growth in the Papua 
Island districts. Thus, this map illustrates the findings in the econometrics analysis that 
there are higher rate of catching-up of economic growth by lagging regions. The map 
also reveals that a positive effect of state restructuring on regions located that at the 
borders. These regions have higher economic growth compared with other regions, 
however, these growth rate are lower than in the pre-decentralisation period. 
The economic level map in 2005 (Fig. 6-11) shows that there are variation in the 
economic level between districts in Sumatra and Kalimantan, even some districts have 
higher economic level than the districts in Java. This confirms the convergence of 
economic development between districts. This is also shown in the SD district economic 
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growth over the period between 1993 and 2005 (Fig. 6-12) that districts in Java have 
low economic growth rate compared with districts in other islands. For instance, 
districts in natural resource rich and manufacturing provinces such as Riau, East 
Kalimantan and West Sulawesi had higher economic growth compared to its 
counterparts. The map also shows that districts at the borders in Sumatra have higher 
SD economic growth rates than bordering districts in Kalimantan and Sulawesi islands. 
The map also shows that districts in Papua and Java have economic growth at the 
national average.   
 
6.5 Research Conclusion and Contribution 
6.5.1 Research Conclusion 
The study of disparity has been conducted in various Indonesia regions. Using 
unconditional convergence models, this research observes the process of convergence, 
consistent with Resosudarmo and Vidyattama (2006), and Akita and Alisyahbana, 
(2002). This research confirms that disparity remains high between regions, and it 
increased during the 1993-1998 period as suggested by Akita and Lukman (1995) and 
Akita and Alisyahbana (2002). Within provinces there has been significant contribution 
to total disparity, while between provinces and between regions the effect is lower.  
This chapter’s main aim to explore Indonesian regional disparities is achieved 
through various methods of disparity indices and convergence analysis. However, the 
author acknowledges the limitations of the disparities regression analysis that uses 
GRDP per capita data and spatial autocorrelation solely. Without further information on 
determinant factors, the analysis only confirms the severe disparities and unequal 
development across regions within different periods. The analysis of local explanatory 
variables and policy determinants are necessary to gain more insights and explanation 
of the economic observation trend. In addition, the econometrics analysis omitted the 
administration type of local governments and their location, as this is insignificant for 
analysis throughout the period. This result differs from McCulloch and Syahrir (2008) 
who found districts located in the Java Island had lower economic growth. 
From the conditional empirical studies, we can draw several conclusions. First, all 
regression conducted in this chapter shows a significant convergence rate indicating 
poorer districts grow faster than advanced districts. The analysis concluded that the 
catching up process was more apparent in the decentralisation period than in other 
periods.  
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Second, the impact of decentralisation is different to Calamai (2009) findings in the 
Italian case. In Indonesia decentralisation has a negative impact on economic growth 
suggesting that autonomy and self-government has caused an increased growth gap 
between districts, even before the decentralisation period. The negative association 
between decentralisation and economic growth decline in the decentralisation period.  
Hence, the absence of central government intervention has further hindered a balanced 
development between regions. In addition, the statistical measurement shows the 
econometrics analysis explains more regional economic growth variation in the 
decentralisation period compared with other periods. This implies that variables 
deployed in this thesis capture more economic and political conditions in 
decentralisation era.  
Third, the share of manufacturing and infrastructure availability have positive effect 
on regional development, however the level of technology is insignificant over both in 
pre and post state restructuring. In a long period, beside infrastructure and technology in 
the manufacturing industry, share of population also have a positive sign suggesting that 
these variables determine regional development, as growth are more apparent in regions 
that has advancement in these variables. This result shows the significance of 
accumulation increase theory that argues regions with more local endowments attract 
more investment and economic activities (Myrdal, 1957). In addition, this thesis also 
attempted to capture the effect of non-tangible political capacities on economic growth 
with the lobbying capacities by the local government. However, the availability of such 
political and institutional variable is limited and requires specific assumptions that are 
unique between countries and regions.  
Fourth, ASEAN FTA tariff elimination has a positive impact on economic growth. 
However, the variable’s insignificant value demonstrates AFTA’s small contribution to 
regional economic performance, as found by Feridhanusetyawan and Pangestu (2003) 
using the CGE model. This research finding agrees with Rodríguez-Pose and Gil (2006) 
that there is a weak positive effect of trade on regional disparity and low intra trade 
performances in AFTA. This is contrary to other studies such as Rivas (2007) that found 
with Mexico and NAFTA, trade openness impact per se promotes convergence, and if it 
is combined with other variables such as infrastructure and per worker income, it will 
enhance disparity. In NAFTA, there was less of a convergence effect, and much less 
gain for Mexico compared with the GATT era (Sanchez-Reaza & Rodríguez-Pose , 
2002). The study of Mercosur FTA shows that economic growth and convergence 
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occurred during the stabile macroeconomic era between 1994-2002 (Madariaga et al., 
2004).  
The chapter also shows the significance of path dependence theory (Krugman, 1991) 
that trade liberalisation promotes the advance regions exploitation of the peripheral 
economies. High economic growth is found in regions with high percentages of exports, 
labour productivity, and value added, and those that are included within the global trade 
integration such as Batam, West Java and East Java. The positive effect of labour 
productivity also confirms this argument. 
Based on our econometrics analysis, Indonesian economic growth has not witness 
the hollowing out of state; on contrary, the sub-national remains heavily dependent on 
the transfer funds from the central government. The importance of intergovernmental, 
and between actors governance, and how that impacts local economic performance and 
disparity will be discussed in-depth in the qualitative chapter.  
 
6.5.2 Contribution to the Literature 
This chapter has contributed to the existing literature on decentralisation, trade 
liberalisation, and Indonesia studies. Within the decentralisation impact studies, the 
chapter shows that decentralisation has a negative impact by itself, but if it is coupled 
with external events such as trade liberalisation, governance capacities, and good social 
policies, decentralisation could promote local economic growth. Thus, central 
governments should accurately decide on additional policies that support 
decentralisation implementation in order to improve local development.  
The research has contributed to the trade liberalisation literature in a sense that trade 
liberalisation impact depends on the size of free trade area, market, and policy 
commitments. The AFTA is limited to 10 developing countries that are limited in 
economic scale, and ASEAN FTA has not confirmed a form of governance and 
regulation that imposes authority and decision-making between state members. For 
example, without regulation of custom union agreements, each member state in ASEAN 
has no limitation with its preferred trade partners, as found in EU and NAFTA, which 
the de jure sovereignty of nation-state at a certain level has been transferred to supra-
national level. The study shows that infrastructure is the only variable that remains 
statistically significant and consistent to local economic performance throughout the 
period. The infrastructure approximated by the proportion of roads that are accessible 
and paved within districts is associated with higher economic performance. An increase 
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in the share of districts by one percent on average shows a higher economic 
performance by 0.5 percent. Thus, this sector should be included in each local 
government development plan.  
This research confirms Scott (1999) finding that the geography of global capitalism 
is diverging across time, as argued by the cumulative causation, and contrary to neo-
classical theories. The positive sign of trade liberalisation provides evidence that the 
higher impact on agglomeration, approximated by the increase in value added and 
export values, accumulates population and economic concentration leading to a cyclical 
process of extensive development of infrastructure, facilities migration, brain drain, and 
centripetal forces for further economic development (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000; 
Florida, 2008).  
The analysis findings also provide insights for the state rescaling literature that the 
nation-state remains as the decision-maker for decentralisation and trade liberalisation. 
The administrative and fiscal decentralisation remains under the central government's 
control such as monitoring of local regulations and limitation on local tax collection. 
However, local government role increase with autonomy on local governance and 
unrestricted DAU spending which confirms the existence of local development 
rescaling as found by Swyngedouw (1997). The absence of supra-national authority is 
reflected with the nation-state through the MoT determines the degree of sectoral 
industry participation in the AFTA trade liberalisation. Thus, central government’s role 
remains important in determining regional development.  
The convergence of growth development remains very limited with growth still focus 
on core regions. Macroeconomic stability has not been fully achieved due to constant 
conflicts between levels of governments and the persistent disparities between the West 
region with Central and East regions in Indonesia. In addition, this research found that 
rich and bordering regions gain the most from FTA, as determined by Juan-Ramón and 
Rivera-Batiz (1996). Abundant local endowment and infrastructure attract investments 
and economic activities, which lead to divergence among regions, with selected regions 
experiencing higher growth rate. 
Overall, a strong central government is needed in the devolution era to avoid 
territorial competition and to minimise negative effects from fiscal and resources 
capacity rivalry. The legislation of new laws that relates with decentralisation to adjust 
current political and economic demands implies that central government regulations are 
flexible and not rigid. For example, the legislation of Peraturan Pemerintah No. 
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19/2010 shows the central government responded to the demand to enhance provincial 
government authority, in order to ensure integrated local policies, development 
integration, and to prevent inter-district disputes. Using state-restructuring on 
devolution and trade liberalisation, this study attempts to understand the interplay of 
state in order to balance regional development and global trade. While the issue of 
governance rescaling peaks, nation-state continues to have a crucial role in directing 
regional development through national policies. This argument also applies to the 
international trade agreements, which is apparent in the case of AFTA.  
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Chapter 7 Effect of State Restructuring on Regional 
Development: A Historical Institutionalist Perspective 
 
7.1 Regional Divergence: Historical Institutionalist Approach  
The chapters devoted to the quantitative study in this thesis, along with a few other 
studies on related issues (McCulloch and Syahrir, 2008; Madariaga et al., 2004; Rivas, 
2007), show that regional divergence is persistent. In Chapter 1, I used quantitative 
methods to test a model that was based on stylised facts. Although evidence was found 
supporting the persistence of regional divergence, such evidence does not explain the 
reason for the persistence. For this chapter therefore, I conducted qualitative research to 
look into areas that the quantitative model could not examine. Amongst various 
strategies within qualitative research, this study followed previous research on historical 
institutionalism, in which the role of antecedent knowledge was considered to elucidate 
institutional changes and how these affected the persistence of institutional and 
economic differences (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Skocpol, 1979; Thelen, 1999, Angeles, 
2011). The historical institutionalist framework was incorporated into North’s (1994a, 
2005) emphasis on property rights as the main determinant of economic growth.   
This chapter attempts to explain the findings obtained from the quantitative study 
through a regional institutional analytical tool that combines economic performance and 
the historical institutionalist approach. Using such an analytical tool, this research 
attempted to recognise institutional antecedents, path dependence, and political shocks. 
In this chapter, I argue that regional disparity is inherent in Indonesian institutions and 
that state restructuring further affects the variations amongst regions. The persistent 
regional disparities are a product of previous institutions, thereby inherently shaping 
current institutions through path dependence.  
The chapter is organised as follows. The section 7.2 discusses the antecedent 
institutions that influenced institutional change. The following section examines the 
effect of institutions that are descended from the previous regime  and state 
restructuring on the persistent regional divergences. The final section summarises the 
research findings and theoretical contributions to regional convergence and state 
restructuring literature.  
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7.2 Methodology and Analytical Framework 
This section discusses the regional institutional analytical framework derived from the 
economic change initiated by North (1994a, 2005) and historical institutionalism of 
comparative political science (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Skocpol, 1979; Thelen, 1999, 
2003; Angeles, 2011). This institutional analytical framework analyses the effect of 
variations in institutions and growth trajectories on regional economic divergence.   
The framework is an analytical tool for explaining the effect of state restructuring-
induced institutional change on Indonesian regional development. Institutional 
economic performance literature provides insight into the role of critical institutions and 
property rights in economic performance, whilst historical institutionalism provides 
more contextualised research with emphasis on ‘timing, sequencing, and interaction of 
specific political-economic process’ (Thelen, 1999). The construction of this regional 
development institutional framework requires economic performance perspectives that 
are translated into historical institutionalist components. The historical institutionalist 
approach studies these components through the regional growth trajectory. The 
distinctive trajectories lie in political theories, in which institutions of polity and 
economic structural conflicts cause non-uniformity.  
 
Economic Performance Literature 
The attempt to explore the relationship between institutions and economic performance 
was initiated by North (1994a, 2005). The studies show that institutions are required to 
create polities that support economic development. Thus, the present study borrowed 
this idea to establish the framework analysis by identifying such polities and their 
environments. The identification of these polities at the district level and understanding 
the nature of the state structuring-induced institutional change enabled this research to 
examine the effect of state restructuring on regional economic growth.  
The core argument of the economic performance perspective is that the 
incentives of development are the underlying determinants of economic performance 
(North, 1991). These incentives are influenced by the role of formal and informal 
institutions and enforcement rules in producing polities that reduce transaction costs, as 
well as adaptive institutions that are bound by a belief system (North, 1994, 2005). 
First, the transaction costs in the market should be minimised, which is essential to 
producing a dynamic economy (North, 1994). Individuals usually find it worthwhile to 
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cooperate with others when the action is reciprocated, information is complete, and 
there are a small number of players whose strategy and goal is to maximise 
development through property rights. Such cooperation necessitates a viable polity 
because  to define and enforces economic rules that shapes economic performance 
(North, 1994). Hence, these polities promote and enforce efficient property rights, and 
their creation is not a result of an autocratic regime; these polities will be stable only if 
supported by organisations that have a stake in their existence. 
Second, understanding the source of institutional frameworks is important to 
identifying the rules and constraints of the belief system within institutions; this belief 
system limits local polities (North, 2005). Finally, a successful economic system should 
be able to survive shocks and changes caused by external development and internal 
adoption (North, 1994a, 2005; Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2006). Adaptive institutions 
are more important as the key to long-run growth, compared with allocative efficiency 
(North, 1994). The regional institutional capacity to adjust and innovate policies 
determines economic growth; such adjustment and innovation are achieved by 
understanding local cultures and characteristics (Chang, 2005). For example, 
interrelated firms and economic sectors can provide insight into the adaptive capacity of 
a region that imitates the institutions from other regions.   
 
Historical Institutionalism  
The economic performance perspective neglects that agents are rule-following 
‘satisficers’, refers to human behaviour that individuals interest to seek satisfaction are 
bounded by their previous knowledge and culture. This is a result of constant and 
repetitive behaviour that are structured by society-defined rules (Thelen and Steinmo, 
1992). Given that economic performance acknowledges that agents are rational in 
maximising their profits as a response to an environment or event, the theory does not 
recognise historical and previous knowledge that bind individual decisions. Thus, the 
approach assumes that present behaviour is independent of agent experience. In this 
sense, the approach views agent decisions at a discreet time and on the basis of isolated 
behaviours or characteristics.  
This perspective reflects the historical institutionalist argument on the importance of 
bound behaviour and knowledge. North’s concern over a state’s inefficient property 
rights regime, which hinders the possibility to choose better policies, is explained by 
historical institutionalism as a result of ‘shared cultural understanding’. The emergent 
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institutional forms will be isomorphic with existing institutions. In redesigning 
institutions, policymakers are bound by local previous knowledge and behaviour in 
forming new institutions as a re-creation of past images. The current research argues 
that rules shaped by polities over time limit the decision-making strategy of the polities 
within the range of the ‘satisfice’ context, and eventually affect adaptive capacity. 
The application of historical institutionalism in comparative politics covers issues 
such as social revolution (Skocpol, 1979), labour formation institutions (Thelen, 2004), 
industrial policy (Hall, 1986), and different popularity rates between states (Rothstein, 
1998). In comparative political studies, historical institutionalism focuses on three 
crucial analyses. First, the timing, sequencing, and interaction of political processes 
determine the attention towards the relationship between democratisation and 
decentralisation. Thus, knowledge on cultural heritage and path dependence is important 
to observe possible influence on doable changes and belief structures that shape local 
policies (Martin and Sunley, 2006). Institutionalism influences embeddedness and 
societal values, which themselves are contested and in flux (Lowndes, 2001) 
Second, critical juncture literature suggests that focus on crucial events such as 
economic crises and regime changes to construct a strong arguments for institutional 
change. These institutional shocks do not always result in institutional change and this 
change does not always arise from exogenous shocks (Pierson, 2004; van der Heijden, 
2011). Over time, the process of institutional change is incremental and mechanisms 
governing this change exist (Thelen, 1999; Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Mahoney and 
Thelen, 2010). These institutional changes introduce modifications that vary in path 
dependence, which differentiates growth trajectories. Two outcomes are possible, first, 
the static regions refers to path development dominated by institutional hysteria, refers 
to the embedded formal and informal institutions and economic, social and political 
relations built on previous growth paths that influence adaptive behaviours (Di Fabbio, 
2011). This causes development lock-in and sunk costs. Second, dynamic regions 
reflect incremental transformation of local institutions (Martin, 2010).  
Third, historical institutionalism places emphasis on the unintended consequences 
and reinforcement of institutional change. This leads to the institutional capacity to 
imitate other institutions and adaptation for further development (Chang, 2005).  
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Analytical Framework of this Research 
The analytical framework differs from the above original theories in defining actors and 
property rights, but works similarly as it is adjusted in accordance with this study’s 
objective. This analytical tool was adapted to the specific conditions of Indonesian 
institutional arrangements. The study defines the governments as the agents and 
property rights as the right to determine the use of resources within a territory, with 
transaction cost as a cost of the economic exchange of these property rights. The 
assumption behind this adjustment is that similar to individuals, local governments 
respond to economic incentives and become more efficient when property rights are 
clearly defined. As a result, the development of various forms of property rights 
institutions is limited by transaction costs. However, as property rights enforcement and 
transaction costs diverge amongst regions, economic incentives for development vary, 
thereby causing regional economic divergence.  
How historical institutionalism explains regional economic divergence within the 
economic performance perspective is shown in Figure 7-1 to explain the framework. 
The property rights and transaction costs within each box differ slightly, indicating 
variations in institutional arrangements over time. The degree to which property rights 
are exploited by agents is bound by transaction cost. The belief system consists of the 
institutional development path that binds the path chosen at a critical juncture; the rate 
of institutional reinforcement and reproduction determines learning capabilities. This 
belief system also determines local growth trajectory and institutional adaptability. 
Finally, the illustration (Fig. 7-1) also recognises the presence of intervention that 
influences the progress of regional institutions. There are two sources of intervention: 
the legacies of previous institutions and the result of institutional learning and 
adaptation. The historical institutionalism perspective argues that regional development 
is a result of cumulative causation through path dependence. Regional development and 
change are bound by past knowledge and behaviour that allows only certain changes on 
existing institutions. The historical institutionalist approach features four types of 
institutional change, namely, displacement, layering, drift, and conversion (Mahoney 
and Thelen, 2010). Considering the Indonesian context, this research is particularly 
interested in the institutional transformation of learning and adaptation, which are 
channelled through institutional conversion with the presence of new actors who find 
opportunity in the system because of institutional changes; it is also interested in 
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institutional layering where the modification of systems are incorporated into existing 
structures (Thelen, 2004). 
 
Figure 7-1 Research Methodology 
 
 Source: Author’s interpretation 
This chapter regards this political economic change as the critical juncture, following 
historical institutionalist literature (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Thelen, 1999; Eaton, 2004; 
Slater and Simmons, 2010). To understand how institutional change determines local 
economic divergence, it is important to observe the institutional adjustments in 
developmental processes that follow political and economic shocks (North, 1994a, 
2005; Rodríguez-Pose  and Storper, 2006). This chapter examines the effect of this 
institutional change on governments and political institutions, and how it influenced 
regional economic divergence. This research also observes the capacity of an institution 
to adapt at the local level whilst bound by the decentralised regime.  
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7.3 Lineage of Regional Institutions and Disparities  
The core ideas of the New Order are unity and regional administration considered as 
extensions of Jakarta bureaucracy (Canonica-Walangitang, 2004, p. 92). This section 
analyses the effect of the state’s hierarchical bureaucracy and centralised regime on 
regional disparities.  
7.3.1 Regional Critical Antecedent Institutions 
The institutional arrangements between the central government and regions influenced 
the divergence in regional economic development and variations in growth rate. First, 
the Jakarta-based bureaucratic system shaped the hierarchical regime, in which the 
central government departments and agencies control subordinate and regional agencies 
(dinas). The central government outlines and directs local economic policies and 
development budgets through the regime’s appointed political leaders; the government 
also heavily depends on budget sources. This financial dependence guaranteed the 
continued dominance of the central government over major policymaking decisions. In 
addition, resource exploitation and administration caused persistent regional 
dependence on state development programmes. As a result, Jakarta exhibited 
exponential economic and political growth throughout the New Order regime.  
Second, centralised fiscal institutions meant that local development budgets and 
directions are controlled by the central government. The development programme 
spends 80 percent of total public expenditure in provinces, disbursed from the national 
budget by departments and agencies at Jakarta, whilst the remaining 20 percent is 
administered through the Presidential Instruction (Inpres), which is designed for 
infrastructure and other development proposals. From the 1970s through 1998, grant-
supported development spending by local governments was channelled through the 
Inpres and Autonomous Region Subsidy/Subsidi Daerah Otonom (SDO) grants. The 
Inpres and SDO grants supported most components of local administration, 
infrastructure, and services, including local government officials, roads, schools, land 
preparation, soil conservation, markets, clean water, sanitation and drainage systems, 
health, re-greening (planting trees along roadways), training, technical assistance, and 
planning. The local development expenditure was funded by the central government 
through the SDO for civil servant salaries and Inpres. The relatively limited 
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responsibilities and tasks indicate that local development was a function of the volume 
and structure of intergovernmental transfer grants (Silver et al., 2001).  
Third, the long-term central government authoritarian governance style enabled 
specific policymaking in a particular region. These specific policies were concentrated 
in regions designed as knowledge and economic growth hubs. As support for these 
projects, development funds ranging from operational costs, project grants, and human 
resource improvement with enormous scholarship opportunities were allocated (Bruell, 
2003). As a result, these specific policies determined the variations in regional 
development and growth divergence. An illustration of this case is the knowledge and 
technology-based economic development initiated in various regions in Indonesia by 
the Minister of Research and Technology, B. J. Habibie, in the 1970s–1990s. These 
projects included the establishment of research agencies (Badan Pelayanan Perizinan 
Terpadu/BPPT, LAPAN, and BATAN in Jakarta and its suburb of Serpong), state-
owned enterprises such as Pindad and IPTN in Bandung (Fromhold-Eisebith and 
Eisebith, 2002), a ceramic centre in Bali, and an agricultural centre in Lampung), and an 
industry-bounded zone in Batam City. Through the state-granted free trade zone (FTZ) 
status, Batam benefited from the central government’s special development funding and 
policies.  
Fourth, the trade liberalisation and decentralisation discourse was prevalent during 
the last years of the New Order in the early 1990s. After the industry policy 
deregulation and trade liberalisation implementation, private sectors had a more 
significant economic role. This deregulation of industry supported the emergence of the 
private sector and political openness in the country. As a result of the post-oil crisis, 
these indigenous entrepreneurs and middle class (which were accustomed to economic 
development) were forced into political action. In the 1990s, a growing number of 
businessmen and activists demanded access to economic and political opportunities, 
decision-making, and human rights (Canonica-Walangitang, 2004, p. 225).  
The period also witnessed the end of the strategy of combining repression with 
formal political institutions. Government processes came under pressure. These events 
introduced political latitude and pushed liberals to guarantee the openness phase (masa 
keterbukaan) (Canonica-Walangitang, 2004, p. 195). For instance, economic prosperity 
introduced a new era of journalism following removals of previous bans, and induced 
the emergence of new media for special readership. The openness phase was then 
controlled through the ownership of members or people associated with the 
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government. Although in the surface the openness seems to give rise to private sector, 
this remains controlled by the government. This is illustrated by the establishment of 
new television channels such as RCTI and TPI, which are owned by relatives of the 
regime leaders, that ended the monopoly of the national television station TVRI. 
In addition, toward the end of the New Order, the government executed the district 
programme (kabupaten program) to strengthen local authority and balance regional 
development. The programme emphasises local employment through economic 
infrastructure development (Wit, 1973). It primarily aims for agricultural infrastructure 
such as irrigation, transportation, and rehabilitation. The programme also introduced 
district governments to the governance process through project proposals initiated 
together with local communities and intergovernmental coordination with the provincial 
government. 
7.3.2 Critical Juncture and Inherited Institutions 
Following historical institutionalism, the institutional change is initiated by critical 
juncture where abundant policies and institutional arrangements are considered and 
decided, determining the trajectories of existing institutions. This section analyses the 
institutional shifts that occurred from the interaction between new policies and inherited 
institutions.  
The discussion in chapter 4.4 shows that global economy and financial crisis act as 
exogenous factor that combined with domestic latent social situation leads to the fall of 
New Order regime. In the historical institutionalist perspective, this study regards the 
resignation of President Soeharto and the fall of New Regime order as a critical 
juncture. Financial crisis role as the economic trigger together with severe regional 
disparities and income gaps lead to social unrest that brought down the regime. The fall 
of New Order regime provide the moment for Indonesia to determine the institutional 
arrangements Bertrand (2004). He argues that despite exogenous factor were the main 
trigger in the fall of Soeharto regime, the ethnic tensions created pressures for 
institutional change. This socio-political situation allows the intensification of 
decentralisation discourses that emphasis on regional demand for economic and 
political authority. At the same time, with the inherited of growing power of mobile 
capitalist, supported by the IMF, to privatise Indonesia economy made policies during 
President Habibie's regime reflects commitment on accelerating economic liberalisation 
and trade deregulation.  
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Hence, the fall of New Order regime is seen as the critical juncture, in which 
growing discourses of decentralisation and trade liberalisation occurs. The deregulation 
and trade liberalisation process, and the national and regional socio-political conflicts 
leads to the establishment of decentralization. The transition period between regimes 
regarded as the critical juncture moment, which various ideas of new institutional 
arrangements and governance emerged. The decentralisation discourse was so powerful 
that within one year, two important laws on political and administrative decentralisation 
and fiscal decentralisation were released. Despite controversial and in contrast with 
decentralisation in other countries, the decentralization was conducted at the districts 
level following political and government reason. Political reason was to prevent 
provinces that might seek for independent considering their physical size and natural 
resources. While the governmental and efficiency supporters claim that local are more 
proximate to understand and have the knowledge of local needs. 
The path development of decentralisation at districts levels was chosen with the 
legislation of decentralisation law No. 22 and 25/1999. The choice of decentralization 
type and legislation shapes the process of institutional change at the regional level 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). In the following years, both trade liberalisation 
and local socio-political issues influence the implementation of regional decentralisation 
and economic performances. The introduction of local public office and council 
elections caused problems in local government organisations. The ambiguity and 
unclear regulations on the qualifications and political experiences of the candidates 
jeopardised the quality of public administration and service. The law only states basic 
individual mental health, secondary education and ambiguity statement that “the 
candidate should understand the region and known by the community”7. As the 
candidates are recruited and nominated by political parties, they are considered to have 
limited bureaucratic knowledge and  orientated to political parties elites that supports 
them during the campaign (Sarundajang, 2011 p.7).  
As a result, leadership quality varied across regions with some areas having clear and 
target-driven development visions, whilst others with incompetent and ill-targeted local 
leaders. This variation caused diversity in local policies and development programmes, 
as emphasised by other researchers (Heinelt and Zimmermann, 2010; von Luebke, 
2009). Furthermore, competent leadership obtained political support from the local 
                                                
7 Undang-undang 32/2004 pasal 58 
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parliament, civic societies, and communities. The ability and capacity to build political 
coalition and societal support afforded them better odds to increase the possibility that 
their programmes will be implemented.  
The political system also altered parliamentary election and political roles. In the 
decentralisation, provincial and district parliament members are elected every five years 
with the same regulations as those of the national parliament. Currently, the local 
parliaments have more responsibilities and control over laws. The parliament, together 
with the government, is responsible for law making with rights to propose and reject 
laws. An illustration of the effect of the new political order is the design of the city of 
Batam decentralisation. The notion of granting the FTZ status shows the reluctance of 
the central government (Phelps, 2004) with debate that arose when in 2004, the 
parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR) legalised the entire island of Batam as 
having FTZ status without agreement from the government. The parliament argued that 
designating the entire island with FTZ status avoids additional bureaucratic hindrance 
compared with designating only the enclaves with FTZ classification, as the 
government proposed8.  
Decentralisation influences political institutions by acknowledging community and 
societal participation. These communities and societies include NGOs, community 
leaders, and business societies that have channels of participation in the governance 
process. The local strategic plan (Renstrada) facilitated the implementation of the new 
development model, which was designed as a bottom-up scheme to evaluate local 
government performance (Peraturan Pemerintah  No. 108/2000).  
 
‘Civic societies believe that citizen empowerment is crucial in local 
development. Our main project is to improve local actor’s network capacities to 
support local growth. A solid local collabouration is expected to generate 
effective regulations and policies’. (Interview 12, Appendix D) 
 
Another example is the local budgetary planning scheme, in which citizen and 
NGO/CBO participation are implemented through multi-stakeholder governance in the 
Annual Activities Planning Forum (Musyawarah Perencanaan Kegiatan 
Tahunan/MPKT) (Fig. 7-2). The role of civic societies in local planning remains limited 
and has not penetrated the decision-making process, as illustrated in the dotted line in 
                                                
8 http://us.finance.detik.com/read/2004/09/15/010152/207835/4/dpr-nekat-sahkan-ruu-ftz-batam 
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Figure 4 (Interview 12, Appendix D). Given that NGOs/CBOs rarely operate at the 
executive budgetary process, these organisations are currently advocating citizen 
participation in several development forum tiers at the district, sub-district, and villages 
levels (Musyawarah Kabupaten/kota, kecamatan, and desa).  
However, the bureaucracy is concerned over the effectiveness rates of the roles of 
these civic societies and views these organisations as pressure groups. In current 
conditions, civic societies are merely headline news seekers, rather than supportive of 
public service improvement, as explained by a senior officer at the MoHA.   
 
‘The question is to what extent the role of other actors such as NGO and civic 
society…they have not been successful to act as a pressure groups as found in 
advance democratic countries…they are only interested with “media attraction” 
issues such as black campaign and splitting of regions, rather than pushing the 
government to provide better public services.’ (Interview 6, Appendix D) 
 
Figure 7-2 Budgetary Process in Indonesian Post-Decentralisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adaptation from Interview 27, Appendix D 
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The decentralisation also altered intergovernmental fiscal transfer and distribution 
administration, both directly and indirectly. Direct distribution is a fiscal 
decentralisation process, which the central government specifically calculates. The 
budget is then allocated to individual regions. Examples include the natural resource 
revenue sharing fund (dana bagi hasil/DBH), general allocation fund (dana alokasi 
umum/DAU), and special allocation fund (dana alokasi khusus/DAK). In addition, the 
central government funds the state’s de-concentration programmes and activities for the 
provinces. These direct allocation funds contributed to more than 40 percent of regional 
income, whilst indirect budget distribution for special programmes, such as the national 
community development programme (PNPM), amounted to 24.3 percent of the central 
government budget in 2008.  
Fiscal decentralisation introduced three source of local revenues: (i) local revenue, 
generated from local tax and retribution, locally owned enterprise profits, and other 
income resources; (ii) the Equalizing Fund, which comprises the share of land and 
building tax, DAU that amounts to 25 percent of domestic revenue (with 10 percent 
allocated to the provincial government and 90 percent to the districts), and the DAK for 
special projects in selected regions; and (iii) foreign loans, which have to be approved 
by the local assembly and the central government. Presently, the district governments 
rely primarily on intergovernmental transfers as the amount own source revenue only 
accounts for 5 percent of the total revenue. In addition, Fane (2003) shows that for 95 
percent of central government transfers, the sources are as follows: 79 percent from the 
DAU, 5 percent from tax sharing, and 12 percent from natural resources share revenues.  
The loose governance system under which the ASEAN operates emphasises the 
commitment of member countries; this approach is known as the ASEAN Way of 
governance (Nesadurai, 2003). The system is characterised by a lack of restriction on 
the trade relationships of member countries and external tariffs for non-members. With 
regard to dispute management, for example, ASEAN and AFTA disputes are rarely 
publicised and settled through informal discussions between senior bureaucrats and 
politicians, unlike the EU and NAFTA, which leverage legal mechanisms in courts and 
technical experts (Stubbs, 2000). When the dispute cannot be resolved, the problem is 
discussed at the AFTA council or the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting. These 
struggles between regionalism and domestic concerns become the character and key of a 
region’s economic dynamic outcomes (Nesadurai, 2003). Thus, this loose governance 
offsets sub-national gains from the AFTA. 
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Another issue is the state’s sole decision-making on the AFTA sectoral industry and 
trade inclusion. For example, the selection of products included in the AFTA sensitive 
product lists (SL) accommodates each producer’s concern over national products and 
labour. This research argues that the existence of the SL has caused limitations and has 
slowed down of the effect of the AFTA. These lists allow member countries to decide 
the extent of their involvement in the trade integration and thus, decelerate the sector’s 
liberalisation rate.  
In this sense, for instance, Octaviani et al. (2007) explains that Indonesia’s greatest 
advantage is in the automotive and electrical sectors. However, Malaysia’s government 
decision to include the sector in the SL has prevented Indonesia to benefit from trade in 
these sectors. During the research period, the AFTA progress was incremental and 
proceeded at a slow rate. Thus, the effect of the AFTA is determined by individual 
country’s readiness to involve in trade integration.  
In addition, with absolute authority on the trade liberalisation policy, the central 
government neglects local authorities and hence, there is lack of trans-national 
development cooperation amongst local governments. Local government officers 
explain the lack of consultation and discussion on the AFTA trade agreements. This 
phenomenon is the opposite of regionalism found within the EU as inter-local 
government networks established through EU spatial cohesion policies (Jessop, 1997, p. 
574).  
 
‘The agreements fails to acknowledge local diversities on business license range 
and regulations, environment standards, urban zoning, and employee 
trainings…only regions with products included in the agreements gain 
advantage from AFTA’. (Interview 27, Appendix D) 
 
Furthermore, the ASEAN Way supports the inherited authoritarian institution of 
elements in the state’s control of the AFTA implementation in Indonesia. The 
relationship and networks amongst the state ministries determines Indonesia’s trade line 
track schedules, tariff lines, and AFTA agreement adjustments on national policies. The 
governance of the AFTA implementation by the central government influences regional 
gains.  
The ASEAN Way promotes the dominance of the Ministry of Trade (MoT) as the 
coordinator of the AFTA implementation in Indonesia, and compels other actors to 
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implement and comply with the AFTA agreements (Interviews 3, 4, 5, 13, 15 Appendix 
D). The MoT’s insistence on including products that are not ready for liberalisation 
does not afford Indonesia much benefit. For example, the AFTA commodity lines 
compel other ministries to satisfy the modalities decided by the MoT, regardless of 
sectoral readiness. AFTA modalities of 90 to 10 percent indicate that 90 percent of the 
products should be free and have zero tariffs, whilst the remaining 10 percent are taxed. 
Another example is the exertion of pressure by the MoT on the Ministry of Marine 
Affairs and Fisheries (MoMAF) to extend the items in its area, but the Ministry argues 
that this is not possible because of the low quality of its products. Hence, the MoMAF is 
apprehensive that Indonesia’s fishery products cannot compete with foreign fishery 
products imported into Indonesia (Interview 8, Appendix D). 
 
‘However, MoI and other departments are responsible with the products and 
communication with the associations and business...but it is the MoT that has 
the authority to decide the modalities and FTA schedules…this causes problems 
and demands to the technical departments, not to the MoT’. (Interview 3, 
Appendix D) 
 
This conflict was explained by a senior officer at the Ministry of Transportation 
(MoTrans) below: 
 
‘Because MoT is the frontrunner for the AFTA, other central government 
departments and agencies are bounded to support the free trade agreements that 
were singed by the Department of Trade…however, in its implementation 
different department views and technical schedules may be differ with what 
MoT has agree on. For example, in the case of open sky policy, Ministry of 
Transportation still reluctant to agree, whilst Ministry of Tourism fully support 
the policy…hence, conflicts amongst state departments are inevitably occurred’. 
(Interview 4, Appendix D) 
 
The institutional changes induced by state restructuring also introduced conflicts of 
interest between actors with conflicts between the state regions and sectoral business 
societies. For example, the AFTA policy enforcement is found merely in the role of 
civic societies and the chamber of commerce. After the Department of Trade reached 
sectoral agreement at the ASEAN level, the sectoral departments or agencies 
coordinated internal discussions that typically involved related stakeholders. The 
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Indonesian transportation sector, for instance, held regular meetings with transportation 
actors, associations, and independent transportation research centres, such as the 
Indonesian Transportation Forum (Masyarakat Transportasi Indonesia/MTI), which is 
participated in by academics, NGOs, and researchers. A senior officer at the Ministry of 
Transportation explained that:  
 
‘In the case of open-sky in AFTA aviation policy that concerns national 
security, the Ministry of Transportation invites sectoral stakeholders including 
the Association of transportation operators, transportation experts and 
academics, NGO (transport society), and the Chamber of Commerce…whilst at 
local level, such as the consortium of monorail in Jakarta, includes additional 
actors such as the media and local government’. (Interview 4, Appendix D) 
 
Another example is the government’s authoritarian power to continue trade 
agreement implementation with modified objectives, despite demands from the 
Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) to postpone the plan (Stubbs, 
2000). The Indonesian government never requested to delay its commitments to the 
agreement, which neglects the demands of producers and business actors regarding 
Indonesia’s involvement in the AFTA and ASEAN-China FTA (Interview 8, Appendix 
D). By contrast, the central government, through the Ministry of Economy Coordinator, 
responded with additional campaigns for trade liberalisation with the launch of the 
‘white campaign’, which promotes the assurance of import quality from the AFTA and 
consumer protection9.  
7.4 Regional Institutional Divergence  
7.4.1 Reproduction of Regional Institutions 
Following Thelen (1999) and Eaton (2004), historical institutionalism should identify 
the reproduction processes that reinforce government and political institutions over time 
in a state restructuring period. In the present study, three mechanisms served as 
instruments of institutional change and reinforced the path of state restructuring: local 
political empowerment, the fiscal decentralisation scheme, and the governance of the 
AFTA implementation. 
                                                
9 Kompas Print edition online, 
http://www.kompas.com/read/xml/2009/12/28/12362833/white.campaign.untuk.hadapi.fta (Accessed 
Desember 29, 2009) 
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The political institutional changes affected economic institutions with the 
introduction of business and investment regulation. The ambiguity of decentralisation 
laws leads to local regulations that are nonconducive to a good business climate 
(Goodspaster, 2003, p. 83). The undang-undang 34/2000 on Regional Government 
Taxes and Charges led to many distortions (Kuncoro, 2009, p. 239). The local 
governments do not have a clear understanding of their responsibilities and tasks, and 
instead project high revenues by imposing high taxes and new levies to meet the 
revenue targets for each local agency (dinas). For instance, the number of local 
regulations on business and investment procedures to be reviewed overwhelms the 
DoHA. In 2001, reports show that 4000 local regulations were reviewed and about 1000 
regulations were problematic and rejected. In Bandung, for example, from nine local 
regulations that were rejected, only one proposed local services, whilst the rest were 
related to local levies and taxes (KPPOD, 2007). Local development problems occurred 
because Undang-undang 34/2000 allows the local governments to pass local regulations 
without the central government’s approval if there is no response within 15 days of 
submission.  
 
‘We need to review all local regulations and ensuring cooperation between 
central and local government in formulating good local regulations…the way 
forward is to change the bureaucrats mind-set and culture to improve 
government capabilities as facilitator for private sectors whilst minimise and 
erase the government administration malpractices and grease monies’. 
(Interview 16, Appendix D) 
 
To explain this problem, acknowledging that tax administration is controlled by the 
state is important. The regional government tax authorities are regulated, with the 
provincial government responsible for vehicle tax whilst the district governments 
impose land and business taxes (districts). The deficiency in tax collection also 
determines regional differences. Regions with more economic activities and business 
activities have higher local revenues than do regions with fewer economic activities.  In 
Bandung, the tax system apparently harmed the local government’s tax collection 
scheme.  
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‘The provincial government do not receive local revenue from the industries as 
the industries are listed in Jakarta…this has disadvantaged our province because 
of losing potential revenue from the industry taxes’. (Interview 18, Appendix D) 
 
Political and economic institutional changes caused the emergence of local 
competition that reflects the deficient adjustment of local regulations in accordance with 
the business climate, as well as the loss of potential revenue from local taxes and 
retribution from existing businesses following inter-jurisdiction tax competition. An 
interview with staff at the Bandung district explained this limitation: 
 
‘The governance on regional planning are conducted with other agencies and 
government departments…. but the complicated relationship between 
different level of governments as found in the decentralisation law has make 
it difficult for any conciliation with others. Thus, the national (provincial) 
regulations and acts are treated as guidance for provincial (districts) 
governments’. (Interview 32, Appendix D) 
 
A similar case occurred in Batam, with its inherited centralised policy that neglects 
linkages with surrounding regions and inter-regional competitiveness. This disregard is 
ongoing and felt by the regions, as explained by a senior officer in Batam:  
 
‘The competitiveness are felt very strongly…for example, currently Batam 
Island are competing with other Riau province districts in terms of city tidiness, 
investment attraction, and social facilities services’. (Interview 29, Appendix D) 
 
As a result, there is a lack of regional cooperation and economic integration in the post-
decentralisation period. A senior officer at Batam confirms this with the following 
explanation: 
 
‘There are communication regarding FTZ’s but lack of cooperation by Batam 
Island with its neighbouring areas to improve regional competitiveness’. 
(Interview 31, Appendix D) 
  
The apparent effect of the decentralisation law is that the lack of spatial integration 
policies was caused by the deficiency of the provincial government as a spatial 
coordinator and development monitor. This caused local policies to become inward 
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looking and lacking in integrated development plans. A senior officer at Batam argues 
that the setback of decentralisation is that the regions do not consider the planning 
documents of other regions as they prepare their own:  
 
‘There has been no cooperation between Batam Island with neighbouring 
areas…of course this might improve regional competitiveness’. (Interview 31, 
Appendix D) 
 
The strong Batam-Jakarta relationship is also reflected in the cooperation with the 
national investment board that promotes the development of Batam. A former senior 
officer at the Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA), who currently works as 
a senior officer at the national investment board, provided the following example: 
 
‘Batam progress is promoted as a part of ASEAN FTA and also exclusive FTA 
with Singapore, which both has benefited from each other on the investment 
and business’. (Interview 9, Appendix D) 
 
Another case is the Batam Skills Development Centre (BSDC) that faced inter-
organisational problems after the decentralisation (Phelps, 2004). Initially, the Centre 
was established as a school for skills and practice transfer during the Indonesia-
Malaysia-Singapore growth triangle (IMS-GT) cooperation in 1992. The administration 
over the Centre’s inter-organisational relations was transferred from a central 
government body (Directorate of Technical Education) to the empowered municipal 
government. However, the municipal government was reluctant to maintain funding as 
they viewed the BSDC as a potential failure when it comes to financial self-sufficiency 
(Phelps, 2004).  
Another reproduction of governmental and political institution is the DAK. This fund 
requires the participation of heads of regions who are not actively lobbying, and less 
sectorally developed regions may be allocated less additional development budgets. An 
argument by an officer at the DoHA provided evidence on the issue as follows:  
‘If you want to develop a particular sectoral product, you can purpose sectoral 
development with the DAK…the more sectoral products you have, the more 
DAK funding you receive’. (Interview 7, Appendix D) 
 
Meanwhile, an NGO official explained the importance of the DAK in further detail:  
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‘There considerably head of regions that spend more time in Jakarta rather than 
in its region…I think it is a common sense because the lobbying activities and 
authorise are found in Jakarta including the Parliament, MoHA, and MoF’. 
(Interviews 13, 14, Appendix D) 
 
As a result of ambiguity and loose regulation, the DAK is exploited by both central and 
local government officers.  
 
‘This fund management is a less transparent process and depends on lobby 
seeking and political connection with central government offices in Jakarta...we 
found that there are head of regions who spend more time in Jakarta to lobby for 
DAK and other additional funding, compared with their time in their respective 
regions’. (Interviews 14, 16, Appendix D) 
 
The DAK likely increases disparities rather than the opposite (Lewis, 2001). The study 
shows that the DAU and DAK are skewed for regions with low populations and low-
density areas. For example, Papua received per capita allocations tenfold higher than 
those of West Java, the most populated province. The DBH could not close the fiscal 
gap amongst regions because Papua received a large amount of allocation funds from 
the DBH. The own source revenue is also uneven as shown by a comparison of the 
highest and lowest achievers. For example, the differences were 510 amongst districts 
and 47 amongst provinces in 2002. 
The last reproduction factor is the management of form D by the state; this 
management neglects the local government role on form distribution. The form is one of 
the main measurements of the AFTA’s progress, reflected by its success in promoting 
only the products that use at least 80 percent of raw materials from ASEAN countries. 
The AFTA commission is determined to extend the utilisation of form D to improve the 
AFTA’s economic advantage. Thus, it compels exporters to use the form to earn AFTA 
tariff reductions. The ASEAN Secretariat confirms the limited indication of 
supranational role present in multi-level governance. An example is the members’ 
authority to conduct form D distribution and promotion. The ASEAN Secretariat has 
acknowledged that this may be a reason for low export figures in form D: 
 
‘There are possibly reasons of the low export from Form D…first is due to the 
rareness of form D, hence it is worth to be used by the exporters…and second, 
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perhaps the local exporters do not know about the form due to lack of 
promotion’. (Interview 8, Appendix D) 
 
In addition, a source at the Ministry of Industry (MoI) explained that:  
 
‘The volume of trade with form D also has not increased significantly…it seems 
that the form has not been distributed and promoted well, this should be DoT’s 
responsibilities, also with the training and guidance regarding the form 
utilisation’. (Interview 3, Appendix D) 
 
Despite this importance, form D has not been distributed equally to the regions in 
Indonesia. Field studies show that the regions are unfamiliar with the form and exhibit 
limited promotion of its utilisation, thereby undermining the use of the form. The 
following statement from the Head Agency for Industry and Trade in West Java 
Province shows that regions are merely participants with no decision-making role in the 
AFTA:   
 
‘I have never seen the form and it is very rare to obtain…but there has been 
promotion by the DoT to our district’. (Interview 21, Appendix D) 
 
In addition, with regard to the monitoring of form D utilisation, there have been doubts 
from the DoI, detailed as follows: 
 
‘Has the form been utilised correctly? Does the Directorate of customs and 
excise have the capacity and competencies to supervise the process?...the DoI 
and other ministries could not controlled although we are responsible to the 
products and communicate with the industries’. (Interview 21, Appendix D) 
 
Hence, with Indonesia’s considerable lack of promotion by the local and central 
governments, the form has not been widely used. Thus, it is difficult for the ASEAN 
Secretariat and researchers to obtain an overview of the actual effect of the AFTA on 
Indonesia and its regions. From this, stem the differences in the implementation of the 
AFTA (Form D) amongst regions. 
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7.4.2 Regional Institutional Learning and Change 
This section discusses institutional change and adaptation that occurs in the form of 
institutional layering related to politics, economics, and ethnics. The institutional 
layering process occurred in a dispersed manner during the post-decentralisation period. 
The following cases from Indonesian regions, especially Batam and Bandung, illustrate 
these institutional changes.  
The first case is Batam City, where the relationship between agents and institutional 
changes also reflects the accumulation of knowledge and behaviour inherited from the 
previous regime. The institutional change forced agents to adapt but this capacity was 
bound by previous knowledge and behaviour. To support this adaptation, Batam 
authorities have improved the city’s competitive strength. The local government 
attempted to establish straightforward task division amongst authorities and a single-
window investment procedure through the local investment coordinating board 
(Interview 28, Appendix D). To maintain its competitive position in the decentralisation 
process, the FTZ status and AFTA accelerate Batam further to compete with similar 
special economic regions. The FTZ status provides special regulations for investors in 
Batam and this has become the region’s competitive value.  
On the other hand, the AFTA has pushed Batam to optimise institutional authority in 
implementing innovative regulations and the ICT to compete with other FTZs such as 
Bayan Lepas and Subic. For example, a high number of FDI projects require qualified 
workers, a requirement that can only be fulfilled through education from Batam 
Polytechnic, which specialises in information technology, manufacturing, and 
machinery courses. Currently, assembly license industries dominate the Batam market 
with competition from export processing zones and FTZs in Batam, Johor (in 
Malaysia), and Subic (in the Philippines). The extensive policies on business-based 
administration and policy innovation include one-stop services (OSS), e-gov 
infrastructures, and cargo tracking systems. The establishment of the ICT and e-gov 
infrastructures enhanced government public service by increasing service reliability and 
the tools for the prevention of corruption. With these technologies, business actors can 
complete business permits online, whilst ship officers can inform port administrators 
regarding their arrival times and other detailed information. Furthermore, the authorities 
also argue that Batam requires these technologies to improve its competitive values in 
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attracting foreign investments and manufacturing, especially those that spill over from 
Singapore (Interviews 28, Appendix D). 
In the labour sector, after three decades of special policies, the region has acquired 
competitive edge in labour pooling, technical management, and industry-related 
trainings. For example, Batam has a capacity to absorb industry labours with an annual 
labour growth rate of 14 percent (Sanyoto, 2003), and continues to enhance labour skills 
with various competency training and educational programmes to meet the high demand 
for professional engineers within the semi-high technology export-oriented industries. 
The polytechnic curriculum is designed to match the real industry environment to 
produce ready-to-work graduates, with 50 percent devoted to theory and 50 percent to 
practical courses and industry working hours. Furthermore, labouratories and up-to-date 
technological tools are also available to keep pace with industries. The polytechnic 
curriculum also features intense communication with industries through technical 
workshops and job placements. Although the majority of rapid growth stems from the 
manufacturing and shipyard industries, prospective student interest in electronics and 
machinery has been very low, causing a shortage in skilled operators in both industries.  
 
‘The polytechnic’s existence is certainly relevant and significant for the 
region…foreign and domestic firms prefer skilled local people rather than 
migrating people…but this means that the polytechnic should be supported by 
the government and firms financially to overcome limitation as it could only 
accepts 300 student annually’. (Interview 27, Appendix D) 
 
Furthermore, as an inherited state-controlled region, the Batam centralisation is 
evident in the persistent importance of the former head of the BIDA. Until recently, the 
governor of the Riau Islands was the former BIDA chairman, enabling him to build 
political coalitions and societal support through his former officers and bureaucrats, 
who replaced him as the BIDA chairman. Another colleague became the mayor of 
Batam. His former officers became leaders of agencies in the city. This provided him 
better ground to implement his policies and development plans in Batam. Specifically, 
this reflects the conditions for the region’s development. First, agent knowledge and 
extensive understanding play an important role in determining the continuity of 
previous policies. Given that the governor is an institutional agent whose behaviour is 
bound by antecedent institutions, the knowledge and policy decisions that he transferred 
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to provincial bureaucrats and political actors are bound to Batam’s institutions. Thus, 
these policies sustain development in the city.  
Second, because the former colleagues of the governor became leaders of local 
agencies in Batam, provincial policies are more likely accepted and supported by 
district leaders. As a former head of the BIDA, the governor has a strong relationship 
with the BIDA as reflected in Batam being the province’s growth centre and its being 
home to the provincial representative office. The office is also the location of OSS 
facilities for investment and business services, and government-business routine 
meetings for the provincial government. Third, an established leadership in 
development became an alternative to the lack of political and ideological philosophy 
within the political parties, as argued by von Luebke (2009). The FTZ status has 
motivated Batam authorities to develop competitive edge policies for regional 
development; economic agglomeration drives Batam’s economic policies. However, 
these events evidently occurred with the support of previous institutional agents. Path 
dependence is clearly reflected in this example because current policies were 
determined by the industrial path that has been established in Batam since the 1980s.  
Another illustration is the consequence of Batam’s early establishment years, in 
which multinational companies (MNCs) exerted a dominant influence over the social 
order in the city. The US and Singaporean MNCs dominated social order in Batam, 
facilitating the establishment of a development-oriented and efficient bureaucratic 
system, as opposed to the proliferation of Indonesian institutional shortcomings 
including corruption (Phelps, 2004). Policy innovations, such as the cooperation 
between the BIDA and BKPM on investment promotion and coordination of investment 
approval, were also implemented. Furthermore, the appointment of Batam as the central 
government’s pilot project on e-government, e-business, and e-public infrastructure 
services (G2G, G2B, G2C) established the Batam intelligent island/BII (Putra, 2003). 
The institutional change induced by the decentralisation introduced institutional 
layering in the dynamic relationship between the BIDA and the municipal government, 
as well as the delineation of the Batam FTZ as enclaves10 requiring institutional 
adaptation and learning, following Mahoney and Thelen (2010). 
The second illustration in Bandung provides two cases of institutional change and 
adaptation. The adjustment and adaptability capacities of agents in institutional layering 
                                                
10 Peraturan Pemerintah No. 46 Tahun 2007 (Government Regulation) 
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are illustrated by the industrial development infrastructure and the emergence of the 
creative industry. Both cases show the attachment of a new element to existing 
institutions to support institutional transformation.  
First, the importance of Bandung grows with plans for the development of large-
scale infrastructure on dry ports and feeder roads to support the province’s agricultural 
and manufacturing production. The Bandung City institutions have exerted decades of 
support for local economic development with core industries being the textile, garment, 
and machinery sectors. The City of Bandung established its manufacturing industries 
with the deregulation on investment permits; that is, the October package (Paket 
oktober/Pakto) in 1993 that established the region as a manufacturing industry centre. 
The sunk cost in infrastructure development and local-based industrial specialisation 
has been profound in the region, hindering novel economic activities. Despite 
econometrics results in the previous chapter highlights the importance of road 
accessibility on economic performance (p.80), in Bandung city the infrastructure are 
under utilized following manufacturing industry’s stagnant growth in the last decade. 
This causes sunk cost of past infrastructure development which forms the institutional 
hysteria of manufacturing industry boom in the 1990s. However, recent provincial 
development policy on dry port with Bandung as the core city provides opportunities to 
utilize the road. This caused the deficiency in innovative policies and economic activity 
creation in West Java (Interview 18, Appendix D). However, after the decentralisation, 
institutional change occurred with the increasing importance of Bandung in the 
province’s economic activities and trade hubs. The city has committed to the top-down 
and bottom-up decision-making process as indicated by its 2009 local regulations. The 
process has included active participation from NGOs, universities, professional 
associations, and creative communities, along with the municipal government 
(Interview 32, Appendix D). To attract investments into the city, the municipal 
government established the One-Stop Service Agency/Badan Pelayanan Perizinan 
Terpadu (BPPT), with learning avenues from other regions such as the Sragen and 
Jembrana regencies. 
 Another illustration is the case of the creative industry discourse that emphasizes on 
the emergence of young creative professionals and the promotion of the textile and 
crafts sectors. Combining historical institutions with proximity to Jakarta, leading art 
colleges, and aspiring young artists, the province postulated the City of Bandung, the 
province’s capital, as a creative city. Furthermore, the Bandung Institute of Technology 
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(ITB) has been known as the initiator of the Creative Industries and Innovation 
movement in Bandung with the four yearly art market events (pasar seni). The city and 
art society have been blessed by the long-term presence of the faculty of Arts and 
Design, which routinely initiated market events long before the Bandung Creative City 
Forum (BCCF) and the creative city concept was introduced in the city. Another 
contribution of the ITB is the creation of Artepolis, a committee specifically formed to 
hold international conferences and design competitions under the Architecture 
department. The Artepolis and faculty of Fine Arts show that the ITB also plays 
important role in the Bandung creative industry development. The Helar Festival, a 
creative industry festival, initiated by the BCCF, which attempted to integrate 15 
creative industry actors and businesses within the West Java Province. The forum 
consisted of representatives of various creative industry communities including 
traditional arts, clothing and fashion, music and visual arts, urban enthusiasts, and urban 
heritage society11. The forum activities are consistent with the provincial government’s 
strategy of developing creative industry policy between 2008 and 2013, and are 
expected to accelerate the creative industries growth (Interviews 21, Appendix D).   
Institutional layering can also occur in the form of the unintended consequences of a 
particular policy. After the implementation of Batam’s special economic zone policy, 
other regional authorities demanded the establishment of similar special zones in their 
respective regions. This state policy on the Integrated Economic Development Zone 
(Kawasan Pengembangan Ekonomi Terpadu/KAPET) was legalised with Presidential 
Decree No.150/2000. The institutions in the selected regions are gradually transformed 
to incorporate a sense of development and competition. The zones are designed as 
engines of growth for the surrounding regions through the state’s special customs and 
investments regimes.  
However, almost a decade after its implementation, the zones failed to achieve their 
objectives with minimum economic growth and investment performance12. The failure 
was argued to stem from the low potential of the location, low infrastructure quality, 
and insufficient budgets. The institutional issue lies in the deficiency of the State to 
designate these zones as growth centres through funding and policies. A crucial problem 
                                                
11Website and information regarding the actors of Bandung Creative City is available at 
http://commonroom.info. 
12http://www.medanbisnisdaily.com/news/read/2011/02/24/20959/11_kapet_gagal_tarik_investasi/#.Tk0
wOHZPRD8 
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with the KAPET governance is that the governor is also the chairman of the KAPET 
Authority, which causes administrative and fiscal reallocation bias between the KAPET 
with the provincial and district governments. Furthermore, there are also several 
KAPET that consist of more than one districts within one province, such as the KAPET 
SASAMBA that include parts of three districts of Sanga-sanga, Samarinda, and 
Balikpapan. This inter-district cooperation requires institutional change in 
administration coordination and policies by the governor, whose role reduced after the 
decentralisation. 
To solve this intergovernmental issue, another institutional layering occurred with 
the introduction of Peraturan Pemerintah No. 19/2010, which empowers provincial 
governments to coordinate and distribute spatial wealth. The regulation also regards the 
provincial governments as the representatives of the central government and only 
receive de-concentration responsibilities (Interview 7, Appendix D). The new regulation 
builds on existing decentralisation laws and improves the provincial role to ensure the 
distributive power of the decentralisation. The enactment of Peraturan Pemerintah No. 
19/2010 was a response to the uncontrollable and chaotic relationship between the 
provincial and district governments. The central government bureaucrats explained that 
this regulation is required to restore administration coordination and spatial 
development integration (Interviews 1, 5, 6, 7, Appendix D).  
The new regulation imposed several effects on public service. First, it guarantees 
improvement in public services by the districts through monitoring and evaluation, 
enhances public service competence, and introduces rewards and sanctions by the 
provincial and district governments. The national budget funded this responsibility with 
an exclusive secretariat, which represents the provincial government as the central 
government’s representative. Second, this regulation also guarantees transparency on 
bureaucracy through the provincial authority of electing the district secretary and 
capacity to inspect corrupt district parliament members. These responsibilities were 
previously supervised only by the governor. Third, improvements in multi-level 
governance enable more coordinated spatial and economic policies, as demanded by 
decentralisation undang-undang 34/2004 that is based on each level of government’s 
specific responsibilities13. Before the enactment of this regulation, memoranda of 
                                                
13 This is broadly specified in Government Regulation No. 38/2007. 
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understanding amongst regions illustrated intergovernmental cooperation, which only 
applies to specific sectors and districts.  
The case studies show that institutional change is a lengthy process and in some 
cases, institutions endure because the shocks do not always introduce institutional 
change. However, when these shocks induce institutional change, the mechanisms are 
incremental and occur within highly-tense political changes. In Indonesia, for example, 
the institutional conversion and layering were the most viable and accepted routes. 
7.5 Conclusions and Contributions 
The discussions above explain the effect of the decentralisation and AFTA from an 
institutional perspective. In the decentralisation, formal rules have substantially altered 
intergovernmental relationships and empowered local authorities. Several conclusions 
can be drawn.  
First, different effects of the AFTA devolution and decentralisation were observed. 
The AFTA is characterised by a lack of trade integration power because of the 
dominance of the nation-state on country agreements, following the limited influence of 
the supranational authority of the ASEAN. The ASEAN Way provides the member 
countries flexible trade liberalisation tariff and trade agreements. On the other hand, 
decentralisation significantly affected regional economic growth in the sense that it 
increased previously existing regional divergence. This pre-decentralisation regional 
disparity was inherited from the authoritarian regime policies that were laxly 
distributed. The previous local institutions inherited divergence, which determined the 
degree of state restructuring on the individual districts.  
Second, regional institutions that were established in the previous period determined 
regional response to state restructuring policies. Two case studies, Bandung and Batam, 
were used in the analysis; these cities influenced the discourse raised during the critical 
juncture and at different institutional reproductions and learning trajectories. For 
Bandung, community and society-led development was observed, whereas government-
led development was observed in Batam. 
Third, the study shows the inefficiency of devolution and the central government’s 
weakening power, as shown by three cases. (i) The empowerment of the regional 
government tended to be an additional layer of bureaucracy that constrained national 
economic growth. The Trade and Industry local agencies may have increased costs and 
the ineffectiveness of bureaucratic processes as high administration costs and 
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overlapping responsibilities increased the inefficiency of devolution (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Bwire, 2004). For example, the AFTA’s Form D was not distributed efficiently to 
the regions. (ii) Inter-regional competition led to inefficient development, as shown by 
the case of the local district regulations that emphasise attracting investments as an 
attempt to increase higher local revenue (Seymour and Turner, 2002). (iii) Local 
resources in physical endowment and networks affected the non-financial gains of the 
fiscal decentralisation (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005). This study shows that historical 
institutions and personal networks determined political and policy support from the 
central government.  
Fourth, previous institutions remain influential to future development. An example is 
the political linkage that the state provides (the IMS-GT and FTZ status of Batam; the 
regional hub and manufacturing park of Bandung). Fifth, at the supranational level, the 
AFTA implementation is based on the ASEAN Way, which lacks supranational 
authority and emphasises the individual member country’s policies in implementing the 
agreements. In Indonesia, the AFTA implementation of governance is dominated by the 
state and only a limited number of actors are involved in the AFTA trade modules. 
Hence, the AFTA implementation has imposed no significant effects on the sectors or 
local development in terms of trade agreement benefits. Thus, this discussion discloses 
that member countries are exempt from trade agreements if there are sectors that are 
viewed as threats to the domestic economy. 
Overall, decentralisation has not improved public services at the district level despite 
the shifts in business and investment procedures. The report by KPPOD (2007) points 
out that although the municipality of Batam is supported by the national act of FTZ 
status designation, the municipality of Dumai is the second worst local government in 
terms of problematic local laws (235 laws). On the other hand, business costs in West 
Java are higher than those in Riau and East Java, with the municipality of Cimahi 
ranking first, followed by Indramayu Regency and Bandung City at the fifth and 
seventh positions.  
 
Contributions  
At the beginning of this chapter, this thesis argued that there are gaps in convergence 
literature in terms of explaining the differences in the degree of the effect of state 
restructuring and regional economic development. Using the institutionalist approach 
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derived from economics and comparative politics literature, this study contributes to the 
theoretical debate as follows.   
First, following other research this study confirms that institutions matter and are 
unique to each region even within a single national economy (North, 1990; Skocpol, 
1979; Thelen, 1999). Each region has distinctive institutions that support local 
development embeddedness and ‘stickiness’ to a given area. Over time, institutions are 
inherited through path dependence, in which future regional development is a trajectory 
of this path. Conversely, the study also illustrates that new institutions are constructed 
and embedded through policies. The case of Batam shows that policies and networks at 
the state level give rise to institutions and embeddedness. This is a unique case 
compared with the institutional arrangement found in other regions, including Bandung. 
Second, the economic policy and development are also influenced by previous 
institutions that limits the extent of institutional change. The study demonstrates that 
because agents are rule-following satisficers (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992), institutional 
layering is the most visible institutional change process. This process enables agents to 
adapt to social shocks and carry on with development whilst recognising the familiar 
habits and rules of previous institutions. Consequently, the acceptance of local 
institutional change is poor when it is considerably distinctive and foreign to previous 
knowledge (Chang, 2005).  
Third, the study provides evidence of the state maintaining an enduring role in the 
form of state rescaling in the decentralisation and globalisation era. Following Brenner 
(1999) and Jessop (2002), the current research reveals that new state spaces evidently 
enhance the state’s role and capacity to mobilise production forces at the supranational 
and local levels. In performing this function, the present study concurs with Sonn 
(2008) that the state is a part of social networks and influenced by society’s power 
structure. The state’s decision to mobilise production forces and economic resources is 
influenced by powerful actors through political and institutional arrangements.  
Thus, regional economic difference is a product of three institutional constellations 
of local institutions, previous knowledge, and the persistent role of the state. State 
restructuring does not guarantee support for balanced regional development and its 
effect depends on the extent of these institutions’ influence in each region.  
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Chapter 8 State-restructuring in Indonesia: Towards a 
balance Regional Economic Development  
 
 
This thesis investigates the effect of the decentralisation and AFTA on regional 
convergence from 1993 to 2005. The research applies quantitative statistical analysis 
and historical institutionalism to explore the effects. This chapter summarises the 
research findings and analysis results, then discusses policy implications and 
limitations.  
8.1 State-restructuring in Decentralisation and AFTA: Research Findings 
This research on the effect of state restructuring on Indonesian regional development 
focuses on two events: the decentralisation and AFTA implementation. From the study, 
we can draw several research conclusions. First, the study shows that despite there is 
evidence of convergence process, persistent and severe regional disparities continue in 
the state restructuring period. The statistical analysis shows that regional disparities 
fluctuated and peaked during the financial crisis in 1997–1999. If we analyse this 
phenomenon geographically, regional disparities are significant between Java and non-
Java districts. In the non-natural resources industry, the West part of Indonesia has a 
higher economic levels and growth compared with the Central and East regions. 
Accordingly, the sectoral analysis reveals that the manufacturing industries are 
concentrated and agglomerated in the West part of Indonesia. The case study on high-
technology manufacturing industries shows a high spatial concentration in Java and 
Sumatra districts. Consequently, these areas have higher economic levels and growth 
compared with other regions.  
Second, the econometric analysis provides a similar result with significant evidence 
of regional economic convergence over the observation period. The state restructuring 
of decentralisation and AFTA have different effects on regional economic development. 
The economic analysis shows that the decentralisation is associated with lower regional 
economic growth, whilst the AFTA impact was insignificant. This finding was found 
both in the OLS and panel data analysis. The study also reveals that the control 
variables, the road accessibility and labour productivity, are associated with higher 
economic growth. However, a higher share of manufacturing industries on GRDP has 
negative effect, this unexpected result might imply a persistence high dependence on 
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natural resource and agricultural industries in Indonesia regions. In addition, the 
lobbying variable implies that political and economic lobbying leads to higher economic 
growth for richer regions than for poorer regions. These econometric results indicate 
regional endowments and capacities that determine the variations in development.  
If we revisit Musgrave’s theory of public sectors (1959), the Indonesian 
decentralisation has not met the ideal core objectives on efficiency in allocation of 
resources, income distribution, and macroeconomic stability. After almost a decade, the 
Indonesian decentralisation has only achieved the first objective, whilst the second and 
third remain in question. The first objective was realised with citizen participation in 
fiscal budgeting, implementation, and evaluation. Accordingly, this participation also 
promoted economic efficiency (Calamai, 2009) and improvement in regional 
administration (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986). On the other hand, regional income 
distribution remains divergent as Chapter 5 concludes. The highest regional income was 
persistently concentrated in Java districts, especially in districts with advanced 
manufacturing activities for the period under observation. More equal regional incomes 
are expected with the enactment of the new decentralisation law (34/2004), but this only 
benefits districts that produce or its neighbour districts within the same province.  
In addition, the institutional analysis in the following chapter provides illustration on 
local politics and government institutions. For instance, this chapter also shows that 
personal capacity for political lobbying determine additional development funding that 
has caused head of regions to spent much time in Jakarta rather than in its respective 
region. In addition, decentralisation caused lack of multi-level administration between 
the provincial and district governments and regional competition amongst the districts. 
The first has hindered integrated economic policy and spatial equality with the 
diminished role of the governor in regional development. Mayors/Regents often 
disregard the regional meetings with the governor, leading to poorly integrated 
provincial development. Effective and coherent regional development is hindered as 
districts neglect the development plans of neighbours. The lack of coordination by the 
provincial governments is also another obstacle to development. The large number of 
district regulations that the MoHA rejected also indicates the high competition amongst 
districts during the decentralisation.  
On the other hand, the effect of the AFTA was insignificant agrees with the Neo-
Marxist theory perspective, which argues that the AFTA will promote within-region 
core peripheral conditions, where core economies exploit peripheral economies through 
  178  
competition in a ‘race to the bottom’. One way to understand the insignificant of AFTA 
is to acknowledge the purpose of the trade integration, which is as a building block 
towards ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) (Tongzon, 2005, p. 145). Consequently, 
intra-trade performance is becomes additional target as the main goal is Southeast Asia 
political and social integration, not only an economically. Thus, AFTA should not be 
measured in terms of trade, but in the amounts of FDI it generates, as a confirmation of 
the ASEAN’s political and economical power (Soesastro, 1991). To sum up, the limited 
effect of the AFTA can be explain by the study of Bowles and MacLean (1996), which 
explores the reason for trade bloc formations and shows that the AFTA should not be 
treated as trade liberalisation per se. 
Finally, historical institutionalism attempted to explore and explain the above-
mentioned econometrics results. The institutional analysis using comparative historical 
institutionalism provides an in-depth explanation of the variations in regional 
development. The study reveals that institutional history and path development strongly 
influence current development progress. Previous institutions determine how local 
institutions respond to institutional changes and adapt to new regional paths. The study 
also shows that state restructuring provides opportunities and path creation for local 
economic development. Decentralisation and trade liberalisation provides access for 
local governments and actors to networks and opportunities to develop local 
endowments. In the case studies, for instance, the path development of Bandung as a 
creative city was pre-determined by previous institutional experiences and capacity as 
the centre of textile manufacturing (Soedarsono, 2009). However, the recent rise of 
young and highly skilled creative professionals has elevated the city as a creative city. 
This idea is a natural development that reflects the integration of historical institutional 
capacities in textile and clothing industries with creative industry development.  
The idea of institutional layering of conversion (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010) only 
appears in regions with exceptional political and social issues. An example is the 
appointment of Sabang city as an FTZ prior to the designation of Batam with the same 
status despite its lack of infrastructure and regulations. 
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8.2 Research Policy Implications and Limitations 
Policy Implications 
The research findings suggest policy implications for Indonesian development 
policies in the decentralisation and trade liberalisation era. First, this thesis argues that 
institutional change at the national level influence regional disparities. National political 
and economic policies determine the level and dynamic of spatial economic 
convergence, as argued by Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire (2004). This thesis shows that 
institutional change in AFTA and decentralisation has influence regional disparities in 
Indonesia over the period under observation between 1993 and 2005. The institutional 
shift of decentralisation and AFTA has different impact on the dynamic of regional 
convergence. In all period, decentralisation has negative effect on regional convergence 
implying that autonomy increase district economic growth. However, the negative 
effect has been reduced in the state restructuring period compared with the centralised 
regime.  
While trade liberalisation in AFTA variable appear to be significant in the pre state 
restructuring period indicating that trade liberalization has higher effect to increase 
regional disparities when there are more policy intervention from the central 
government. While in the state restructuring period, AFTA has insignificant effect on 
regional economic growth implies that shift in Indonesia political system and local 
institutional change has minimise the negative effect. Furthermore, the institutional 
characteristics and trade policies of ASEAN Way has limits the trade integration in the 
post financial crisis period. Hence, although the econometrics analysis shows that 
decentralization variable promotes regional growth and AFTA is insignificant, regional 
convergence is maintained during the period under observation. Econometrics analysis 
justify there are other significant variables that contribute to economic performance. 
Second, spatial development should be a priority of policymaking. Given that path 
dependence and untraded industries are embedded within a specific location, policies 
should embrace these local values and knowledge. The adaptation of policies, such as 
cluster industries and innovation systems, is crucial to developed specialisation and 
competitive advantage. Furthermore, because trade liberalisation effect depends on 
market size, gains also depend on economic structure and flexibility for such 
supranational economic integration. Thus, only regions with high capacity for 
innovative policies and dynamic governance to mobilise local actors have opportunities 
to gain advantage from state restructuring (Uyarra, 2011).  Policies such as  pro-cyclical 
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dimensions of economic growth (Petrakos et al, 2005, p.1853) and place-based policies 
(Barca et al, 2011) emphasis the differences between local endowments, infrastructure, 
cultural, and institutional. By isolating individual regions, the thesis contributes the 
importance of the role of manufacturing industries and labour productivity as argued by 
endogenous growth theory (Lucas, 1986; Romer 1988, 1994). 
Thus, integrating pro-cycle dimension and place-based policies are expected to 
control regional disparities level based on local endowments and institutions in both 
expansions and poor economic periods. This is possible in a country where the nation-
state polices determine national economic growth and regional spatial disparities level 
policies such as Indonesia (Pike et al, 2012). For example, throughout the period of 
observation, the Indonesian manufacturing industry was highly concentrated in Java 
districts and Batam. Hence, balanced development with emphasis on locational and 
geographical policies should take advantage of the implementation of the 
decentralisation and trade liberalisation.  
Furthermore, the thesis also found poor technological level in Indonesia 
manufacturing industries. This shows that research and development (R&D) activities in 
Indonesia are neglected and the level of technology has limited contribution on 
economic growth. Thus, technological innovation policies such as the regional 
innovation system (RIS) and the national research council/Dewan Riset Nasional 
(DRN) are crucial to formulate science and technology (S & T) development strategic 
policies. The S & T law requires the regions established Regional Research 
Council/Dewan Riset Daerah (DRD) to advice and assist regional government in S & T 
and innovation system. Presently, there are nineteen provincial DRD and five DRD-like 
organizations have been established. It is expected that regions with DRD have better 
research and policy agenda to support regional technology progress and growth. This 
policy is coordinated by the DRN to enhance the role of the DRD as an “advisory 
council” for science, technology and innovation policies to support local development 
(Law No. 18/2002).  
Third, the qualitative chapter argued that institutional arrangements determine local 
economic growth. The place-specific policy recognise past institutions and knowledges 
that determines regional regulations as responds to institutional changes at the national 
level. This is explained that at critical juncture, field of choice are widely open and each 
regions have their own institutional change that certain groups or actors gain/lose in the 
negotiation over power access (Bertrand, 2004, p. 24-25). Institutional change in 
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regional development begin with the shift of politico-economic from the centralised to 
decentralisation. The financial crisis as an exogenous factor that triggers the fall of New 
Order regime that considered as the critical juncture. During this juncture, there is 
intensification of decentralisation discourses that shape and influence the type of 
Indonesia decentralisation.  
In addition, the trade liberalisation and decentralisation introduced state (re) scaling 
and multi-level governance as a result of institutional transformation to accommodate 
state reconfiguration, both at high (supranational cooperation) and low geographic 
scales (sub-national authorities) (Coe et al., 2007, p. 137). This research findings are 
contrast with arguments that nation-state has lost its power and become the victim of 
globalisation (Gill, 1993; Ohmae, 1995), and supports literatures on state rescaling 
(Jessop, 1996; Brenner, 2004). Specifically, the centre government-driven policies in 
decentralisation and AFTA reflects the continuity of nation-state in formulating, 
implementing, coordinating and supervising urban polices, despite the national scale of 
politico-economy has been decentralized as argued by Brenner (2004, p.3). In this 
sense, nation-state is reorganized-functionally, institutionally, and geographically-to 
achieve its new role to promote and mediate socio-spatial transformations as states are 
being rescaled upwards, downwards, and outwards. This suggest a making of state 
space that is a qualitatively new, polymorphic, plurilateral institutional geographies that 
no longer overlap evenly converge into a single, dominant, geographical scale or nested 
organisational hierarchy (Ibid, p.67). The central policies of the nation-state remain 
crucial for ensuring balanced development through the creation of development 
opportunities in decentralisation and welfare distribution from trade openness. For 
instance, the introduction of Peraturan Pemerintah No. 19/2010 empowers provincial 
governments to overcome institutional and spatial divergence in decentralised 
Indonesia. 
The research also shows conflicts amongst government agencies, confirming the 
reluctance to accept decentralisation and trade liberalisation, as argued by Sonn (2008). 
Conflicts and power asymmetries between state departments and agencies imply 
evidence of reluctance within the government. The empirical studies provide evidence 
of limited experience and capacity in providing public service. This confirms 
Prudhomme’s (1995) finding that the assumption ‘supply is always perfect’ does not 
apply to public service, especially at governments in developing countries. Overall, the 
study provides a preliminary look into the state (re)scaling and multi-level governance 
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in developing countries to fill the gaps in this field; research focuses mainly on 
developed countries, especially those belonging to the European Union (Brenner, 1999, 
2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Jessop, 2002; MacLeod, 2001). These perspectives 
may be used as bases for studies on political economy and nation-state roles, and how 
these influence development.  
 
Research Limitations 
This thesis acknowledges several technical and conceptual limitations that may have 
influenced the findings and discussion. The lack of available statistical data has limited 
the observation period, and more comprehensive possibilities for economic analysis, 
such as examination of trade data at the local level, are constrained. The statistical data 
also suffers from severe noise that has been recognised by numerous researches. 
Furthermore, the effect of the AFTA should be analysed further with additional 
measurements, such as more data on Form D and non-tariff barriers.  
In addition, the case studies using institutionalist analysis focuses on only two 
regions with similar economic structures; that is, Batam and Bandung, which have 
manufacturing-based economies. To provide broader analysis, future studies requires a 
few selected that represents regions with agricultural- and service-based economies. The 
author also acknowledges that state restructuring has only been implemented for a 
decade; a longer observation period can reveal more findings that are comprehensive 
and provide more opportunities for analysis to understand the influence of state 
restructuring on local path dependence and policies. Another limitation is that the 
research analyses the effect at the district level, which neglects the role of individuals 
and groups in regional development. For instance, studies on the role of universities and 
civic societies may provide additional insights into the variations in regional 
development. Social capital and actors at individual regions offer more opportunities for 
in-depth analysis. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A Tariff Impact 
 
Table A-1 AFTA CEPT Tariff Impact based on total firms in 1993 and 2005 
Total firm  Impact 
1993 2005 
1 0% 3893 3918 
2 <5% 10204 7225 
3 5%+ 4066 9586 
 
 
Table A-2 AFTA CEPT Tariff Impact based on Industry disic 1993 
disic 
Impact 
31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39  
0%   2,256    139   3,893 
<5%  4,258  779     344 10,204 
5%+ 4,823    2,154 1,498  1,912  4,066 
 4,823 4,258 2,256 779 2,154 1,498 139 1,912 344  
 
Table A-3AFTA CEPT Tariff Impact based on Industry disic 2005 
disic 
Impact 
31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39  
0%   1,325  1,523 1,070    3,918 
<5%  4,347  958     1,920 7,225 
5%+ 5,580    2,540   1,466  9,586 
 5,580 4,347 1,325 958 2,540 1,523 1,070 1,466 1,920  
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Table A-4Effects of Trade Tariff 
   Tariff Rate (MFN)  Change in Tariff 
ISI
C Industry 
Tariff 
Rate 
CEPT-
AFTA 
 1991 1995 2001 2005  1991-1995 
1995-
2001 
2001-
2005 
31 Food 5  21 20.99 16.21 6.9  -0.1 -22.8 -57.4 
32 Textile Clothing 5  27.8 20.1 9.39 7.5  -27.7 -53.3 -20.1 
33 Wood 5  24.2 17.95 6.91 5  -25.8 -61.5 -27.6 
34 Paper 5  21.21 10.09 4.03 2.5  -52.4 -60.1 -38.0 
35 Chemicals 2.5  15.6 12.05 6.92 5  -22.8 -42.6 -27.7 
36 Metals 0  23.04 10.62 5.65 5  -53.9 -46.8 -11.5 
37 Machinery 5  11.5 8.08 5.77 5  -29.7 -28.6 -13.3 
38 
Equipment 
and 
Electrical 
5  18.9 14.75 6.72 5  -22.0 -54.4 -25.6 
39 Other 5  32.48 22.11 10.97 10  -31.9 -50.4 -8.8 
 All 5  20.88 15.6 8.44 5.8  -25.3 -45.9 -31.3 
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Appendix B  
Figure B-1 AFTA Tariff Rate 1993-2005 (Standard Deviation) 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation
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Appendix C  
 
Table C-1 Table of Variables 
No Variable Name Purpose Data Source 
1 GRDP pc, initial year (!) To capture initial development level BPS 
2 
Share of people 
ever/being in junior high 
school and vocational  
Capture the effect of literate citizen in economic 
growth BPS 
3 Share of people in urban areas 
Capture the effect share of people in urban areas in 
economic growth BPS 
4 Share of road that are paved 
Capture road effect on availability in economic 
growth  BPS 
5 Borders dummy Capture distance effect to foreign country  Bappenas 
6 Distance between regions Capture distance effect and spatial autocorrelation  Bakosurtanal 
7 Manufacturing GRDP Capture the effect of manufacturing sector on economic growth BPS 
8 Local revenue to GRDP Capture effect of local generate revenue to economic growth BPS 
9 
Transfer fund from the 
Central Government to 
GRDP 
Capture effect of transfer allocation fund to 
economic growth 
WB data. 
MoF 
10 Total development expenditure 
Capture effect of local generate expenditure to 
economic growth 
WB data, 
MoF 
11 AFTA CEPT tariff cut Capture the effect of sectoral AFTA CEPT tariff ASEAN Secretariat 
12 Trade Liberalisation Capture the effect of level of trade openness BPS 
13 Labour productivity (Value Added/Labour) 
Capture the effect of labour productivity to regional 
economic growth BPS 
14 Industry output-gov’t expenditure ratio 
Capture governments’ effectiveness expenditure to 
stimulate industries BPS 
15 
Industry activities in the 
borders  (Industry output 
and borders) 
Capture the impact of industry activities in 
bordering districts BPS, manual 
16 Institutional Governance Capture institutional governance effects KPPOD 
17 Socio-politic Governance Capture local socio-politic effects KPPOD 
18 Infrastructure Governance Capture infrastructure effects KPPOD 
19 Labour and demographic Governance 
Capture local labour and demographic policies 
effects KPPOD 
20 AFTA Impact Capture the impact of AFTA to initial GRDP (AFTA tariff * Initial GRDP) 
ASEAN 
Secretariat  
21 Decentralisation Impact Capture the impact of Decentralisation to initial GRDP (Transfer fund * Initial GRDP) BPS 
22 Java Isolate districts located in Java Island BPS 
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23 Municipality Isolate districts that are municipality (urban activities) BPS 
24 Manufacturing Wage Capture the level of technology advancement and labour skill level BPS 
25 
Change of share of people 
ever/being in junior high 
school 
Capture the effect of growth in a variable BPS 
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Appendix D  
Table D-1 List of Interviewees 
No Institutions Position and responsibility Interview Date 
1. Director of Macro Planning 30 November 2009 
2. 
National Planning Agency Director of Industry, State 
Owned Enterprise, and 
Information Technology 
1 December 
2009 
3. Department of Industry Head of Centre of Regional Trade Cooperation 
2 December 
2009 
4. Department of Transportation General Secretary 
234November 
2009 
5. Department of Trade Deputy of Foreign Trade 4 December 2009 
6. Senior Advisor for the Minister on Governance 
17 November 
2009 
7. 
Department of Home 
Affairs Director of Regional Autonomy 4 December 2009 
8. ASEAN Secretary Head of data, ASEAN FTA secretariat 
2 December 
2009 
9. Director of Promotion 23 November 2009 
10. 
Investment Coordinating 
Board/BKPM 
 Staff 23 November 2009 
11. Chamber of Commerce Advisor 18 November 2009 
12. IDS, Sussex University Economist 9 December 2009 
13. The Asian Foundation Head of Economics Division 23 November 2009 
14. Regional Autonomy Watch/KPPOD Executive Director 
24 November 
2009 
15. APCO worldwide Managing Director 23 November 2009 
16. Multi-donor NGO Advisor 18 November 2009 
17. SOAS Professor of Economics with reference to Asia 
10 December 
2009 
18. 
Regional Planning 
Agency, Province of West 
Java 
Vice Head  13 November 2009 
19. Department of City Planning, City of Bandung Planning Staff 
13 November 
2009 
20. Bandung Institute of Former Dean and Urban 13 November 
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Technology Planning Professor 2009 
21. 
Agency for Industrial and 
Trade, Province of West 
Java 
Chairman 29 November 2009 
22. 
Agency for Promotion and 
Investment, Province of 
Riau 
Head 26 November 2009 
23. 
Agency for Promotion and 
Investment, Province of 
Riau 
Secretary 26 November 2009 
24. 
Agency for Promotion and 
Investment, Province of 
Riau 
Sub-Head of Investment Data 
and Evaluation 
26 November 
2009 
25. Province of Riau Vice Governor 26 November 2009 
26. 
Agency for Planning and 
Environment, Riau Island 
Province 
Former Head  19 November 2009 
27. Batam Polytechnic Director 19 November 2009 
28. Batam Industrial Development Authority Chairman 
20 November 
2009 
29. Batam City Government Vice Mayor 20 November 2009 
30. Riau Island Province Governor 20 November 2009 
 31. Batam Industrial Development Authority Head of Data and Information 
21 November 
2009 
32 Bandung Planning Agency Secretary 15 June 2011 
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Appendix E Research Questionnaire (English) 
 
Respondents Data 
Name   :……………..……….. 
Position  :……………..……….. 
Institution  : ……………..……….. 
Interview Details : ……………..……….. 
 
a. Date  : ……………..……….. 
b. Time  : ……………..……….. 
c. Place  : ……………..……….. 
 
Abstract 
 
This study aims to analyze the impacts of decentralisation and ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA) on economic disparities across various Indonesian regions. First, using 
econometrics analysis, the research examines the impact of decentralisation and trade 
liberalisation has on Indonesian regional disparities. Second, employing qualitative 
methods, this study analyzes how trade openness and decentralisation impact an 
individual region’s growth and welfare. Different local endowments and multi-level 
governance will determine various local policies and diverse economic growth among 
regions.  
 
 
Survey Purposes 
This quantitative chapter follows the quantitative chapters earlier in this doctorate 
thesis. This chapter is conducted by interviews with experts and decision-makers in 
Jakarta and visits to several regions in Indonesia.  
This qualitative chapter studies how institutional arrangements at the central and 
regional levels local determine development. The survey is conducted with semi 
structured and in depth interviews, which this questioner is used as interview guidelines 
and the interview is adjusted to the respondent’s expertise and experiences.  
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POLITIC AND ECONOMY 
1. What were the main arguments being made for and against decentralisation in 
Indonesia?  
2. Who, which government ministries, what political parties, industry groups or 
other interests were arguing for and against? Why was this do you think?  
3. What have been the main arguments being made for and against ASEAN and 
free trade in Indonesia?  
4. Who, which government ministries, what political parties, industry groups or 
other interests were arguing for and against? Why was this do you think? 
5. Who, what government ministries, political parties, industry groups or other 
interests have been most concerned about economic disparities in Indonesia? 
Why is this do you think?  
6. What are their opinions regarding the causes of disparities and how does this 
impacts the progress of devolution and trade liberalisation nationally / in the 
region?  
7. What has been your/your organisation’s position with regard to decentralisation 
and ASEAN free trade and their potential benefits and drawbacks for Indonesia?  
 
IMPACT OF DECENTRALISATION 
8. What do you think have been the main impacts of decentralisation on Indonesia? 
9. How would you describe the relationship between central government and 
provinces and districts before and after decentralisation? 
 
IMPACT OF ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA 
10. What do you think have been the main impacts of ASEAN and free trade on 
Indonesia? 
11. How would you describe the Indonesia’s national bargaining position in trade 
negotiations/agreements prior to and after the ASEAN free trade agreement? 
12. What if any role does national/central government play in shaping the impacts of 
free trade on regions? What role could, or ought it to play? 
 
 
 
 
  192 
IMPACT OF LOCAL ENDOWMENTS AND MANUFACTURES 
13. How important each of the following economic indicators is in accounting for 
the impact of devolution and AFTA on manufacturing at a local level in 
Indonesia? 
o Proportion of employments  
o Population growth 
o Human Capital (adult literacy rate) 
o Infrastructure (road accessibility) 
o Technology availability (electricity and communication) 
o Local revenue (PAD) and transfer allocation fund (DAU) 
o Local Government psychical capital 
o Physical distance between regions that influence economic linkages 
o Export-import rate within ASEAN 
o AFTA tariff (CEPT) 
14. Would you say there is a strong linkage between manufacturing performances 
and a region’s economic development?  
15. Since Decentralisation and AFTA implementation, does manufacturing sector 
change significantly? In terms of new industries, rationalisation or shift of 
business, new jobs generated, etc 
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Appendix F Research Questionnaire (Indonesian) 
 
 
 
Data Responden 
Nama   :……………..……….. 
Posisi   :……………..……….. 
Lembaga  : ……………..……….. 
Keterangan  : ……………..……….. 
 
a. Tanggal  : ……………..……….. 
b. Waktu  : ……………..……….. 
c. Lokasi  : ……………..……….. 
 
 
Abstrak 
Studi ini bertujuan untuk menganalisa dampak otonomi daerah dan perjanjian 
perdagangan bebas ASEAN (ASEAN FTA) terhadap berbagai disparitas pembangunan 
wilayah di Indonesia. Kajian ini terdiri atas dua bagian utama yakni analisa ekonometrik 
dan analisa kualitatif. Pertama, menggunakan analisa ekonometrik, riset ini 
menggunakan data statistik dan model ekonomi untuk mengamati dampak otonomi 
daerah dan perdagangan bebas terhadap ketimpangan wilayah. Kedua, menggunakan 
analisa kualitatif, riset ini mengkaji dampak perbedaan sumber daya dan multi-tingkat 
tata kelola (multi-level governance) dalam perumusan kebijakan pembangunan dan 
pertumbuhan ekonomi antar wilayah di Indonesia.  
 
 
 
Maksud survey 
Setelah bagian kuantitatif dilaksanakan, riset doctoral ini melaksanakan riset kualitatif. 
Riset kualitatif dilakukan dengan metode interview para ahli dan pembuat kebijakan 
serta observasi langsung ke beberapa daerah.  
Adapun tema riset dalam penelitian kualitatif ini adalah bagaimana keunikan dan 
perbedaan tata-kelola (governance) pada tiap daerah mempengaruhi kebijakan 
pembangunan dan pertumbuhan ekonomi masing-masing daerah. Survey akan 
dilaksanakan dengan bentuk semi structured dan in-depth interview sehingga 
pertanyaan-pertanyaan berikut hanya sebagai panduan wawancara dan diskusi akan 
disesuaikan dengan pengalaman dan bidang keahlian narasumber.   
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POLITIK DAN EKONOMI 
1. Menurut pengetahuan saudara, apa sajakah alasan dibutuhkannya dan 
ditentangnya otonomi daerah di Indonesia? 
2. Berdasarkan pengalaman/pengetahuan saudara, bisakah dijelaskan pihak-pihak 
mana sajakah yang mendukung atau menentang otonomi daearah? Mengapa?  
3. Menurut pengetahuan saudara, apa sajakah alasan dibutuhkannya dan 
ditentangnya perdagangan bebas (khususnya AFTA) di Indonesia? 
4. Berdasarkan pengalaman/pengetahuan saudara, bisakah dijelaskan pihak-pihak 
mana sajakah yang mendukung atau menentang perdagangan bebas (khususnya 
AFTA)? Mengapa?  
5. Berdasarkan pengalaman/pengetahuan saudara, bisakah dijelaskan pihak-pihak 
mana sajakah yang mendukung pertumbuhan berimbang antar daerah?  
6. Bagaimana pendapat mereka mengenai ketimpangan wilayah dan apa 
dampaknya terhadap kinerja otonomi daerah dan perdagangan bebas (khususnya 
AFTA)? 
7. Berdasarkan pengalaman/pengetahuan saudara, bisakah dijelaskan posisi 
institusi anda terhadap otonomi daerah dan perdagangan bebas (khususnya 
AFTA) dan bagaimana dampak kedua hal ini terhadap Indonesia? Mengapa?  
 
DAMPAK OTONOMI DAERAH 
8. Berdasarkan pengalaman/pengetahuan saudara, bisakah dijelaskan dampak 
otonomi daerah terhadap Indonesia?  
9. Bagaimana anda menggambarkan hubungan pemerintah pusat dan pemerintah 
daerah sebelum dan sesudah otonomi daerah? 
 
DAMPAK PERDANGANGAN BEBAS ASEAN 
10. Berdasarkan pengalaman/pengetahuan saudara, bisakah dijelaskan dampak 
perdagangan bebas terhadap Indonesia? 
11. Berdasarkan pengalaman/pengetahuan saudara, bisakah dijelaskan posisi 
Indonesia dalam pelaksanaan perdagangan bebas?  
12. Berdasarkan pengalaman/pengetahuan saudara, bisakah dijelaskan peran 
pemerintah pusat pada pelaksanaan perdagangan bebas di daerah?  
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DAMPAK KEMAMPUAN LOKAL DAERAH DAN INDUSTRI MANUFAKTUR 
13. Bagaimana pendapat saudara mengenai tingkat kepentingan variabel-variabel 
industri dibawah ini, terhadap kinerja desentralisasi dan perdagangan bebas? 
o Proporsi tenaga kerja 
o Tingkat baca-tulis  
o Infrastruktur 
o Ketersediaan Teknologi 
o Kapasitas pemerintah daerah dalam PAD dan DAU 
o Modal fisik pemerintah daerah 
o Keterkaitan ekonomi antar-daerah 
o Export-impor antar negara ASEAN 
o Tarif ASEAN FTA 
14. Menurut saudara, apakah terdapat keterkaitan erat antara kinerja industri dengan 
pertumbuhan ekonomi daerah dimana industri tersebut berlokasi? 
15. Berdasarkan pengalaman/pengetahuan saudara, apakah terjadi perubahan 
signifikan terhadap kinerja industri sejak pelaksanaan otonomi daerah dan 
perdagangan bebas?  
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